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Śūnyatā is not regarded as a religious experience, nor is it regarded as a non-theistic mystical
experience. Śūnyatā is neither religious nor secular. It is not particularly sacred; neither is it
profane. It is what it is. Śūnyatā is the first clear thinking and conclusion about reality in the
history of the human mind.
-Chögyam Trungpa

…[W]e leave behind us all our own notions of the divine. We call a halt to the
activities of our minds and, to the extent that is proper, we approach the ray
which transcends being. Here, in a manner no words can describe, pre-existed
all the goals of all knowledge and it is of a kind that neither intelligence nor
speech can lay hold of… nor can it at all be contemplated since it surpasses
everything…
-Pseudo-Dionysius
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ABSTRACT
Christopher Claude Huck
THE EMPTY-SUBLIME:
From ‘Je ne sais quoi’ to Śūnyatā

Barnett Newman’s essay “The Sublime Is Now” (1948) animated fresh interest in the
topic of the sublime within the coterie of Abstract-Expressionist painters in New York in the late
1940s and early 1950s. French and British philosophers, perhaps most notably Jean-François
Lyotard and Paul Crowther, took up the subject anew in the 1980s and 1990s. Guy Sircello and
Jane Forsey shed new light onto troubling problematics of the historical sublime project shortly
thereafter. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that further interrogation of the sublime--which has
bedeviled philosophers for many centuries--is warranted. The subject has become no clearer
since Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux published his seventeenth-century French translation and
preface to Longinus’ first-century CE rhetorical treatise, Περὶ Ὕψους, or On The Sublime.

What is the sublime? What is happening in the ‘sublime moment’ that has provoked so
much interest in artists and philosophers? When we interrogate the sublime object and its affect,
what is it that we find? Is the sublime a quality inherent in certain classes of phenomena? What is
the nature of the feelings experienced when the ‘sublime’ is encountered? How are they different
from other, more quotidian, experiences? These are a few of the questions that guide my inquiry.
In this dissertation, I argue that the historical proposition of the sublime is burdened by
several not-insignificant epistemological and ontological problems, which reveal unresolvable

vii
incoherencies and contradictions. Working within a methodology of dialectic inclusivity, the
reach of this disquisition extends into the Madhyamaka project of the second-century CE Indian
philosopher Nāgārjuna, revealing an elegant elucidation of the ‘sublime’ through the view of
emptiness, or śūnyatā.

KEYWORDS: Sublime; Emptiness; Śūnyatā; Yogācāra-Madhyamaka; Aesthetics; Wolfgang
Laib; Agnes Martin; Robert Rauschenberg.
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1
INTRODUCTION
The Empty-Sublime:
From ‘Je ne sais quoi’ to Śūnyatā1

Few aesthetic concepts have gripped artists as much as the sublime, yet its meaning and
relevance to the quotidian details of life continue to be debated. Longinus, a Greek or Roman
critic and philosopher from the first or third century CE, first engaged the subject of the sublime
to elucidate an earlier, now-lost treatise by Caecilius from the first century BCE, in order to set
the record straight. Longinus writes in his treatise that: “For by some innate power the true
sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy…”
(Longinus §7, 120). And yet, this ‘innate power [of] the true sublime’ is territory which the
ancients had a hard time mapping. And that difficulty persists into the present day. “Longinus is
a key to understanding this inheritance—though hardly the solution to the problem”, James
Porter points out (Porter 2016b: xviii). The wholly unambiguous problem begging a solution can
be stated simply: What, exactly, is the sublime? And why has the sublime bedeviled philosophers
and critics alike for more than two thousand years?
I argue that the problem stems from the fact that the normative concept of ‘the sublime’
suffers from inherent and unresolvable ontological contradictions and epistemological
incoherencies, beginning with Boileau’s hermeneutic, and continuing on for the intervening three
and a half centuries. Simply stated, it is impossible to formulate a coherent theory and
explication of the sublime when one approaches the subject by way of the usual western
philosophical scaffolding. It is on this insubstantial terrain of incoherencies, contradictions, and
fleeting glimpses of a state of mind beyond reason, beyond thought and beyond imagination—a
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phenomenological experience most commonly subsumed in western thought by the surrender to
an allegiance to the concept of a divine Absolute—that my thesis of the empty-sublime is
launched, employing what I call a dialectic of inclusivity. Through this dialectical method of
inclusivity, I examine the western philosophical view of the sublime in tandem with another,
rigorously developed system of elegant thought heretofore excluded from the conversation of the
western Academy. This excluded philosophic project includes a rigorous examination,
archeological analysis, and subsequent explication of that very state of mind we refer to when we
talk about ‘the sublime moment’. This is the philosophy of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka Mahāyāna
Buddhism, which developed and flourished in India during the first millennium CE, during
which time it also spread to China, Mongolia, Tibet, Japan, and Korea. To employ a dialectic of
inclusivity demands that we embrace the breadth and depth of philosophical thought developed
throughout the entire recorded history of humankind, venturing well beyond the borders of
western Europe. In the investigation of the sublime which follows, I draw not only on 2,500
years of western philosophical developments, but also the extensive and extraordinarily fruitful
Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Tibetan philosophical canon through this dialectical method. This
is not merely another exercise in ‘comparative philosophy’. The results carry profound and vast
implications that highlight the boundless well of inspiration which artists of all stripes access.
This will become apparent as we look at ‘the sublime’ artistic praxes of three contemporary
visual artists when seen through the lens of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy.
What follows, then, is a critique in the Kantian sense, which seeks to establish and
explain the “conditions of possibility of experience, knowledge, morality, and judgment”
(Cazeaux: 721). That is to say, this is an interrogation of the ideas, phenomenological
experiences, and misapprehensions of the sublime moment. But unlike Kant who, in the Critique
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of Pure Reason (1783), appraises the scope and limits of our cognitive powers [Erkenntnis],2 and
argues for a postulation of the impossibility of knowledge or reason extending beyond the limits
of experience,3 I am arguing that the sublime, when rightly understood as an experience of
emptiness or śūnyatā, illuminates the boundless, cognizant nature of our mind, which is empty of
an individuated, reified essence, yet is lucid and clear. And further, that it is from this space of
emptiness, or lucid clarity—which Kant interprets as ‘genius’ [Genie], or originality4—that all
genuine sublime artistic praxis springs.
In Chapter One, I set the stage for this project through a condensed survey of the sublime
as it has appeared in western philosophic criticism from antiquity to postmodernity. I first turn to
Longinus (first- or third-century CE), and briefly investigate the source of all the confusion about
this singular experience, viz., his rhetorical treatise Περὶ Ὕψους [Peri hupsous, or hypsous (On
Height, or On the Sublime)]. About this treatise, Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, in the Préface to his
French translation of 1674 (revised in 1683 and 1701), writes that
It must be observed then that by the Sublime [Longinus] does not mean what the
Orators call the Sublime Stile [sic], but something extraordinary and marvellous
that Strikes us in a Discourse and makes it elevate, ravish and transport us. The
Sublime Stile requires always great Words, but the Sublime may be found in a
Thought only, or in a Figure or Turn of Expression. A Thing may be in the Sublime
Stile, and yet not be Sublime… (Boileau/Clewis: 59.)
While Longinus dwells on the sublimity of rhetoric and oratory, Boileau argues that Longinus’
sublime extends far beyond these two categories, placing him squarely within the ranks of the
most esteemed philosophers, e.g., Socrates and Cato. Boileau goes on to assert that “the
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character of an upright man appears everywhere in [the Treatise], and there is something about
[Longinus’] sentiments that testifies not only to a sublime understanding, but to a mind of rare
nobility” (58). Boileau’s Préface served to elevate Longinus’ On The Sublime to a work of
critical philosophy.
I next examine James Porter’s argument that the concept of the sublime does not trace its
roots to Longinus early in the current era, nor to the Sicilian critic and rhetorician, Caecilius of
Caleacte, and his now-lost manuscript from the first century BCE, thought also to be titled On
The Sublime. Instead, Porter argues that there is ample enough evidence of a genealogy of poets,
writers, critics, philosophers, and dramatists of both early and late antiquity who repeatedly
invoked the sublime in their varying works from at least the time of Homer, without ever using
the word Ὕψους, hupsos, or (the Latin) sublimitas, as a signifier of this experience. Porter avers
that “Longinus locates the sublime in an astonishing range of areas, from thought to one’s own
nature to political rhetoric, literature, silence, the emotions, statues and paintings, the gods,
natural phenomena, and even natural inquiry. The very promiscuousness of the sublime in
Longinus,” Porter continues, “its sheer applicability—tells us much more about its nature than
any single definition ever could” (Porter 2016a: xviii). The conceptual boundaries of the
sublime, both inside and outside aesthetic inquiry, were completely permeable for Longinus and
his predecessors. So important was the assumption of the sublime as a “category of aesthetic and
non-aesthetic judgment, experience, and value”, that Greek and Roman thought from earliest
antiquity was continuously forged from this idea (xix).
I then take a giant step from late antiquity to the eighteenth century, to discuss Immanuel
Kant and his Analytic of the Sublime, from the Third critique (1790). Kant’s treatise is so seminal
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historically that it is wholly unavoidable. Samuel Monk, in his important hermeneutic on the
sublime from 1935,5 explains that
Kant’s Critique of Judgment is the great document that coördinates and synthesizes
the æsthetic concepts which had been current throughout the eighteenth century. It
was Kant who took the isolated discoveries of earlier thinkers and welded their
fragmentary æsthetic together so as to create a truly philosophical system, and who,
moreover, found a place in his larger system for æsthetic theories. (Monk: 4)
For Kant, the aesthetic experience yields a disinterested pleasure in both the sublime and the
beautiful, free of cognition produced by or through conceptual understanding; it does not seek to
discover any knowledge of the object. But whereas the beautiful is concerned with forms, the
sublime “is to be found in objects that are limitless, that have no form, though they are always
accompanied with a ‘super-thought’ of totality” (4). When defining the sublime, Kant posits an
opposition between our faculties of knowledge and cognition, and an object. The beautiful, on
the other hand, is comprehended when an object and our faculties of knowledge and cognition
are in complete harmony. Monk concludes that “it is upon this lack of harmony between object
and subject, upon the futile effort on the part of the imagination to grasp and to represent the
formless, that Kant erects his theory of the sublime” (7). I will have more to say about Kant’s
flawed construct of the sublime experience, and its ramifications, later in this project.
From here I take another giant step into the 1940s, where I explore the engagement of the
painter, sculptor, and thinker, Barnett Newman (1905-1970), with the American, post-war,
modern aesthetic sublime, first articulated in his essay, “The Sublime is Now”. Published in late
1948, Newman’s declaration that the sublime American aesthetic moment had arrived appeared
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some thirteen years after Monk’s study of critical theories of the sublime in eighteenth-century
England. However, it is unknown whether Newman ever read Monk’s influential monograph, or
what may have kindled Newman’s abiding interest in the sublime. Nevertheless, Newman argues
for a radical, new tendency in the work of American avant-garde abstract-expressionists, which
he defined in terms of an axiom that embodied an aesthetic sublime; a tendency wholly divorced
from earlier hegemonic protocols obtaining from the dominant Parisian ‘school’ which Newman
hoped the Americans would eclipse. However, Newman gets the sublime wrong, and conflates
aesthetic sublimity with an absence of figuration combined with a grandness of scale, which in
turn emphasizes the self-consciousness of the viewer standing before a large canvas.
American artists of the 1940s had finally freed themselves, Newman contends, from the
“props and crutches that evoke associations with outmoded images, both sublime and
beautiful…”. Newman writes emphatically that: “Instead of making cathedrals out of Christ,
man, or ‘life’, we are making it out of ourselves, out of our own feelings. The image we produce
is the self-evident one of revelation, real and concrete, that can be understood by anyone who
will look at it without the nostalgic glasses of history” (Newman/Clewis: 244-45, original
emphasis). Curiously, the subsequent renaissance in interest in the aesthetic sublime during the
1980s and 1990s seems to have been influenced more by Newman’s exuberance than by Monk’s
seminal, scholarly work from a few years earlier.
Moving from the mid-twentieth century artistic avant-garde, I make the more modest step
to the postmodern period, with a brief look at Paul Crowther’s (1989, 2013) hermeneutic of the
Kantian sublime and its implications for art and morality. However, Crowther spends a lot of
print examining Kant’s explanations of the (mathematical) sublime relative to the grand and
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overwhelming scale of phenomena which gives rise to an experience of the sublime moment. In
the conclusion to his more recent work, The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the AvantGarde (2013), Crowther turns his attention to Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1950-1), and
Rothko's The Rothko Chapel in Houston (1971). In these works, Crowther finds that “we are
dealing with artefacts containing perceptual cues suggestive of imaginatively overwhelming
structures and/or forces, but expressed through works which comprehend and, in a sense, contain
these forces” (Crowther 2013: 197). Crowther continues, asserting that “whilst these may evoke
a sense of rational thought’s transcendence of the limitations of sensibility as such, they can also
suggest a more distinctively artistic variety of the sublime…[because] we know that this
[representation of unimaginable vastness and/or power] has been comprehended and expressed
in an artwork” (197, original emphasis). In sum, Crowther argues that “the Kantian aesthetic
presents both a promise and a challenge. The promise is its searching justification of higher
cultural phenomena; the challenge is to think this through critically in relation to specific cultural
practices so as to preserve and enhance that which is of enduring significance to them” (201).
Crowther here seems to want to wrap up the sublime into a neat package, i.e. that of a defined
work of art. And further, Crowther thinks that size does, indeed, matter when speaking of the
sublime. But as we will see as we proceed, my argument is that, by employing a dialectic of
inclusivity through which we examine the thesis of the sublime from a scaffolding altogether
different from what Crowther builds upon here, viz. the view of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka
project of emptiness, we will determine if Kant’s proposition of the sublime is tenable.
And finally, the chapter concludes with a wide-ranging survey of critiques of Kantian,
modern, and postmodern aesthetic sublime movements and players by the eminent art critic and
philosopher, Arthur Danto.
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Chapter Two will importantly and centrally offer ‘some thoughts on the sublime and the
question: Is a theory of the sublime possible?’. I begin with a close reading of Guy Sircello’s
paradigm-shifting argument that the construct of the theory of the sublime, as interpreted and
understood since the appearance of Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux’s seventeenth-century French
translation of Longinus’ treatise, has been riven with epistemological incoherencies and
ontological contradictions from the start, and which, in sum, render any normative theory of the
sublime epistemologically and ontologically impossible. Despite Sircello’s rigorous assertion, he
himself equivocates at the final moment, suggesting that there must be a way to save the sublime
that he does not recognize.
Jane Forsey, writing some thirteen years later, disagrees, and argues that the sublime, in
fact, cannot be saved; Sircello’s arguments do hold up to scrutiny. But that is not the end of it.
Forsey runs into opposition of varying degrees from six scholars, whose responses are published
in a slim volume entitled The Possibility of the Sublime, which is precisely what the contributors
argue. Forsey’s two most interesting antagonists, Joseph Margolis and Jennifer McMahon,
launch particularly interesting refutations which I examine. These discussions spill over into the
subject of the aesthetic, which lead me into surveying this multifaceted area as it relates to the
sublime through the words of Baumgarten (who coined the term), Kant, Schopenhauer, Dickie,
and Guyer. I then briefly explore the aesthetic experience as interpreted by Bell, Shelley, and
Carroll.
In Chapter Three I lay out the foundation for my dialectical argument and begin to turn to
this work’s positive innovation. I contend that the experience of the sublime—which I
established in Chapter Two as being an incoherent and contradictory principle—is, when
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construed more carefully, an experience of emptiness, or śūnyatā, as explicated in the YogācāraMadhyamka philosophical project of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The question then follows: What is
emptiness? I begin my interrogation of that question by first turning to the western canon and
Martin Heidegger who, in his inaugural lecture to the faculties of Universität Freiburg in July of
1929, a lecture entitled What Is Metaphysics? (Was ist Metaphysik?), investigates das Nichts, or
‘the nothing’. I survey his several conclusions from this early work, which examines, and
answers, the question: “How is it with the nothing?” (Heidegger 2008: 96). The point of this
exercise is to determine if Heidegger’s work might be useful in fleshing out the experience of
emptiness. Suffice it to say that, despite Heidegger’s curiosity about East and South Asian
thought, it falls short. In brief, Heidegger asserts: “For the nothing [das Nichts] is the negation of
the totality of beings; it is nonbeing pure and simple” (97). ‘Nonbeing’, the negation of being, is
not what we are looking for. Fifteen years later, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote about le néant, or
‘nothingness’, in his magnum opus, Being and Nothingness (1943), and I examine this
philosopher’s premise of nothingness. Sartre, however, is no more insightful in this search than
is Heidegger. Neither Heidegger nor Sartre offer us any useful explanation of what the
experience of true emptiness might be, short of total negation which, as I explain, is a flawed
interpretation of emptiness. Western thinkers have been forever unable to make sense of the
sublime due to the fact that the very nature of the discourse is rife with incoherencies and
contradictions. By consequence, I turn to the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka philosophical project
which situates and explains emptiness not as negation, but as the lucid-cognizant nature of mind
and the vivid yet essencelessness nature of all phenomena. And contra Kant, I argue that the
‘thing-in-itself’ is, indeed, in some sense of the word, knowable.
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More recently, several western philosophers and writers have addressed this field of
inquiry in ways which, unfortunately, fail to add clarity to the debate about the sublime. Stephen
Batchelor, a contemporary interpreter of Buddhist thought and practice, principally of the
Theravāda tradition, writes on the ‘everyday sublime’ in an essay from 2014, which is
particularly unhelpful. And Timothy Morton writes a wide-ranging essay on “Hegel and
Buddhism” (2002), which does little to advance the debate around the contribution Buddhist
philosophy can offer to the dialectic of Buddhist and Hegelian thinking. These contemporary
interpretations are examples of suppositions which get the understanding of emptiness
regrettably wrong.
To steer the discussion into more profitable waters, I next consider an early text in the
Mahāyāna Buddhist Prajñāpāramitāsūtras corpus, viz. the Sūtra of the Heart of Prajñāpāramitā,
which comes down to us of uncertain provenance. This pithy Sūtra, commonly known as the
Heart Sūtra, condenses the essence of the Mahāyāna Buddhist project into thirty-six lines. At the
very heart of this project is the postulation of emptiness, śūnyatā. An examination of several
verses of the Sūtra then ensues.
I next turn to the great Indian scholar, philosopher, and meditation adept, Nāgārjuna
(second-century CE), who wrote what has become the foundational text of the Madhyamaka
Buddhist projectum, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, or The Root Stanzas on the Middle Way. This
remarkable and demanding philosophical work, written in negative dialectic method, comprises
twenty-seven chapters, and runs to some 107 pages of English text. As Wulstan Fletcher
explains, the Madhyamaka, or Middle Way, propounded by Nāgārjuna is not “a philosophical
explanation of Reality, if by that is meant some remote transcendental absolute. The purpose of
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Madhyamaka is simply to elucidate the nature of phenomena [dharmas]: the things and
situations that make up the world of our experience”.6 The Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (MMK)
argues that interdependent coörigination is homologous with emptiness, i.e. “the absence of
intrinsic being in things as they appear” (Fletcher: xix). Therefore, “if phenomena are a [mere]
tissue of interdependent relations, they cannot be the clear-cut, isolated, really existing entities
that they seem to be” (ibid.). And when the ‘tissue’ of reality dissolves, there is a gap, or
experience of emptiness or, we could say, sublimity. This is the quintessence of the
Madhyamaka view. Thus, Nāgārjuna argues that the Middle Way is unencumbered by either
extreme of nihilism or eternalism by virtue of this view of interdependent coörigination, being
the unity of appearance(s) and emptiness. It is free of eternalism because it does not regard
phenomena as possessing any true existence or concomitant true nature when, in fact, there is
nothing of the kind. And it is free of nihilism because it does not deny that things appear—
remarkably, spontaneously, and vividly—due to the confluence of causes and conditions, and
which ceaselessly constitute the display of this insubstantial world. To further elucidate these
points, I focus on, and discuss, three chapters of the MMK which are central to our discussion
here: Chapters 1, 24, and 25.
Moving on to Chapter Four, I begin by recalling the image of Melville’s great leviathan
Moby-Dick, with eyes set far back on either side of its massive head, which makes for a natural
dialectical view of its world. On this metaphorical model of a dialectic of inclusivity (i.e. the two
opposing eyes of a Sperm Whale), I explore the distinctions between western philosophical
formulations of the sublime and the Madhyamaka, or Middle Way, view. I first survey the
thoughts of the now-obscure British critic and theist John Dennis (1657-1734), and his early reformulation, or ‘refinement’ in theistic terms one could say, of Boileau’s and Longinus’ sublime,
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which adds, for the first time in the history of the notion of the sublime, an element of divinelyinspired enthusiastic passion/terror to the mix. Arthur Danto notes that “the sublime was in fact
associated with fear in Burke’s writing, and in some degree in Kant’s, but mostly Kant treated it
with reference to such feelings as wonderment and awe…” (Danto 2019: 296); while all the time
having no idea what they were looking at as experience. And these experiences of awe, of
wonderment, were inevitably induced through an immensity of scale which played a defining
role in ‘the sublime’. But, avers Danto, “the idea of sublimity must entail something more than
great size. So it is easy to understand why Kant—or Burke—felt that he had to add the sense of
terror as the further condition” (299). And of course, Dennis, with his earlier addition of terror to
the recipe of the sublime, prefigured Burke by more than a half century, and, in the case of Kant,
much longer; Burke and Kant were following along a path which Dennis had already blazed. The
other side of this dialectic of sublime emptiness is filled by Nāgārjuna and his Madhyamaka
philosophical argument for the complete openness and lucidity of emptiness, absent passion or
terror.
I next consider the dialectic of the current neuroscientific view of consciousness qua
experience, on the one hand, and the empty, or Madhyamaka, view of consciousness, on the
other. Christof Koch, a contemporary neuroscientist from the US, argues in his most recent
monograph that consciousness is experience, and nothing more nor less. Koch’s argument can be
fairly summarized by the following excerpt which he quotes from Saint Augustine of Hippo’s
City of God, Book 11, chapter 26:
But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain
that I am, and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at
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all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived?
For if I am deceived, I am (si enim fallor, sum). For he who is not, cannot be
deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am
deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am if I
am deceived. (Koch: 175)
The Madhyamaka view disputes this thesis, arguing that nowhere in Augustine’s argumentation
is there any understanding or awareness of the ‘I am’ who posits the assertion. Who is this ‘I’?
Where does s/he exist? What is the nature of this ‘I’? And if consciousness is no other than
experience, as Koch argues, who is it that experiences? What is the nature of the experiencer?
The preëminent Tibetan scholar and meditation master, Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso, demolishes
Koch’s argument, stating unequivocally that
[we do] not accept the view that consciousness is truly existent. The Madhyamaka
view [is] that [consciousness] is non-arising and without self-nature…free from
conceptual contrivance. [Furthermore,] the concept of a stream of consciousness
consisting of moments having knowing and known aspects [is] a misunderstanding
of reality. It is a false or deceptive ‘reality’ or ‘truth’, or ‘saṃvṛti’, which means
‘covered’ or ‘concealed’; the Tibetan translation, ‘kun rdzob’, means ‘dressed up’
or ‘blown up’ to give a false appearance. Ultimately, [this seeming reality] is not
true at all. (Gyamtso 1986: 77)
I then take another step to explore the dialectic of Kant and his Transcendental Illusion
vis-à-vis Nāgārjuna’s précis for non-conceptual mind. The notion of a ‘transcendental illusion’,
i.e. ‘the impression, and therefore the constant temptation to think that thought is able to lay hold
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of perfectly perspectiveless objectivity’, was a portentous, yet undoubtedly troubling discovery
on Kant’s part; however, he apparently never fully understood its significance, and the direction
in which it pointed, viz. to non-conceptual mind, the nature of which is “the inseparability of
[mind’s] open expanse and awareness (Tib. dbyings rig dbyer med), [which] is lucid-empty”,
quoting Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso (Brunnhölzl 2009: 108). The discovery of the reasoning
mind’s limits and limitations, and Kant’s subsequent retreat from the horizon opening before
him, precludes for Kant any possibility of jñāna,7 the “nondual wisdom in which [things as they
are] is known directly without the mediation of thought. He failed, in other words, to appreciate
the immense spiritual significance of his discovery and, as [T.R.V.] Murti aptly observes, ended
by putting it to a trivial purpose” (Candrakīrti: 25).8 Wisdom, or highest knowledge absent the
mediation of thought, or the conceptual, reasoning mind, was seemingly beyond the realm of the
possible for Kant, as it remains for the vast preponderance of Western scientists and
philosophers. Kant’s discovery of the ‘transcendental illusion’ took him to a threshold of infinite
disclosure, but he never stepped over that threshold, beyond which lies a ‘wholly new dimension
[of] the mind itself’, viz., its lucid open-emptiness. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the
repercussions of crossing that threshold might well have resulted in “the entire worldview of
common sense [and reason] to be shown to be completely incoherent” (16), as I have shown to be
the case with the modern project of the sublime when subjected to a close and thorough
examination.
Section VII of this chapter addresses the nihilism / eternalism dialectic, charting a course
to the inclusive view of the Middle Way, beyond the two extremes; a view beyond any
bifurcation. The belief in a nihilistic non-existence, or nothingness, can be traced to the
philosophical view that if one holds no belief in anything at all, one is, by turn, free from
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everything; free certainly from the notion of its apparent opposite, eternalism, with its attendant
binaries, i.e. transcendence and immanence. However, in holding to such a view, we wind up
theorizing everything, every experience. And we convince ourselves that if we experience our
life as an expression of nothingness, holding to the denial of eternalism, then our existential
problems and concerns will dissolve and evaporate into this nothingness. Which they never do.
On the other hand, holding to the position of, or the belief in, the eternal and ever-lasting is
characteristic of the theistic project. When we hue to a view which holds there is an eternity
stretching out before us, we then set ourselves to a scheme of constantly striving to maintain
ourselves, thereby extending our mortal being, our self, on and on into this eternity.
Paradoxically, despite this belief (or hope) in an eternity, we still, inevitably, harbour a deep fear
of our own death. And because of this fear of death, “we begin to look outward from ourselves to
others, out into the world, and grasp at the world as a way of maintaining ourselves” (Trungpa
2014: 406). Our belief in the eternal becomes more of a hope born of desperation than any kind of

certainty born from experience.
The final section of this chapter discusses the nature of phenomena and our experience of
phenomena, which seem to lie at the very heart of the sublime / emptiness dialectic we have been
discussing here. Boileau writes that the Longinian sublime is “something extraordinary and
marvelous that Strikes us…”, obviously referring to the, or a, (sublime) phenomenon which we
suddenly and unexpectedly encounter, and which evokes an experience of a ‘sublime moment’.
For Dennis, there is the transcendent9 phenomenon of “the wrath and vengeance of an angry
god”, which is perceived and experienced as ‘real’ and present, which brings us up short, and
stops our (discursive, ever-thinking) mind. Kant’s narrative on phenomena, in the “Analytic of
Teleological Judgment” in his third Critique, seems to come remarkably close, in certain
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respects, to the Madhyamaka view of the manifold vividness and emptiness of phenomena. Kant
writes: “…it is at least possible to regard the material world as a mere phenomenon, and to think
something which is not a phenomenon, namely a thing-in-itself [Ding an sich], as its substrate. In
this way a supersensible real ground, although for us unknowable, would be procured for nature,
and for the nature of which we ourselves form part” (CJ §409, 237). Here Kant walks right up to
the threshold, but cannot see the empty nature of all phenomena, of which we ourselves are an
inextricable part, that unfolds before him. This section then goes on to delve more deeply into the
nature of phenomena and our experience of ‘it’.
In the final chapter, Chapter Five, I begin with a review of the significant part which the
painters Mark Rothko and Barnett Newman played in the reintroduction of the notion of the
aesthetic sublime into the world of young New York artists of the 1940s. Both were key figures
in the Abstract Expressionist movement of the 1940s and early 1950s, and were among the early
members of the group that adopted ‘the sublime’ as a central issue defining their art.
Turning to an examination of the artistic praxes of Robert Rauschenberg (1925-2008),
Agnes Martin (1912-2004), and Wolfgang Laib (b. 1950), I consider how their art-making
exemplifies an empty-sublime in praxis, each in its own distinctive way. The work of Robert
Rauschenberg would never be singled out as illustrative of ‘the sublime’ by twentieth- or twentyfirst century critics, and yet his early work of 1949-1953 presents incontrovertible evidence of a
fearless and unselfconscious outpouring of creativity, openness, and endless experimentation.
Moreover, Rauschenberg’s comments of late 1959, that: “painting relates to both art and life.
Neither can be made. (I try to act in that gap between the two)” (Miller: 58), reveals a
recognition of, and an allegiance to the empty-sublime which has resulted in a remarkable body
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of work, much different than one might initially expect from an artistic praxis described as
‘sublime’.
Agnes Martin’s work, on the other hand, has been said to be “an ambience one enters, as
into the ocean, or the landscape…[which] function[s] as a lens through which [Martin] saw the
world…clarify[ing] that world…and organiz[ing] it, making it both orderly and luminous”
(Princenthal: 176). Does this qualify Martin’s canvases or her praxis as sublime? Or, could there
be a dichotomy at work here? Perhaps there is more tension than dichotomy, a tension which
Martin seems to have experienced regularly in her everyday life, as well as in the act of her artmaking. And yet, this tension seems to have paved the way for an extraordinarily disciplined,
measured, and above all, elegant work through which, I argue, she practiced the discipline of
emptiness (śūnyatā), or the empty-sublime.
And, turning to Wolfgang Laib, we encounter work totally distinct from that of either
Rauschenberg or Martin. Laib’s constructions and installations speak of an austerity, and a still
awareness developed through a meditative life, of an echoing, beautiful silence, simultaneous
with an unmistakable expression of ‘being-here’. Laib’s work seems to embody meditation cum
action. Can we identify this as another rare aesthetic expression of an authentic empty-sublime?
We will see. In any case, it is my hope to advance our appreciation of the powers of art making
by rethinking the sublime within the context of the Buddhist idea of emptiness.
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Chapter One
Setting the Stage: The Sublime, From Antiquity to Postmodernity:
A Very Brief Survey

Introduction
Longinus and Boileau
Je ne sais quoi…10

Although Barnett Newman declared, in late 1948, that “the sublime is now”, we begin our
brief survey of the sublime in late antiquity. That is not to say that Newman was wrong; the
sublime is, and can only be, now. But the discourse about and around the sublime begins, if one
is to follow the widely accepted view, with an otherwise unknown author, Longinus, from the
first (or perhaps as late as the third) century of the Common Era.11 The treatise Περὶ Ὕψους
[Peri hupsous, or hypsous (On Height, or On the Sublime)],12 attributed to this Greek or Roman
rhetorician, literary scholar, critic, and philosopher, has left us with lingering questions: “Is
sublimity a matter of language or of thought, of art or of nature? Is it a feature of texts, of art
outside literature, of the mind, or of natural phenomena? Is it an aspect of style or an element of
aesthetics? Is it a kind of beauty or a matter of unsurpassed intensity? Is it lodged in the object or
the subject, a cause or an effect? Is it a self-evident category or does one need instruction to
grasp it?”13 These questions mark our discussion throughout this monograph. I argue that the
sublime, as lived experience, is indeed a matter of art and nature, but resides in neither the object
nor the subject, nor can it be said to function as cause or effect. I claim that the sublime is that
experience which is a gap of clear awareness within our normative, discursive, thinking minds.
We often experience this gap when we encounter something suddenly, unexpectedly; something
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or other which is shockingly abrupt or unimaginably spectacular, perhaps. Or even that which
may be considered utterly abject, as argued by Julia Kristeva in her 1980 Powers of Horror: An
Essay on Abjection.14 However, this is not necessarily the case. Rauschenberg reports evoking
this ‘gap’ while working through fatigue, or under the influence of alcohol. And many of us have
experienced this sudden lightness of being, seemingly inexplicably. The gap of the sublime often
takes our breath away; our discursive thoughts dissolve, replaced at once by an experience of a
fresh breeze of delight. We find ourselves floating free and untethered from discursive intuitions
and imaginations, from all labored reasonings, as well as from anxiety and worry.
Longinus writes of the experience of the sublime in his first chapter of Peri hupsous thus:
…sublimity [hupsos] is the source of the distinction of the very greatest poets and
prose writers and the means by which they have given eternal life to their own fame.
For grandeur produces ecstasy (ekstasis) rather than persuasion in the hearer; and
the combination of wonder (thaumasion) and astonishment (ekplēxis) always
proves superior to the merely persuasive and pleasant. This is because persuasion
is on the whole something we can control, whereas amazement (ekplēxis) and
wonder (thaumasion) exert invincible power and force and get the better of every
hearer. (§I.4)15
This ‘invincible power and force’ that gets ‘the better of every hearer’, and which Longinus
writes about so compellingly here, is the ‘gap’ of the sublime. In this early passage, Longinus
privileges ecstasy (ekstasis), wonder (thaumasion), astonishment and amazement (ekplēxis) as
markers of the experience of the sublime moment produced through the praxes of the verbal and
rhetorical arts. For Longinus, ‘hupsos is the source of the distinction of the very greatest poets’
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(my emphasis). It is from this source, or in this moment of wonder or suspension, that the great
poets and prose writers produce works of grandeur which, Longinus asserts, endure.
Both Timothy Costelloe and Robert Doran claim in their recent monographs that
Longinus’s sublimity, this moment of wonder, is an experience expressed in and through
language, rather than belonging to or of language (see: Costelloe: 4; Doran: 103).16 This point of
view, viz. that sublimity is a critical concept rather than a literary style or technique, was first
introduced by Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux (1636-1711), who writes in the Préface to his 1674
French translation of Peri hupsous, Traité du sublime ou le Merveilleux qui frappe dans le
discours (Treatise on the Sublime, or The Marvellous That Strikes in Discourse),17 that
It must be observed then that by the Sublime he [Longinus] does not mean what the
Orators call the Sublime Stile [sic], but something extraordinary and marvelous that
Strikes us in a Discourse and makes it elevate, ravish and transport us. The Sublime
Stile requires always great Words, but the Sublime may be found in a Thought only,
or in a Figure or Turn of Expression. A Thing may be in the Sublime Stile, and yet
not be Sublime, that is, have nothing extraordinary nor surprising in it…(Boileau:
7.)18

Boileau’s interpretation of the sublime as an expository philosophical concept is not just
noteworthy, but was, as Samuel Monk (1902-1981) writes in his seminal 1935 work on the
sublime, “heretical” in the day (Monk: 29).19 Monk contends that Boileau is claiming, in his
Préface to the treatise, that “the thought operates directly and with no let or hindrance to the
reader’s mind, filling it with awe and awakening emotions of a very intense kind. Thus at one
blow the sublime is severed from rhetoric and becomes art, a matter of the revelation of a quality
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of thought and the emotions which that quality, vividly presented, evokes…” (31-2).20 However,
Monk may, in referring to sublime art, be conflating the sublime, as postulated by Boileau, with
Kant’s idea of genius, which stresses inspired originality. Kant states that the genius is s/he “who
makes use of originality and produces out of himself [sic] what must ordinarily be learned under
the guidance of others” (Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) §6).21 In the
Analytic of the Sublime, Kant writes that “Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives
the rule to art” (Kant, §46, ¶307, p. 136, original emphasis).
On this topic of genius, Longinus states early in his treatise that: “Genius…is innate; it is
not something that can be learnt, and nature is the only art that begets it” (Longinus: §2, 115).
However, these passages could also be interpreted as meaning that genius arises from the same
source (or non-source) as does the sublime moment. And although Monk maintains that Boileau
is articulating a sublime that Longinus never intended, Boileau’s isogesis of what that sublime
moment is—experientially—is extremely prescient. Boileau seems more proximate to Longinus
here than either Monk or Kant. I will have more to say on this as we go on.
Those who preceded Boileau in translating Longinus’s treatise into a modern European
vernacular22 regarded the sublime as an interesting, yet singularly literary protocol; the sublime
was considered by early translators and interpreters as merely a category of rhetorical or oratorial
style. After the appearance of Boileau’s translation and pivotal Préface, sentiment shifted.
Longinus began to be considered, as suggested by Boileau, “worthy to be set beside a Socrates
and a Cato” (Boileau/Clewis: 58), i.e. as a great philosopher in his own right. Boileau’s account
nonetheless remains contentious. Monk, for example, writes that “the Longinus who is of value
for this study is really the creation of Boileau” (Monk: 28; also Doran: 99). And Monk is not
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alone.23 But even if the sublime as a critical aesthetic concept belongs to Boileau and not
Longinus, why then does the Idea that is the sublime hold such fascination for us more than 325
years after the appearance of Boileau’s translation? Even if one agrees with Monk (and I do not),
does this invalidate the sublime as a relevant philosophical/ontological concept, or project? Is all
the ruckus for naught? The issue is not ultimately what Longinus has written, but rather that of a
compelling account of the sublime experience. I therefore share Doran’s puzzlement, when he
asks: “What is it about the concept of the sublime that inspired some of Europe’s most important
and influential critics and philosophers to devote considerable effort to its elucidation and
theorization?” (Doran: 3). What is it, indeed? This project will, I trust, provide some
unanticipated answers.
The dialectic evident in Longinus’ lamentably incomplete text and Boileau’s hermeneutic
gives rise to a host of questions, several of which I posed at the outset of this chapter. I argue that
the sublime, as many philosophers have wrestled with it as a concept/experience, is a
phenomenon not just up to, but beyond the limits of conventional thought, reason, imagination,
and intuition. Further, I claim that the sublime is a marker for an experience of non-conceptual
mind. The title that Boileau gave to his translation of Longinus’ treatise, i.e. Traité du Sublime,
ou le Merveilleux qui frappe dans le Discours (Treatise on the Sublime, or the Marvelous That
Strikes in Discourse), affirms that Boileau regards ‘the sublime’ as a critical concept, and not
simply as a literary or oratorical style. Doran argues that “if the sublime is a kind of ‘marvelous’
(merveilleux) that ‘strikes’ in discourse, then it is something manifested in or through discourse
and not an objective property of discourse itself. In other words, Boileau argues that sublimity is
a matter of transcendence, not style. Le merveilleux is thus being used as a kind of equivalent or
substitute for sublimity, a use that is eminently strategic” (Doran: 103). This is strategic because
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it signals Boileau’s radical interpretation of Longinus; a wholly new interpretation heretofore
unthought of. Boileau was a gutsy guy, in light of the on-going Inquisition which silenced, in no
uncertain terms, those who would speak against the sanctity and unitary transcendence of the
Divine Father. Writing that le merveilleux qui frappe, i.e. that ‘the marvellous strikes’, without
assigning a provenance of le merveilleux as originating in and coming ‘from above’, Boileau is
saying that le merveilleux, that gap of pre-thought clear awareness, is accessible to everyone
without the mediation of the church or its ecclesiastics.
The discourse around the sublime, Robert Doran argues, is “framed in large measure by
three classic or foundational theories [found in the works] of Longinus, Edmund Burke, and
Immanuel Kant…” (Doran: 2). Others have argued that John Dennis (1657-1734), Joseph
Addison (1672-1719), and Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), all
figure importantly in any rigorous archeology of the development and subsequent understanding
of the sublime.24 For the purposes of this present chapter, however, and for this project more
generally, I am limiting my examination of early modern hermeneutics of Longinus’ sublime to
Dennis (a key figure in the hermeneutic development of the sublime in the early eighteenthcentury, about whom I will have more to say in Chapter Three) and Kant. And not because the
other figures in the genealogy of the sublime just listed aren’t important; they are, and much
more could be said about their interpretations of the Longinus/Boileau sublime, and how their
ideas influenced subsequent developments of the (mis)understanding of the sublime. But the
scope of this dissertation does not permit such a broad survey. In what follows, then, I present
James Porter’s recent and revelatory ideas about the pervasiveness of the sublime throughout
antiquity before Longinus; then, a summary of what I consider to be the main arguments and
concepts about the sublime offered by Kant in his third Critique. I then fast-forward to the

24
twentieth century for a look at a pivotal figure in the history of the sublime: the twentieth-century
American avant-garde painter and critic, Barnett Baruch Newman; Newman’s landmark essay
from late 1948, “the sublime is now” [sic],25 re-established the sublime as an important aesthetic
idea/concept after a century-long interregnum. I move on to explore the recent thoughts and
writings of the contemporary British scholar, Paul Crowther, within the context of the Kantian
sublime; and finally, I consider the ideas and hermeneutics of the American art critic and
philosopher of art, Arthur Danto (1924-2013), as they pertain to the work of Barnett Newman and
Newman’s writings as they relate to the modern sublime.
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I.
The Sublime Before Longinus

Before engaging Kant’s sublime, we will take one last, brief step back to the beginning of
the recorded history of the idea of ‘the sublime’ to provide a bit more context to these
intertextual explorations. Modern and contemporary hermeneutics of ‘the sublime’ presume that
the treatise, Περὶ Ὕψους, Peri hupsous, attributed to a Roman or Greek thinker known to us as
‘Longinus’, to be the source of all the perturbation and debate. But is it…? James Porter argues
otherwise.26 Porter’s original and rigorously argued premise rests on the view that the ‘sublime’,
Ὕψους, hupsos, is more than a ‘mere’ rhetorical, literary, or aesthetic concept,27 category, or
strategy, and rather is the semiosis which can be traced to orators, writers, poets, and thinkers
long before ‘Longinus’ penned his now-famous treatise. The sublime cannot, Porter maintains,
simply be consigned to a single signifier, viz., the Greek word Ὕψους, hupsos. Rather, the
sublime, in its fullest sense as lived experience, is to be found in multiple guises, and is
referenced in manifold fashions and terms throughout antiquity. Longinus himself readily
acknowledges this, and credits Demosthenes, Homer, Sappho, Plato, Cicero, and others with
“naturally sublime minds or spirits” (Porter 2016b: xvii-xviii). Porter finds evidence of the
sublime (i.e., “a poetically enhanced rhetorical style, one that is elevated, overpowering, and
effective beyond the limits of rational persuasion”) in works by Aristotle; Gorgias (who is named
by Longinus); in Plato’s Ion and the Menexenus; and Democritus (Porter 2015: 395). In addition,
Longinus is “well aware that sublimity is not limited to literary phenomena; it includes reflection
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on the heavens, the vast plethora of sensations in the world, non-literary art forms, and the
highest potentials imaginable (if not attainable) by humankind” (Porter 2016b: xviii).
Porter reads Longinus broadly, finding in On The Sublime a philosophy limited not to
rhetoric, oratory, and literature, but rather one addressing an “astonishing range of areas, from
thought to one’s own nature, political rhetoric, literature, silence, the emotions, statues and
painting, the gods, natural phenomena, and even natural inquiry” (xviii). While we find no usage
of the word hupsos in Aristotle or his predecessors, all the “other prerequisites one could ever
hope to have in order to establish the presence of sublimity” can be found in their writings.
Porter argues that one can find further echoes in Theophrastus (371 or 372 - 287 or 288 BCE),28
Aristotle’s successor as the head of the Lyceum, who writes that: “the lofty goal of the orator is
‘to delight and amaze [ekplēxai] the hearer and to force him into a state of conviction…directing
all his attention…to the semnotēs, magaloprepeia, and sublimitas of his language” (Porter 2015:
395).
If this is so, and I side with Porter that it is, then Longinus’s “little Treatise”29 requires
another, longer look. There is more here than prima facie meets the eye. I contend Longinus did
not write his Peri hupsous to create a thought-puzzle which would entertain, bedevil, and
otherwise occupy philosophers and their publishers for centuries. Rather, he and many other
ancient philosophos saw in the experience of hupsos—one in which, as Boileau writes, “the
marvellous… strikes”—something which has, or perhaps could have, profound import to our
understanding of who we are, how we live, and how we approach everyday life, if examined
thoroughly. Thus, there was, and still is, a practical reason for thinking about, reflecting on, and
writing about hupsos, which should neither be overlooked nor neglected.
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II.
Kant’s Sublime

Turning to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), we begin with a short passage from the Analytic
of the Sublime, found in Kant’s third Critique, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment),
published in 1790:
…we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we term any object of nature sublime
…All that we can say is that the object lends itself to the presentation of a sublimity
discoverable in the mind. (CJ §23, ¶246, p. 76, original emphasis.)30
Kant here establishes his isogesis of Longinus’ (and Boileau’s) sublime in an idealist
manner. That is to say, he attributes the sublime to a property of the mind of the subject and not
to the object (which, for Kant, is nature). This runs counter to that of later modernists and poststructuralists, including Jean-François Lyotard and Barnett Newman, whom I will discuss below.
Kant idealistically stipulates two aspects of the sublime: 1) the mathematical, and 2) the
dynamic. In the mathematical sublime, Kant argues that the imagination is utterly overwhelmed
by a phenomenon beyond its comprehension, producing an experience of complete
referencelessness. That is, we are able to apprehend something that we cannot comprehend.31 By
contrast, the dynamic sublime is characterized by the sensation or feeling of an immovable
power restricting the mind’s ability to act in its customary ways. Apprehension is suspended.
Stated another way, the movement of the mind stops; neither the imagination nor reason function
in ways in which we are accustomed. In fact, they do not function at all. There is a gap; complete
openness. Kant, recalling Dennis, signals the dynamic sublime as that experience found in the
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“awesome” and “awful”, which arises when we suddenly and unexpectedly encounter ‘dazzling’,
or ‘spellbinding’ forces of nature. Kant illustrates these forces as, for example, “volcanoes with
all their destructive power, hurricanes with all the devastation they leave behind, the boundless
ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a mighty river, and so on” (CJ §28, ¶261, p. 91). (Not that
Kant ever saw a volcano, or a ‘boundless ocean heaved up’, so as to experience for himself his
dynamic sublime en vivo; Königsberg provided little opportunity for such expressions or
experiences of sublimity of this sort, produced by nature’s upheaval.) Nonetheless, Kant
continues: “But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect is all the more attractive for its
fearfulness; and we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul
above the height of vulgar commonplace…” (91). Kant’s dynamic sublime describes a dynamism
of the discursive mind which, upon being presented with the unpresentable, stops, as if dazzled
and spellbound. There is a gap. An instant later, however, reason concludes that, in fact, there is
no physical or mortal danger. An instant of fear gives way to a sustained delight in our own
rationality. Kant thus concludes:
In the immeasurableness of nature and the inadequacy of our faculty for adopting a
standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its realm, we
found our own limitation. But with this we also found in our rational faculty another
non-sensuous standard, one which has that infinity itself under it as unit, and in
comparison with which everything in nature is small, and so found in our minds a
pre-eminence over nature even in its immeasurability. (CJ §28, ¶261, pp.91-2,
original emphasis)
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In this case, Kant references an immensity of phenomena that represents the utterly
incomprehensible. However, in Kant’s project, human reason always takes pride of place, always
already towering ‘pre-eminently over nature even in its [incommensurability]’.
Through and by an encounter with the mathematical sublime, the imagination surrenders
to the rational idea of totality, and thus finds the “faculty to transcend the realm of sensible
intuition” (Shaw 2017: 105). Similarly with the dynamic sublime, we discover freedom (i.e.,
union with (?) the absolute) in reason’s overcoming the grandness of nature. Thus a rational a
priori ground of reason asserts control, as “a pure ‘idea’ of totality or freedom, which is not
subject to the empirical, contingent conditions of nature” (105).
While Kant privileges the phenomena of grandness in nature or the architectonic to
stimulate or initiate the experience of the sublime, it seems that, for him, the sublime resides
within or, is created by and controlled by, the mind, rather than in or by nature; and nor is it to be
found in a built structure of human design, such as St. Peter’s Basilica in the Vatican.
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III.
Barnett Newman and the Modern Aesthetic Sublime

Barnett Baruch Newman (1905-1970) was a painter, critic, and protagonist of an
American artistic avant-garde forming in the early forties in New York. Newman also reintroduced the long-dormant idea of the aesthetic sublime into the twentieth-century discourse
around the plastic arts.32 For this reason, Newman himself, and his evolution as an artist, figures
prominently in this survey of the modern aesthetic sublime.
In 1943, Newman co-authored a manifesto of sorts at the invitation of the New York
Times critic Edward Alden Jewell, in collaboration with fellow painters Adolph Gottlieb (19031974) and Mark Rothko (1903-1970), which sought to explain the ‘new’ abstract expressionist

works which he and his colleagues were exhibiting at the ‘Federation of Modern Painters and
Sculptors’ exhibition in New York that summer. These were perhaps Newman’s first steps
towards articulating his interest in, and his understanding of, the sublime. The statement begins:
“To the artist the workings of the critical mind is one of life’s mysteries” (Harrison & Wood: 568).
The three artists went on to delineate several ‘aesthetic beliefs’, of which the following (point #4
of 5) is particularly relevant to our discussion: “We favor”, they wrote, “the simple expression of
the complex thought. We are for the large shape because it has the impact of the unequivocal.
We wish to reassert the picture plane. We are for flat forms because they destroy illusion and
reveal truth” (569). In other words, ‘illusion’, ’truth’, the ‘unequivocal’, and the ‘simple
expression’ are critical markers for their project.
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Newman continued to develop this affinity for the so-called sublime in succeeding years.
In the catalog for the exhibition, ‘The Ideographic Picture’, at the Betty Parsons Gallery in New
York in early 1947, Newman writes that the entire plastic language of the Kwakwa̱ka̱ʼwakw
artist, of the northeastern coast of Vancouver Island and the opposing western shore of the
Canadian mainland, originates with their ideographic vision which “was directed by a ritualistic
will towards metaphysical understanding” (574). Newman continues: “To him a shape was a
living thing, a vehicle for an abstract thought-complex, a carrier of the awesome feelings he felt
before the terror of the unknowable. The abstract shape was, therefore, real rather than a formal
‘abstraction’ of a visual fact, with its overtone of an already-known nature” (574). Newman
articulates a curious (if blatantly Orientalist) hermeneutic of the indigenous artists’ metaphysical
experience as at once full of awe and of terror, conceived as a sublimity expressed in art. ‘A
shape was a living thing’ for these artists, Newman asserted. Newman then hypothesizes about
the Kwakwa̱ka̱ʼwakw “idea-complex that makes contact with mystery” (574), but this mystery is
not necessarily of the hypostatic dimension. The mystery, in Newman’s mind, concerns “…life
…men …nature …the hard, black chaos that is death, or the greyer, softer chaos that is tragedy”
(574). But whether the Kwakwa̱ka̱ʼwakw artist theorized and then drew such distinctions, only to
then classify these distinctions and concepts as such, is open to debate, and certainly more
research.
Later that same year, Newman wrote the essay “The First Man Was an Artist”. Appearing
in the first issue of the avant-garde journal Tiger’s Eye, Newman uses the recent discovery of
Meganthropus palaeojavanicus, thought at the time to be a giant predecessor of Homo sapiens,
as a springboard from which to launch into a “quarrel”, as he puts it, with the scientific
community. Newman proposes a thesis that humankind is an aesthetic being, first and foremost,
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long before a social being, or a mere subsistence hunter-gatherer, as hypothesized by the
scientific community. “The totemic act of wonder in front of the tiger-ancestor”, Newman
asserts, “came before the act of murder. […] The purpose of man’s first speech was an address to
the unknowable. His behavior had its origin in his artistic nature” (576). And Newman asks:
What is the raison d’être, what is the explanation of the seemingly insane drive of
man to be painter and poet if it is not an act of defiance against man’s fall and an
assertion that he return to the Adam of the Garden of Eden? For the artists are the
first men”. (577)
Newman seems to be staking out, somewhat bombastically, an ontological ground for the artist
to reclaim her place in sublime being, or, turning to Newman’s metaphor, to the sublimity of the
Garden of Eden. I would suggest that this adumbrates Newman’s growing fascination with
something he subsequently refers to as ‘the sublime’. But are artists and poets ‘driven’ to create
by a drive which Newman characterizes as ‘insane’? As a contrary example, Robert
Rauschenberg would remark some years later that, in his process of creating in the studio, he
would invoke some-thing outside of his conscious control. He would often resort to tricks, he
said, to “reach that solitary point of creativity” (and not insanity!), such as pretending to have an
idea, and then seeing what might proceed from that. Rauschenberg says
…I put my trust in the materials that confront me, because they put me in touch
with the unknown. It is then that I begin to work… when I don’t have the comfort
of sureness and certainty. Sometimes Jack Daniels helps too. Another good trick is
fatigue. I like to start working when it’s almost too late… when nothing else helps…
when my sense of efficiency is exhausted. It’s then that I find myself in another
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state, quite outside myself, and when that happens there’s such a joy! It’s an
incredible high and things just start flowing and you have no idea of the source.
(Gruen 1977)33
Rauschenberg’s description here describes reaching a sublime state in which he would work.
Perhaps the ‘totemic act of wonder’, that Newman invokes in his vividly imaginative
reconstruction of the being of Meganthropus palaeojavanicus, could be said to be comparable:
an ‘act of wonder’ which is experienced as ‘another state, quite outside [one]self’. ‘…And when
that happens there’s such a joy!’. This would seem to me to be a description germane to ‘the
totemic act of wonder’.
In late 1948, Newman penned his paradigm-shifting essay, “the sublime is now” [sic],
which was published in Tiger’s Eye (Vol. I, No. 6) in December of that year, as part of a
symposium entitled “Six Opinions on What Is Sublime in Art?”. Arthur Danto writes that “two
of the [nascent Abstract Expressionist] movement’s more intellectual figures—Robert
Motherwell and Barnett Newman—were among the symposiasts, but it was Newman who wrote
with an excitement and conviction that the title of his contribution perfectly conveys” (Danto:
293). (Newman’s thinking, as well as that of his fellow Ab-Ex painters, foreshadowed later

Anglo and French interest in the concept of the sublime during the 1980s and early 1990s,34 viz.,
the collection of essays, Du Sublime in its French publication of 1988 (Of the Sublime: Presence
in Question, 1993); Paul Crowther’s The Kantian Sublime, 1989; and Jean-François Lyotard’s
Leçons sur l’analytique du sublime, 1991, (Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, 1994). These
were followed by several other English-language essays and monographs shortly thereafter.)
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In the essay, “the sublime is now”, Newman’s critique spans 2,000 years in short order,
arguing for an American vanguard leading art out of its long fixation with beauty, which can be
traced back to the Hellenistic period, and forward into the realm of sublimity, which embodies,
according to Newman, the true expression of humankind’s desire to express their relation to the
Absolute. Newman maintains that Hellenistic sculpture belies a fetishism of “quality and perfect
creations in the form of perfect beauty” (Newman/Clewis: 243). The Greeks thus sought to express
the Absolute through a ‘perfect’ idealization of the beautiful form. This early tension, or what
Newman suggests is ‘confusion’, was, Newman argues, further sustained by Kant in his theory
of ‘transcendent perception’, a perception “that the phenomenon is more than phenomenon”
(243). What is the ‘transcendent perception’ of Kant that Newman thinks continued this
confusion? Referencing the Critique of Pure Reason, Howard Caygill elucidates, explaining that
Kant distinguishes between transcendent and transcendental, contrasting the
transcendent principles which 'incite us to tear down all those boundary-fences and
seize possession of an entirely new domain which recognises no limits of
demarcation' from the transcendental 'misemployment' of the categories, which
extends their application beyond the limits of possible experience, and 'which is
merely an error of the faculty of judgement’. (CPR-A ¶296/B ¶352) (Caygill: 400)
Newman militated for the tearing-down of ‘all those boundary-fences’, and for an opening of the
plastic arts to a sublimity conceived as free of the ‘limits of demarcation’ which had persisted at
least since the Renaissance.
“the sublime is now” acknowledges the conventional definition of the sublime as an
experience originating in, stemming from, or in tandem with a sense of exaltation. Newman
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argues that the Greeks, with their “insistence that the sense of exaltation is to be found in perfect
form” (Newman/Clewis: 243), which was to be extolled by Longinus, who “could not extricate
himself from his platonic attitudes concerning beauty… [and the] perfect statement” (243),
conflate the sublime with beauty. Exaltation is not simply the province of perfect form, be it
found in the plastic or literary arts, Newman contends, but can be found in the formless, as is the
case with the Gothic. (I surmise that Newman is referring here to the towering, utterly capacious,
awe-evoking naves of the monumental European gothic cathedrals, such as the Cathédrale NotreDame de Bayeux, Normandy, France, dedicated in 1077; see Plate 1, below.) The Renaissance,
however, saw a return to the ideals of the Greeks, dressing up the “the traditional ecstacy [sic] in
an even older tradition [than that found in the original Gothic ecstasy]—that of eloquent nudity
or rich velvet” (243-244). It wasn’t until the Impressionists’ “insistence on a surface of ugly
strokes” (244), that, in what Newman calls the moderns’ reaction to the Renaissance, we see the
stirrings of an inspiration to create a contrary answer to the notion of beauty as the ‘perfect
statement’ and as an expression of the Absolute.
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Plate 1. Cathédrale Notre-Dame de Bayeux, Normandy, France.

The Impressionists embarked on a quest to “destroy the established rhetoric of beauty”
(244), and set to work to paint the utter mundanity of the everyday, as can be seen, for example,
in Millet’s 1857 work, The Gleaners (Des glaneuses), Plate 2; Mary Cassatt’s The Child’s Bath,
from 1893, Plate 3; or van Gogh’s The Yellow Chair, from 1888. The quotidian was depicted in
all its inherent sublimity, which can also be seen as a foreshadowing of Richard Hamilton’s early
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Pop Art statement Just what is it that makes today’s homes so different, so appealing? (1956), or
Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans (1961-62). This earlier move by the Impressionists was,
however, criticized by Newman as a wholly unsuccessful effort, insofar as it only represented a
“transfer of values instead of creating a new vision” (244). “So strong is the grip of the rhetoric
of exaltation as an attitude in the large context of the European culture pattern”, Newman writes,
“that the elements of sublimity in the revolution we know as modern art, exist in its effort and
energy to escape the pattern rather than in the realization of a new experience” (244).

Plate 2. Jean-François Millet, The Gleaners (Des glaneuses) 1857
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Plate 3. Mary Cassatt, The Child’s Bath, 1893

Neither Mondrian nor Picasso, nor the Cubists nor the Dadaists, according to Newman, escaped
the pull of this deep cultural pattern of rhetorical beauty which figured so pervasively in the The
Paris School of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century.
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Newman contrasts this “failure of European art to achieve the sublime” (244) with the
nascent American avant-garde project of creating an art free from the problem of beauty. The
question that Newman, Motherwell, Rothko, et al., were wrestling with was: “How, if we are
living in a time without a legend or mythos that can be called sublime, if we refuse to admit any
exaltation in pure relations, if we refuse to live in the abstract, how can we be creating a sublime
art?” (244). Newman argues here for finding exaltation in ‘pure relations’, living in ‘the
abstract’, and thus creating the opening for a sublime art; while discarding irrelevant ‘props’,
symbols, and legends, which often conflate the beautiful with a mistaken sense of the sublime,
and which no longer provokes nor invokes any chance of relationship with the sublime. ‘We’ are
making towering, awe-filled “cathedrals…out of our own feelings”, Newman declares, “freeing
ourselves of the impediments of memory, association, nostalgia, legend, myth, or what have
you… The image we produce is the self-evident one of revelation, real and concrete, that can be
understood by anyone who will look at it without the nostalgic glasses of history” (244).
However, contra Newman, I am arguing throughout this project that the sublime is empty
openness, a freedom which neither Kant nor Newman could probably have ever imagined; a
freedom from concepts about the “extremes of existence and nonexistence, or, more generally,
[of] the extremes of eternalism and of nihilism” (Thrangu 2016: 65). This sublime is not ‘real
and concrete’, made ‘out of our own feelings’, nor is it the opposite. The sublime is free from all
extremes, free from this or that. The sublime is the openness and spontaneous creativity that
Rauschenberg, Laib, and Martin find in their art-making. Newman failed to realize this.
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IV.
A Postmodern Hermeneutic of the Kantian Sublime

Paul Crowther presents a distinctive hermeneutic of the Kantian sublime through what he
calls “a genealogy of the sublime in the postmodern era” (Crowther 1989: 165),35 positing four
categories of the sublime, in contradistinction to Kant’s two. They are: 1) the cognitive sublime,
which comprises the dynamical and mathematical modes of the sublime; 2) the artefactual
sublime, which arises when one confronts an incomprehensible phenomenon made by human
hands; 3) the personalized sublime, which Crowther says “involves some overwhelming personal
significance that an artwork holds for us, making vivid the scope of artistic creation”; and, 4) the
expressive sublime, which reads more like Kant’s notion of ‘genius,’ and points to the artist’s
originality and mastery of her/his medium and subject matter, revealing a universality in the
work.36 Through this four-fold logic of the sublime, Crowther argues that the sublime is “an
experience wherein some perceptually, imaginatively, or emotionally overwhelming aspect of
the sensible world serves to make the scope of specific human capacities vivid to the senses”
(166).
But Crowther takes his reading of Kant much further, by looking at the moral and
metaphysical implications of the latter’s aesthetic critique, reaching conclusions well beyond
Kant’s premises. Crowther’s summary is pertinent here for its postmodern stance. He writes:
…our various experiences of the sublime can have a broader metaphysical
significance in terms of what might be called ‘primordial disclosure’. By this, I
mean that the sublime is an affective experience which qua aesthetic is logically
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distinguishable from those connected with the immediate vicissitudes of everyday
life, but which, if understood correctly, reveals a foundation in ultimate structures
which are immanent to, but customarily concealed within, that life. …what the
aesthetic experience hinges upon here—namely the projection of rational
comprehension from a finite base—is itself a dramatic exemplar of several
fundamental relationships which philosophy tries to recover and express. If,
therefore, we enjoy such an [aesthetic] experience and at the same time know what
is involved in it, we have a more primordial way of understanding some of our
fundamental relations to the world than that which is afforded by purely
philosophical knowledge. In primordial disclosure, in other words, reflective
knowledge dwells close to the points of its own origin. (172, emphasis added)
Here Crowther introduces the notion of a ‘primordial disclosure’ in the sublime moment which is
not found in Kant. This disclosure is ordinarily concealed in the quotidian experiences of life; the
sublime functions as a forest clearing from discursive thought, the imagination, and reason.
However, in viewing the sublime through a theistic lens, as both Kant and Crowther do, epistēmē
approaches its point of origin, viz. the threshold of non-conceptuality, and goes no further, thus
reneging on its promise of an examination of the non-conceptual nature of the sublime. However,
it is noteworthy that Crowther concludes that Kant “saw (however opaquely) that aesthetic
experience—and the sublime in particular—has the capacity to humanize” (174, original
emphasis). This extraordinary, however brief experience, with its power to ‘humanize’, to reveal
or disclose the true nature of our humanness, is why I believe the sublime, in all its moral,
epistemological, and ontological dimensions, has intrigued and challenged philosophers for
2,500 years.
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V.
Arthur Danto and the Postmodern Aesthetic Sublime

In his 2003 polemic on beauty and the sublime, The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the
Concept of Art,37 Arthur Danto writes that it “is clear from the way in which Newman polarizes
the two concepts [of the sublime and the beautiful], that he saw no possibility of finding the
axioms of his art in the aesthetic of the beautiful” (Danto: 293). Danto explains that the
intellectual American avant-garde of the 1940s tended to view the world in terms of binaries:
Europe and the US; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; the fascists and the socialists, etc.
Newman saw his artistic project in terms of binaries as well, “as an aesthetic struggle, between
‘the […] exaltation […] to be found in perfect form’ on one side, and on the other, ‘a desire to
destroy form, where form can be formless’ (294). Exaltation was also to be found, by Newman
and his cohort, as residing in scale. Robert Motherwell (1915-1991), in 1968, says that “I think
that one of the major American contributions to modern art is sheer size. […] No Parisian is a
sublime painter, nor a monumental one” (294).
Danto creates a context for this American avant-garde move to the so-called sublime by
recounting the impact that Longinus’ treatise had on European thinking in the eighteenth century,
further compounded by a young Edmund Burke’s (1729/30 - 1797) treatise of 1757, A
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, published
nearly a century after Boileau’s translation of Peri hupsous had appeared in Paris. “Beauty,”
Danto writes, “was a source of pleasure—but sublimity, in art and especially in nature, produced
what Burke spoke of as ‘the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.’” Danto
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continues, writing that: “Reading Longinus caused the cultivated audiences of the eighteenth
century to wonder why their art never lifted them out of themselves, which is what ‘ecstasy’
means, and thus the idea of the sublime collided with the sphere of the tasteful as a disruptive
force…” (Danto: 295).
But it is not solely the cultivated eighteenth-century audiences who have felt left in the
lurch by all the talk of the sublime. The New Yorker art critic, Peter Schjeldahl (b. 1942), writes
acerbically that the sublime is a “hopelessly jumbled philosophical notion that has had more than
two centuries to start meaning something cogent and hasn’t succeeded yet” (295-6). It would
seem that perhaps Schjeldahl simply fails to understand Kant, whom he presumably never read
during his short career as an undergraduate; nor Newman nor Lyotard, for that matter. Or,
perhaps not… Schjeldahl may be seeing, intuitively, through the inherent paradoxes which riddle
the thesis of ‘the sublime’. Regardless of whether Kant is right or wrong (and here I think Kant
simply didn’t go far enough, likely restrained by the prevailing religious strictures of his time),
his meaning is clear: it is the capacity of reason to grasp something that does not originate in
sense perception. For example, the senses tell me that the ground is shaking; the so-called
sublimity of an earthquake is not something that I further sense. Rather, the reasoning mind
cognizes an incomprehensibly awesome and vast force expressing itself in what I am sensing.
First, I feel the openness attended to the unexpected awe of the ground moving. Then, discursive,
thinking mind kicks in and I feel afraid: what is happening? In Kant’s sublime, the experience of
the ungrounded openness absent any thought, prior to the subsequent shock, awe, or fear, or
whatever it may be, is not catalogued. I suspect it is not particularly experienced, either.
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Kant writes about the sublime in contradistinction to that of the beautiful; in §23 of his
third Critique, Kant contends that
the beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of the furtherance of life, and is thus
compatible with charms and a playful imagination. On the other hand, the feeling
of the sublime is a pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought about by the
feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all
the more powerful, and so it is an emotion that seems to be no play, but a serious
matter in the exercise of the imagination. […] …the delight in the sublime does not
so much involve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i.e., merits the name of
a negative pleasure. (CJ §23, 244-245)
In other words, is a negative pleasure simply a pleasure that I feel as I stand before something
which invokes awe? Reason delights in what sense or imagination cannot understand, according
to Kant. Precisely here exists the tension between reason and intuition. Longinus, however, is
much more poetic in his explication than Kant. Longinus writes:
That is why, by some sort of natural instinct, we admire, not, surely, the small
streams, beautifully clear though they may be, and useful too, but the Nile, the
Danube, the Rhine, and even more than these the Ocean. The little fire that we have
kindled ourselves, clear and steady as its flame may be, does not strike us with as
much awe as the heavenly fires, in spite of their often being shrouded in darkness;
nor do we think our flame a greater marvel than the craters of Etna, whose eruptions
throw up from their depths rocks and even whole mountains, and at times pour out
rivers of that earth-born, spontaneous fire. In all such circumstances, I would say
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only this, that the useful and the necessary are readily available to man, whereas
what is out of the ordinary always excites our wonder. (§35, p. 155)
Wonder and awe are the pastiche from which proceeds the sublime; a bonheur, a happiness or
joy. According to Danto, Kant argues that the sublime “is to be found in a formless object, so far
as in it or by occasion of it, boundlessness is represented, and yet its totality is also present to
thought” (Danto: 297). However, Danto’s employment of the idea of totality is puzzling when
describing the boundless. To totalize the boundless is to wrap your mind and boundaries around
it, which is impossible to do with the boundless, by definition. This is precisely what is not
happening in Longinus’ account above.
Danto, however, maintains that “sublimity is internally related to size, indeed to vastness;
it cannot be pictured” (300). And because of this seemingly unambiguous definition, he
concludes that Newman ran into trouble. First, Danto argues that any pictorial reproduction of a
Newman canvas inevitably fails to reveal Newman’s so-called sublimity, which Newman insists
is evoked by the scale of the canvas. And secondly, there is no terror to be found anywhere in
Newman’s work, as Dennis and Burke insisted there be as a necessary ingredient of the sublime.
As Danto rightly points out, nor does our contemplation of the ‘starry heavens above’ provoke
terror in us. Awe, perhaps, at the incomprehensibility of the vastness above, but certainly not, in
my experience, any terror. And while an element of fear or terror may, by chance, be thought to
accompany a sensation of the sublime, it is certainly not a necessary ingredient to the concept or
experience. Indeed, there are no ingredients to the experience of the sublime, nor to the emptysublime. However, Danto notes with good humor that fear
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continues to play its role in, of all things, the postmodern theory of the sublime
developed by Lyotard, who speaks of the feeling in questions [sic] as ‘an admixture
of fear and exaltation’. One cannot but wonder…how often Lyotard can have had
this feeling in front of works of art. If it is like ecstasy, it cannot be something we
can be overcome by several times in a single visit to a gallery of art. My sense is
that Lyotard was overcome by the literature on the subject rather than by actual
aesthetic experiences he had had on the rue de Seine in Paris. (Danto: 300.)
The idea of the sublime is undeniably compelling, but how much commentary has been devoted
to its various hermeneutics by thinkers ‘overcome by the literature…’, but with little or no actual
understanding, never mind non-conceptual experience, to inform an understanding of the
sublime? It is, perhaps for this reason, rightly or wrongly, that Schjeldahl would say that the
sublime is a ‘hopelessly jumbled philosophical notion’.
Danto points out that Kant draws a line of flight in his first two Critiques between our
view, or, as Longinus writes above, our ‘natural instinct’ towards ‘the starry heavens above’, i.e.
the realm of nature, and that of the moral law within, i.e. that of freedom. We are, at the same
time, legislative and cognitive beings. Kant designates these as the “two great powers of the
human mind — to represent the world as a rational system, as covered by universal laws; and to
prescribe the laws which universally define moral conduct” (300). It is in his third Critique,
moreover, that Kant acknowledges that we are more than mere creatures of reason; importantly,
we also possess a capacity for powerful feelings, such as those of astonishment and awe. “The
sublime…is wonder’s content”, Kant asserts (300).
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Returning to Newman, Danto remarks that “abstract painting is not without content.
Rather, it enables the presentation of content without pictorial limits” (301); and without any of
the constraints that Kant imposed on the beauty of form. Lyotard, Danto remarks, in the former’s
critique of sublimity that is to be found in the work of Newman, “attempts to build the
unpresentability of its content into the analysis of the sublime — but I think he had to mean that
the sublime was unpicturable” (301). Which then makes perfect sense of Lyotard’s critique,
which is often opaque in the extreme.
Newman employed unconstrained scale in his work to “awaken this sense of selfawareness…” (301). He (rather clumsily) says of his praxis:
…the painting should give a man a sense of place that he knows he’s there, so
he’s aware of himself. In that sense he [becomes] related to me when I made
the painting because in that sense I was there…Standing in front of my
paintings you had a sense of your own scale. The onlooker in front of my
painting knows that he’s there. To me, the sense of place not only has a mystery
but has that sense of metaphysical fact” (301).
Danto suggests that Newman’s “scale of the painting is intended to induce a certain selfawareness, and this is what brings the status of sublimity with it” (301). But is this what the
sublime is? Is the sublime moment a ‘certain self-awareness’, a self-consciousness which
denotes a separation of one’s self from one’s experience, so that there is the manifold of a selfconsciousness of a self, or an ‘I’, which is experiencing what one is experiencing? This forms an
apparent, and very cumbersome, tripartite phenomenological experience. And what about the
‘mystery’ and the ‘sense of metaphysical fact’ that Newman suggests? Where exactly does that
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fit within the thesis behind his work? These are further questions we will take up in following
chapters as we delve into what is and is not sublime emptiness, as well as a hermeneutic of the
empty-sublime.
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Conclusion

In this chapter I have offered a brief survey of the evolving ontological, epistemological,
and aesthetic notions of the sublime and their authors since ‘Longinus’. Longinus’ account of the
sublime is one of rhetorical grandiloquus, a grand-speaking or grandeur with “the ballast and
stability of knowledge …[which] uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud exaltation and a
vaunting joy…” (Longinus: §2, p. 115; §7, p. 120).
Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux’s French translation of Longinus’ treatise, published in Paris
in 1674, appends a Préface which, some later scholars have argued, offers a hermeneutic of the
locus of the sublime not as a mere extra-ordinary literary or oratorical device, but rather as a
critical, philosophical concept in its own right. James Porter argues, however, that the sublime
enjoyed agency throughout antiquity and long before (as well as after) Longinus, and whose
markers can be found in works as early as those of Homer and Sappho, as well in later works by
Demosthenes, Plato, Cicero, and others. The notion of the sublime should not be held hostage to
the use of a single signifier, in this case the word hupsos, maintains Porter, for the markers of
exaltation, enthusiasm, and joy are to be found everywhere in the writings of the Ancients
preceding Longinus. Porter situates himself squarely in Boileau’s camp, arguing convincingly
that the sublime is not merely a rhetorical or literary device, but is a much more universal truth.
We then took a brief look at Kant and his explication of the sublime in the third Critique.
Kant holds that the sublime is ‘… discoverable in the mind’, rather than something inherently
existing in nature; although he equivocates by saying that great forces in nature, and even in
architecture, most all of which he had never personally experienced, can trigger our experience

50
of the sublime. Kant conceives of the sublime as divisible into a binary of, first, a mathematical
nature; and, secondly, of a dynamic nature. The mathematical sublime is explained under the
headings of quantity and quality, and the dynamically sublime under the heading of relation.
Briefly, Kant held that the grand in nature which overwhelms, presents to the imagination the
unpresentable which the imagination is unable to process. However, our sense of overwhelm is
momentary, as reason immediately takes over and formulates ratiocinative comprehension of the
incomprehensible. The incomprehensible becomes apprehensible, and we are again standing on
firm ground.
Next up was the influential Barnett Newman, who declared in 1948 that ‘the sublime is
now’! Newman took up the mantle of an aesthetic sublime which had been languishing for more
than a century, and called for an end to the fetishism of beauty in art—a tendency of the
Renaissance artist which, Newman argued, could never be adequately fulfilled—and for a
subsequent move to an aesthetic of the sublime, as he defined it. “So strong is the grip of the
rhetoric of exaltation as an attitude in the large context of the European culture pattern that the
elements of sublimity in the revolution we know as modern art, exist in its effort and energy to
escape the pattern rather than in the realization of a new experience” (Newman 244, original
emphasis). The aesthetic which Newman is championing requires, in his view, a presentation of

utter formlessness, or as Jean-François Lyotard calls it, the ‘presentation of the unpresentable’.
Free from the weight of European historicity, Newman argues that the American avant-garde is
disclosing the sublime answer, “denying that art has any concern with the problem of beauty and
where to find it” (244). And Newman concludes, without any apparent lack of humility, that “the
image we produce is the self-evident one of revelation, real and concrete, that can be understood
by anyone who will look at it without the nostalgic glasses of history” (245). Newman seems to
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be arguing here for a sublimity which is revelatory, real, and concrete, all apparently at the same
time. He does not explain, however, how the revelatory can be a reified experience, i.e. a
concrete, real experience, and still be sublime revelation. This is a contradiction in terms. The
truly sacred, divine, absolute, and the sublime: all these refuse any and all attempts at
hypothesizing a rigid, concrete, structural thingness or beingness.
Paul Crowther diverges from Kant’s contrariety, saying that the sublime has, actually,
four aspects: 1) the cognitive sublime, which comprises the dynamical and mathematical modes
of the Kantian sublime; 2) the artefactual sublime, which arises when one confronts an
incomprehensible phenomenon made by human hands; 3) the personalized sublime, which
Crowther says “involves some overwhelming personal significance that an artwork holds for us”;
and 4) the expressive sublime, which seems to echo Kant’s notion of ‘genius’, and points to the
artist’s originality and mastery of her/his medium and subject matter, revealing a universality in
the work (see: Crowther 1989: 165). However, what is most notable in Crowther’s critique is his
conclusion that there is a metaphysical aspect which Kant does not discuss, and which Crowther
calls ‘primordial disclosure’. He argues that “the projection of rational comprehension from a
finite base is itself a dramatic exemplar of several fundamental relationships which philosophy
tries to recover and express. If, therefore, we enjoy such an [aesthetic] experience and at the
same time know what is involved in it, we have a more primordial way of understanding some of
our fundamental relations to the world” (172). This seems to me to be an argument for a
supersensibility of the reasoning mind, a step beyond normal reason to a super-normal rational
mind; an enhanced faculty, but the faculty of reason nonetheless. This conclusion, however,
seems to presuppose reason and the understanding as subsuming whatever aesthetic experience
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might have spawned it; our aesthetic experience becomes short-circuited, or at least shortchanged by this hermeneutic.
The philosopher and art critic, Arthur Danto, argues that Newman is ultimately
unsuccessful in his efforts, contending that abstract expressionism merely ‘enables the
presentation of content without pictorial limits’. “Modernism opened up the possibility of
aniconic painting” Danto writes, “and this somehow brought with it the possibility of sublimity
as an attainable aesthetic” (Danto: 301). Nonetheless, Danto argues that abstract painting is not
devoid of content, despite the adamant assertions by Newman and his fellow AbstractExpressionist colleagues that pictorial representation was to be avoided at all costs. The abstract
expression merely presents an abstract expression of its author. The work is neither author-less
nor content-less.
Newman employs scale to “awaken [a] sense of self-awareness in relationship to his
paintings…”, Danto writes, believing that “man can be or is sublime in his relation to his sense
of being aware” (301). And through largely undifferentiated color-fields on sweeping canvases,
such as Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1950-51), which measures 242.2 cm x 541.7 cm, Newman intends
his works “to induce a certain self-awareness, and this is what brings the status of sublimity with
it” (301). But this leads to the question: Through and within this self-conscious awareness, we
experience…what? Perhaps nothing more than a self-consciousness of an ‘I’ which is standing
before a large canvas ‘without pictorial limits’…? Danto says Newman “aspired to instill
through such paintings…wonder and awe at ourselves as here” (301). For Newman, perhaps, the
work of art, absent pictorial representation, becomes a vehicle of the transcendental mirror of
Dasein. But is Dasein, ‘being-there’, sublime, or sublime-emptiness? Following on this line of
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thought, Danto, in the conclusion to his essay, recalls the answer that Vladimir Nabokov gave to
an interviewer who inquired what it was that most surprised him about life. Nabokov replied:
“The marvel of consciousness—that sudden window swinging open
on a sunlit landscape amid the night of non-being”. (Danto: 302)
Consciousness is indeed a marvel, but what is this consciousness, this feeling, this
experience we have of life? What is it, or, more to the point: who is it that is conscious? What
about the being vis-à-vis non-being dichotomy? Can there even be non-being, as such? And if so,
who would know? These are questions which arise during the investigations of the various
thinkers engaged throughout this chapter, but are never investigated thoroughly by them, nor
ever addressed directly by them, and, consequently, are never answered. Heidegger is perhaps
the closest there is to an exception, who questions the meaning of being, or Dasein. But
questioning the meaning of being is a different project altogether than examining the very nature
of the mind of the being who is questioning the meaning of being. I will have more to say about
this, and Martin Heidegger, in chapter three.
It remains curious to this writer that a reflection on the sublime moment by Western
thinkers has yielded a wholly different kind of (non-)conclusion than that found in the Indo-SinoTibetan Yogācāra-Madhyamaka philosophical project of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The experience
of sublimity, which I argue is an experience of emptiness (śūnyatā), is a non-conceptual gap in
our ordinary stream of discursive thinking, be it of an imaginative, intuitive, or reasoning sort.
This experience of non-conceptuality, or utter openness, containing the same characteristics as
those found in the hupsous of Longinus, led Nāgārjuna (ca. second century CE) and other early
Indian Buddhist thinkers into the examination of the very nature of this mind which experiences
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hupsous. This then led to the subsequent development of the understanding of śūnyatā, or
emptiness. Śūnyatā is the innate emptiness of an ‘I’ which experiences, and the ‘that’ which is
experienced as something ‘other’. I will delve much further into this idea of what could be
termed the ‘empty-sublime’ as an experience of non-conceptual, open mind as we go on; and I
will discuss why the sublime remains, when not viewed through the lens of śūnyatā, “that everalluring and elusive entity which proves so difficult to describe or define with any precision
…reflecting either a sense of its ineffability or else the sheer frustration of trying to pin down its
ancient and modern meanings” (Porter 2016a: 73).
We are tantalized by the notion of the sublime, from the accounts of Longinus and
Boileau, and then by Burke and Kant, and on into the twentieth century and its adoption by
Newman, Lyotard and others as expressed or signaled through the medium of the plastic arts. I
believe Nabokov had it right: it is indeed “the marvel of consciousness” that we can and do
experience the sublime moment. And the sublime’s signature may be the “vaunting joy” which
both Longinus and Robert Rauschenberg have indicated. But there is much more than that. In the
chapter which follows, I will examine troubling epistemological and ontological problems
inherent in the discourse around the sublime as it is currently understood. There is a way out of
these dilemmas, however, and I argue that these paradoxes and contradictions, when reexamined, may be finally reconciled if we look at them, and the sublime, through the lens of the
Yogācāra-Madhyamaka postulation of emptiness, or śūnyatā, thereby arriving at an emptysublime.
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Chapter Two:
Some Thoughts on the Question:
How Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?

Introduction

Following the brief survey of the history of the sublime that I offered in Chapter One, I
will now take a close look into problems inherent in normative philosophical hermeneutics of
‘the sublime’ by examining the arguments outlined by Guy Sircello in his paper, “How is a
Theory of the Sublime Possible?”,38 that appeared in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
in the fall of 1993. Here Sircello argues that a theory of the sublime is burdened by significant
epistemological and ontological problems which are difficult to ignore or to reconcile. However,
Sircello concludes by arguing (unconvincingly, to my mind) in the last two paragraphs of his
disquisition that, if the interpretation of ontological transcendence is merely rejected, this then
“at least leaves open the possibility, for the nonce, of a theory of the sublime” (Sircello: 549).39
This strikes me as a wholly disingenuous conclusion to a paradigm-shifting inquiry into the
thesis of the sublime. Unfortunately, Sircello died before he could be engaged in conversation
about his radical proposition.
Some fifteen years after the appearance of Sircello’s essay, Jane Forsey wrote a response,
entitled, “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” (2007).40 In her essay, Forsey is correct in
holding the epistemological and ontological problems Sircello identified as inherently
problematic to any coherent theory of the sublime, and that a strategy of rejecting these
problems, such as Sircello suggests, does not make them disappear, nor does it make such a
theory any more viable. This clearly makes a theory of the sublime “such as we have historically
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striven for…simply out of reach” Forsey concludes, due to the contradictions and incoherencies
which riddle all theories of the sublime, beginning with Boileau-Despréaux and continuing to the
present day (Forsey: 327).
This, however, does not negate the experience of what we call ‘the sublime moment’. What
this ‘sublime moment’ is will be discussed at length in chapter three.
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I.
Guy Sircello’s Argument Contra ‘The Sublime’ (Almost)

We first turn to an investigation into the epistemological and ontological problems which
Sircello raises, and which are inherent throughout the whole of the sublime project. Sircello
writes that his “considerations begin from what I take to be a common, if not very well
considered, or perhaps articulated, opinion that, because sublime experience often professes to
‘see’ beyond human powers of knowledge and description, the sublime is inaccessible to rational
thought” (Sircello 541). Sircello states that he is situating his essay within the pastiche of “those
problems and themes that came to be associated with the sublime in nature” (541), rather than a
kind or style of art, as is the case with Longinus, who referred to a certain style of writing and
oratory in his treatise on the sublime; or Lyotard, who speaks of a postmodern sublime art which
‘presents the unpresentable’.
Sircello introduces a three-fold distinction found within the discourses surrounding the
sublime:
first, those narratives of what he calls ’experiences of the sublime’, or
alternatively, ‘sublime experiences’; second, those narratives which fall under
the heading of ‘sublime discourse’; and, finally, all the rest, which includes all
the ’talk about the sublime’.
Sircello aims to situate his essay within this third distinction, viz., the ‘talk about the sublime’, in
which he also includes, for example, Burke’s exposition of the sublime, as well as Kant’s
accounts in the “Analytic of the Sublime”. ‘Experiences of the sublime’ purportedly narrate
those experiences we call ‘sublime’. ‘Sublime discourse’ proceeds, Sircello contends, directly
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from, or out of a sublime experience. And finally, the ‘talk about the sublime’, in which Sircello
locates his essay, can be said to be an analysis of, in descriptive terms, the sublime experience.
In addition to the three distinctions drawn above, Sircello delineates two base assumptions
from which he proceeds: first, that “only sublime experience properly motivates sublime
discourse and therefore… only sublime experience is the proper and ultimate subject matter of
talk about the sublime”. And secondly, that “sublime experience can and does occur in a large
variety of personal, cultural, social and historical contexts, all such contexts also inevitably
involving experience that is not specifically sublime” (542, original emphasis). This second
assumption does not, he maintains, implicate him in “some sort of simple-minded
‘universalism’” (542). He does not, for example, “assume, or believe, that sublime experience
can or does occur in any and all personal, social or historical contexts”. (Why he holds to this
view he unfortunately does not explain.) However, he says he does “assume that time, place and
culture definitely color any sublime discourse as well as affect its use and significance” (542). In
other words, culture, time, and place, and ourselves as Dasein, or being-in-the-world, always
already imbue our experience(s) of the sublime with our individual as well as (inter-)relational
themes. Thus, Sircello argues that there must be “some kind of ‘natural core’ in sublime
experience that is distinguishable from various personal or cultural elaborations and
embroiderings”, and that “this ‘natural core’ will [reveal] what sublime experience at bottom has
to tell us—if anything at all—either about the world or about ourselves” (542). This is, as far as
it goes, an extraordinary conclusion by a western philosopher, and one which we will interrogate
as we go on.
The central theme of Sircello’s paper is the theme of epistemological transcendence, which
he argues can be found within all sublime discourse, which we have briefly discussed above.
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This theme, he says, may be explained through “assertions or assumptions to the effect that
human mental powers in general are revealed (in the experience of moment) [sic]) to have
radically limited access to what, provisionally and for want of a more precise designation, I’ll
call ‘reality’ ” (543). To illustrate this claim, Sircello first enlists the British poet, William
Wordsworth (1770-1850), and an excerpt from his autobiographical epic poem “The Prelude”, or,
“Growth of a Poet’s Mind” (published 1850). Wordsworth writes:
For I would walk alone
In storm and tempest, or in starlight nights
Beneath the quiet heavens, and at that time
Have felt whate’er there is of power in sound
To breathe an elevated mood, by form
Or image unprofaned; and I would stand
Beneath some rock, listening to sounds that are
The ghostly language of the ancient earth,
Or make their dim abode in distant winds.41

Although Wordsworth doesn’t exactly say so, Sircello argues that Wordsworth here refers to that
which is “clearly…beyond cognitive and descriptive powers” (543) when Wordsworth writes
“To breath an elevated mood, by form or image unprofaned…”. I would argue, however, that the
poet is describing in sublime terms, an “elevated mood…unprofaned…”, which we can touch
and experience, and know. I am unclear, however, if Sircello’s contention is really to the
contrary, i.e. that this is beyond ‘cognitive and descriptive powers’, and hence that we cannot
know the sublime experience.
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Sircello next turns to the French writer and philosopher of early post-structuralist thought,
Georges Bataille (1897-1962), whom he cites as a source of the “recent revival of interest in the
sublime” (543).42 Sircello cites Bataille’s writings as an example of discourse about the sublime
experience, and quotes from Bataille’s Inner Experience (1988) [first published as L’expérience
intérieure (1943)] as illustration. Bataille writes: “Experience attains in the end the fusion of
object and subject, being as subject non-knowledge, as object the unknown. It can let the
agitation of intelligence break up on that account: repeated failures don’t serve it any less than
the final docility which one can expect”.43 Bataille is self-identified as siding with the Christian
mystical tradition originating with Pseudo-Dionysius (5th-6th century CE). Bataille’s spirituality,
which may perhaps be traced back through Nietzsche to Schopenhauer, was uniquely a mystical
one, founded upon an absence of god, or Absolute; his was an uncommon attenuation to the
extramundane which looked inward, beyond the normative boundaries of religion, philosophy,
literature, and science, for the discovery of ‘truth’. This, I think, is what attracted Sircello to what
he saw as Bataille’s relationship with the sublime.
Sircello interestingly uses Bataille’s reverence for the transcendental as a springboard of
sorts to discuss Laozi, the elusive author of the Daodejing (ca. 6th century BCE)44 into the
conversation. Sircello states that the opening verse of the Daodejing “firmly establish[es] that
text as sublime discourse” (544), and quotes from a translation by Stephen Mitchell (1988) to
illustrate his point. I repeat that verse here, but I turn to an earlier translation, by Witter Bynner
(1962), which I think conveys this first verse far more poetically, and deeply, than Mitchell’s
more recent translation. It reads:
Existence is beyond the power of words
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To define:
Terms may be used
But are none of them absolute.
In the beginning of heaven and earth there were no words,
Words came out of the womb of matter;
And whether a man dispassionately
Sees to the core of life
Or passionately
Sees the surface,
The core and the surface
Are essentially the same,
Words making them seem different
Only to express appearance.
If name be needed, wonder names them both:
From wonder into wonder
Existence opens.45
While the journey from Bataille to Laozi may seem improbable, Sircello bridges the two
with a nod to Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite (5th-6th century CE), a Christian theologian and
philosopher. Pseudo-Dionysius believed that one’s own “version of sublime experience reveals
‘God’, and hence [he] calls it the ‘divine enlightenment’ ” (544). Neither Bataille nor Laozi
would agree to this theistic formula, however, as both were non-theists. But Sircello insightfully
illuminates Pseudo-Dionysius’s otherwise expansive view, quoting a passage from the latter’s
The Complete Works:
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…[W]e leave behind us all our own notions of the divine. We call a halt to the
activities of our minds and, to the extent that is proper, we approach the ray
which transcends being. Here, in a manner no words can describe, pre-existed
all the goals of all knowledge and it is of a kind that neither intelligence nor
speech can lay hold of… nor can it at all be contemplated since it surpasses
everything and is wholly beyond our capacity to know it.46
Pseudo-Dionysius takes a step well beyond (even) the divine, and all our ideas and concepts
associated with it, and reveals a remarkable affinity with the first verse of the Daodejing. In
quoting this passage, Sircello is building his case for a normalization of a ‘transcendence of
epistemology’ found throughout the ages in ‘talk about the sublime’, beginning with Laozi in
antiquity, and proceeding to Pseudo-Dionysius, then Wordsworth, and then Bataille.
Sircello moves on to quote the contemporary writer Kate Braverman, who argues that
“we…live in the sublime where there is, finally, no rational or imaginative grip on things, where
the only correct response can be ‘Silence like an ocean, incalculable, dimensional’ ” (Sircello
544). Is this an accurate definition of the sublime, or the sublime experience through sublime
discourse? Is Sircello successful in building a reasonable case for a transcendence of
epistemology when considering the sublime? First, before answering these questions, we will
explore what Sircello means by a “transcendence of epistemology revealed in a certain kind of
experience”.
Sircello argues that “the meaning of the epistemological transcendence of the sublime
experience consists in the following proposition: an experience of the sublime presents the object
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of the experience, i.e., the sublime, as epistemologically inaccessible” (544-45). In this first
proposition, Sircello makes clear that an object of (sublime) experience is necessary for any
experience of the sublime to occur, and hence is necessary to his sublime equation. This requires
an experiencer, an object of the sublime experience, and the subsequent sublime experience,
which is, as Sircello defines it, an “experience of radically limited access to reality” (545).
Because Sircello has defined the parameters of his thesis as explained above, viz. that a sublime
experience requires a sublime object, there is no possibility for an alternate approach to the
problem without the requisite inclusion of the manifold of subject and object. This is Sircello’s
first big problem, as I will argue below. But Sircello goes on to postulate that “a theory of the
sublime is a theory of the object of an experience of the sublime”, which, he says, obviously
means that “any true theory of the sublime constitutes epistemological access to the object of the
experience of the sublime and thus to the sublime” (545). This leads him to the inevitable
conclusion that “a true theory of the sublime is impossible” (545), as we have no epistemological
access to an object of experience which is undefinable or unknowable, nor to the experience
itself, “which presents the object of the experience, viz. the sublime, as epistemologically
inaccessible” (545). This results in an incommensurate contradiction.
Following on his premise above, Sircello explains that his interpretation of epistemological
transcendence is “that [the] sublime experience represents something as existing that is
inaccessible to the epistemological powers of human beings, something on a level of being
which therefore transcends that of humankind and all of humankind’s possible environments,
natural and cultural” (545, original emphasis). This latter interpretation also includes, Sircello
says, a thesis of ontological transcendence (which he later tries to dismiss). Sircello then poses a
key question: “[Does] the sublime experience… indeed present a kind or level of being as
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existing that is epistemologically inaccessible?” (546). In the conclusion to his paper Sircello
answers this question, but only provisionally, stating that
if [the thesis of ontological transcendence] is the only possible interpretation of
that theme [of epistemological inaccessibility], (or only reasonable one), then the
theme of epistemological transcendence becomes itself a powerful reason for
believing the thesis of ontological transcendence, for it becomes indirect
evidence for the latter. And in such circumstances the weight of considerations
for and against the thesis of ontological transcendence might well seem simply
to balance one another. In which case, sublime discourse could seem hopelessly
confused, indeed, radically self-contradictory. And such a result could mean
that…a theory of the sublime would be precluded from the beginning by the very
incoherence of its ostensible subject matter. (549, original emphasis)
Sircello’s central argument is this: “Just as it is impossible to have a visual experience that
presents an invisible object, it is impossible to have any kind of experience at all that presents an
object or realm that is in no way epistemologically accessible” (546-47, original emphasis). This,
of course, is indisputable. Sircello thus concludes that
sublime experiences cannot simply be fantasies or dreams, in which anything
goes. For if they are simply such fantasies—and here is a small argument for this
very deep assumption—they have no philosophical meaning whatsoever. For
only if sublime experiences can be seen to tell us something (true or plausible)
about ‘the world’ or ‘ourselves’, and/or about what we can do or be, do they
become of philosophical interest. (547, original emphasis)
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This argument makes this point clear: the sublime experience is of philosophical interest
precisely because it can tell us something, true and plausible, about ourselves and our relation to
the world if we can cut through the incoherencies and contradictions. However, we cannot speak
of ‘dreams or fantasies’ as sublime experiences, for they are not. Nor can we posit something
which is contradictory and incoherent, as much as we might be drawn to any one or another
particular premise.
Sircello poses a refutation to the idea he has raised earlier: that the sublime assumes an
ontological transcendence by virtue of its necessary epistemological transcendence. Sircello now
argues that a not-uncommon theme found in sublime discourse is “the intuition of nothingness,
or the theme of nothingness” (547). This reveals that “for all the revelatory force that sublime
experience is frequently described as having,” quite often this sublime discourse demonstrates
that “there is nothing there to be revealed” (547, original emphasis). This ‘nothing there’ is cited
as a ‘positive’ theme in Wordsworth, whereas with some other writers, a theme of ‘negative’
sublime is found. “It is only in the most tenuous sense”, Sircello writes, that the “Wordsworthian
sublime indicates a presence; it more clearly indicates an absence” (548). Much as Sartre found
an abyssal blank void in his nothingness, Sircello has seized upon ‘nothingness’ as that sign
which a discourse of the sublime frequently invokes in its ontological transcendence. He argues
“even in sublime discourse that, on the whole, has a quite different cast, the theme of
nothingness saliently appears” (548). Sircello invokes the Daodejing to defend his ‘nothingness
theme’, and quotes a fragment of Verse 5 to this effect (citing Stephen Mitchell’s 1988
translation, for which I have, again, substituted the Witter Bynner 1962 translation here):
[…] The universe, like a bellows,
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Is always emptying, always full:
The more it yields, the more it holds.
Men come to their wit’s end arguing about it
And had better meet it at the marrow.47
This, however, does not strike me as a demonstration of the Daodejing’s emphasis on
nothingness or ‘the void’, as Sircello would have us believe. It speaks more to the notion of
opposites, of Yin and Yang, the masculine and the feminine, the dark and the light. Nor does the
following verse, Verse 11, which Sircello contends is the text’s “clearest and most elaborate
expression of the nothingness theme” (548):
Thirty spokes are made one by holes in a hub
By vacancies joining them for a wheel’s use;
The use of clay in moulding pitchers
Comes from the hollow of its absence;
Doors, windows, in a house,
Are used for their emptiness:
Thus we are helped by what is not
To use what is.48
Rather than that “there is nothing there to be revealed”, Laozi contends that the vacancies, the
hollows, and the emptiness are what are inextricable from the whole. There is no bifurcation
which subsequently yields any meaning whatsoever.
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Sircello moves on to quote from the Sūtra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch on the High Seat
of ‘The Treasure of the Law’, or more commonly known as the Sūtra of Huineng (Huineng: 638713 CE), to again make his point about nothingness, or void, as being the same as the sublime.

Sircello chooses three sentences from Chapter II, On Prajñā, of the sutra:
All Buddha kṣetras (lands) are as void as space. Intrinsically our transcendental
nature is void and not a single dharma (thing) [phenomenon] can be attained. It
is the same with the Essence of Mind, which is a state of ‘Absolute Void’ (i.e.,
the voidness of non-void).49 (Sircello: 548)
Here, however, Sircello is clearly conflating his own notion or understanding of ‘nothingness’
and/or ‘voidness’ with what is traditionally meant in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts by the term.
Sircello is trying to make the point that, even in this passage by Huineng, which he defines as
‘sublime discourse’, “the theme of nothingness saliently appears” (Sircello: 548). Which is true.
But what is this ‘nothingness’ to which Sircello speaks? Unfortunately, he does not give a clear
answer. Nevertheless, a reading of the paragraphs immediately following Sircello’s selection in
the text, which Sircello does not reference, clarifies the meaning of this ‘theme of nothingness’
to a much greater degree than do the lines Sircello quotes. Huineng continues:
Learned Audience, when you hear me talk about the Void, do not at once fall
into the idea of vacuity, (because this involves the heresy of the doctrine of
annihilation). It is of the utmost importance that we should not fall into this idea,
because when a man sits quietly and keeps his mind blank he will abide in a state
of ‘Voidness of Indifference’.
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Learned Audience, the illimitable Void of the universe is capable of holding
myriads of things of various shape and form, such as the sun, the moon, stars,
mountains, rivers, worlds, springs, rivulets, bushes, woods, good men, bad men,
dharmas50 pertaining to goodness or badness, deva planes,51 hells, great oceans,
and all the mountains of the Mahameru. Space takes in all these, and so does the
voidness of our nature. We say that the Essence of Mind is great because it
embraces all things, since all things are within our nature. […]52
Huineng insists, therefore, “that there be an awakening in prajñā (transcendental wisdom) rather
than mere absorption in quiet sitting meditation (dhyāna)”.53 In this meditation, one does not
keep one’s mind blank, nor does one strive to abide in a ‘Voidness of Indifference’. The point is
clear that neither vacuity nor nihilism is part and parcel of what Huineng is pointing towards in
this text, nor should it be conflated with a notion of the sublime which is imagined as both
vacuous and nihilistic, or as a ‘nothing there to be revealed’.
The above translation of the Sūtra of Huineng by Wong Mou-lam, from 1929, and then
“polish[ed] up” in 1952 by Christmas Humphreys,54 still leaves much to be desired. Nineteenthand early twentieth-century translations of Buddhist texts would often translate the Sanskrit word
śūnya as ‘void’, and śūnyatā (or 空, read kong in Chinese, and kū in Japanese), as ‘voidness’.55
However, this translation falls far short of the mark. Śūnyatā refers to the foundational Mahāyāna
view that all dharmas, or phenomena, are completely lacking in any trace of autonomous essence
or self-existence. This is due to the interdependent coörigination of all phenomena. In speaking
of śūnyatā, Chögyam Trungpa writes that: “the absence of preconceived ideas is what is called
shunyata [sic], or emptiness, in Buddhist terminology. This absence of preconceived ideas brings
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a tremendous amount of space between the object and yourself” (Trungpa 2017: 191).56
Furthermore, he writes that “as a realization, it grows out of the awakening of prajñā”57 (Trungpa
1980:368). As śūnyatā, or emptiness, is a central focus of this current project, vis à vis the

sublime, I will have much more to say on this subject as we progress.
Here Sircello ends by stating, optimistically but unconvincingly, that “epistemological
transcendence…may not presuppose any ontology and may not directly concern ‘the real’ at all,
but only the limitations of any attempts to grasp it, whatever it is or is taken to be” (549, original
emphasis). However, having cataloged the contradictions and incoherencies inherent in the
positing of epistemological and ontological transcendence in a theory of the sublime, it is
difficult to reconcile how he resorts to this very problematic ‘non-conclusion’.
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II.
Jane Forsey Responds to Sircello

Sircello states at the outset of his essay that he holds to the belief or, as he says, “perhaps
better, my operating principle, that true, or at least reasonable, theories of the sublime are
possible…” (Sircello: 541, original emphasis). Perhaps, but Jane Forsey notes in the introduction
to her paper that Sircello “was concerned that our efforts to capture and explain the sublime have
in fact resulted in claims that are either contradictory or incoherent, due to tensions between
(often unarticulated) epistemological and ontological commitments” (Forsey 319). These
tensions result in contradictions and incoherencies which, Forsey argues, are prima facie
incommensurable, and I agree. I will argue in this chapter that these contradictions and
incoherencies are inherent in the mistaken interpretations of what is normatively understood as
‘the sublime’.
Sircello identifies the incoherency fundamental to the thesis of an ‘epistemological
transcendence’, where the “sublime presents the object of the experience, i.e. the sublime, as
epistemologically inaccessible” (Sircello 545). Forsey asks: “how [is it that] we can have an
experience—and describe that experience—which presents an object that is in no way
epistemologically accessible? This would be tantamount, [as] Sircello noted, to having a visual
experience of an invisible object: impossible” (Forsey 321, original emphasis). Furthermore, this
thesis assumes an object of experience, although, as Forsey argues, “it leaves open the question
of what this object might be, or whether it indeed exists” (545, my emphasis). And this then calls
into question the ontology of this object, and its possibility of existence and/or non-existence.
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Where there is not this epistemological incoherence, there is contradiction. In describing
objects of sublime experience, Addison, Burke, and Lyotard, for example, variously recount
“objects…too big for its capacity” (Addison);58 a “mind so entirely filled with its object that it
cannot entertain any other nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it”
(Burke);59 and “that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation
itself…” (Lyotard).60 In each of these theses of the sublime, the sublime object of experience is
postulated, be it “huge heaps of mountains, high rocks and precipices, or a wide expanse of
waters” (Addison);61 or “serpents and poisonous animals of all kinds” (Burke),62 etc. The
problem, then, as Forsey points out, is that “rocks and mountains [and oceans, etc.] are not things
we do not comprehend or cannot comprehend; we would not describe them if we did not have
access to them. When we do identify them as sublime objects, we are not treating them as
[simultaneously] inaccessible to rational thought” (Forsey 321). Therein lies the contradiction:
we are saying in effect that an object which is accessible and knowable to us is also inaccessible
to us, i.e. to our rational thought, by virtue of its transcendent nature, and is therefore
unknowable. How can that be? This is a very problematic contradiction, with vast ramifications
to the entire thesis of the sublime.
Where, then, does this incommensurability leave us? Forsey argues that “if we focus on the
metaphysical status of the sublime object, our epistemology becomes problematic, but if we
address instead the epistemological transcendence of a certain experience, we still seem forced to
make some metaphysical claim about the object of that experience” (321-22). From what has
been argued above, the object of the sublime experience presents a dilemma of incoherence, and
knowing that which is presented to us, which we define as a knowable or cognizable
phenomenon, presents a contradiction. These dilemmas have been ignored from Longinus up to
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the present day in postulating a ‘sublime’. It could be possible that we are going about the
discussion about the ‘sublime’ from a completely mistaken foundational view. Are we looking
through the wrong lens?
Forsey proceeds to an examination of the Kantian sublime, seeking resolution to the above
contradictions, if any are to be found. Kant writes in the first section of the “Analytic of the
Sublime” that “we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we call any object of nature
sublime…All that we can say is that the object lends itself for the presentation of a sublimity
discoverable in the mind. For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in
any sensuous form…” (§23, ¶245, p. 76, original emphasis).63 Forsey concludes that “what is
sublime for Kant is not something in the world—some portion of the ‘real’ that we directly
experience—but a feeling we have that is occasioned by certain sensory experiences” (Forsey
322). However, I find Forsey’s use of the word ‘feeling’ problematic, and not at all edifying.
‘Feeling’ can be variously defined as: “sensation, sense, consciousness, sensibility, discernment,
emotions, moral sense”,64 and so on. However, she does go on to say that Kant is not particularly
interested in our mere phenomenological experience as much as he is in “epistemological
transcendence: the mechanism by which we realize our cognitive limitations and the positive
(moral) implications of this realization” (323). This, however, brings us back to the problem of
an epistemological contradiction, never mind the spider’s web of moral (and theistic)
implications.
But further reading of §26 in the “Analytic of the Sublime”, compels Forsey to
immediately revise her previous conclusion, stating that “Kant seems to suggest… that, in the
moment, we become aware of a part of us that transcends the natural world” (323). For Kant,
Forsey argues, the sublime “is more than a feeling: it is an awareness of a part of ourselves that
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surpasses understanding: ‘Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu konnen ein Vermogen des
Gemüts beweiset, das jeden Maßstab der Sinne übertrifft [the sublime is that, the mere ability to
think which shows a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of sense]’ ” (§25, ¶250, p.81)
(Forsey 323). However, Kant takes this a step further in his last paragraph of §28, where he
writes:
Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only
in our own mind, in so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over
nature within, and thus also over nature without us (as exerting influence upon
us). Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature
which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and it
is only under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we
are capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that being which inspires
deep respect in us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by
the faculty which is harboured in us of judging that might without fear, and of
regarding our vocation as sublimely above it (§28, ¶264, p. 94).

What is truly sublime then, Forsey concludes, “is not an object of experience: it is an object of
thought” (Forsey 323), or our supersensible nature. However, this is not the clear explanation we
need here. I would argue that Kant is saying that the experience of sublimity opens a window to
our own ‘divinity’, which is superior to nature without and our ‘fallen’ humanity within. This is a
wholly theistic view, minus the proper noun denoting the Creator from and through whom we
experience an Aufhebung, or a ‘raising up’, and thereby assimilating the ‘might’ of nature which
challenges our [mere human] strength.
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Kant situates the sublime as originating, and residing, within the experiencing
subject, as opposed to within, or as, the object of experience. And while this thesis does not
necessarily betray the incoherence we find in Sircello’s conception of an epistemological
transcendence, there remains for Kant a view of ontological transcendence, where a reality is
indicated as existing, viz. as the sublime experience, while simultaneously remaining inaccessible
to our mere human cognitive faculties. “With Sircello’s second formulation”, Forsey writes, “we
escape incoherence only to find ourselves facing some ineffable or mysterious reality that we do
not experience directly, that we cannot know, but that nevertheless we must posit as existing, of
which the sublime gives us a glimmer. This…renders the ontology all the more mysterious and
all the more tantalizingly out of reach” (324). And all the more problematic. Just as an
archeologist cannot go into a ‘dig’ with preconceived expectations, and then work to fit the
discoveries of the investigation into her preconceived thesis, so a philosopher cannot profitably
work backwards. This, however, seems to be what has plagued the genealogy of the sublime
from earliest times.
Forsey concludes by examining ‘experience’. “Experience”, Forsey writes, “is largely held
to be intentional, with at least a perceived phenomenal content (whatever that content may turn
out to be). If this experience is not conceptual, leading to the above-noted problems with
epistemology, then we can suggest that it is perhaps emotional, a kind of feeling that we have
when faced with some (or any) phenomena” (326). Forsey does not consider that there is yet
another alternative when considering the nature or varieties of experience: the non-conceptual
experience, such as Shelley and Carroll argue.65 Nevertheless, Forsey comes closer to this
conclusion than she may know when she states that “not only may we say[, if we consider this

75
third possibility,] that the sublime is not a species of cognitive failure, but also that it has nothing
to do with [rational] cognition at all” (326). However, she does not pursue this line further, and
instead concludes that “if we seek to describe the sublime as a feeling (of pleasure) of a certain
kind, we face a paradox: either feelings are intentional and object-regarding (and so are
theorizable in the above problematic ways), or feelings are non-intentional and cannot be
theorized at all” (326). And if feelings are intentional, why does the sublime, as postulated,
capture some feelings and not others? And furthermore, if we maintain that feelings are
unintentional then, Forsey argues, we wind up with something that cannot be theorized. “How do
we provide a theory of this sort of thing”, Forsey asks, “beyond some kind of literary capturing
of the feelings as they occur?” (327). This ‘literary capturing’ of feelings, or experience(s),
results in the texts Sircello cites in his examples of the sublime discourse, which speak to and of
the sublime experience: Wordsworth’s (1770-1850) The Lyric; Laozi’s (ca. sixth century BCE)
Daodejing; and the Sixth Ancestor Huineng’s (638-713 CE) Platform Sūtra, more widely known
as The Sūtra of Huineng. These texts shed no light on a theory of the sublime for Forsey,
however, and come up wanting in the search for answers to the ‘fundamental questions’ she
argues have driven the debate around the sublime for two millennia, viz. “What kinds of objects
are sublime? What does the sublime tell us about ourselves as subjects? and centrally, What does
sublime experience illuminate about the limitations of our access to the world?” (327). While I
agree that these questions may be postulated as central concerns and unknowns in any discourse
surrounding the sublime, only an investigation into the second, i.e. What does the sublime tell us
about ourselves as subjects? might hold out hope for an insight into the true nature of the
sublime, and by consequence, the true nature of mind conceptualizing the sublime. This is key. If
we are to avoid the missteps of contradiction and/or incoherence, we must conclude that “a
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theory of the sublime as it has been historically formulated is simply not possible” (324), then
proceed apace.
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III.
Critiques of Forsey’s Argument:
McMahon and Margolis

Forsey received pointed blowback for arguing that the sublime, as historically postulated,
is completely untenable. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen, has edited an anthology66 of six invited
responses67 to Forsey’s paper, and writes in his brief Preface to the volume that: “if Forsey’s
detection is correct [that all available accounts of sublimity, duly unpacked, are indeed corrupted
to the point that no coherent account is possible], the notion of the sublime collapses into a mere
useless label or is given over to frivolous use much like a curse, an exclamation like ‘Cool!’ and
‘Wow!’…” (viii). Forsey’s conclusions are (of course) contested, and Aagard-Mogensen’s
volume presents six different views on Forsey’s interpretation of the sublime project, plus a final
rebuttal by Forsey. In this section and the next, I will survey two of these arguments in response
to Forsey’s contention: first, Jennifer McMahon’s; followed by Joseph Margolis’.
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McMahon
The sublime is that aspect of experience that prompts a narrative about our place in the world…,
the content of [which] is culturally contingent.
-Jennifer McMahon

Forsey has an insightful critic in Jennifer McMahon. McMahon begins her argument by
stating that “the sublime is an experience of the world which involves us in orientating ourselves
within it, and this orientation, our human orientation, elevates us in comparison to the nonhuman world according to traditional accounts of the sublime”(McMahon: 81). McMahon goes
on to say that “the sublime tells us something about our relation to the world rather than anything
about the world per se” (81). McMahon sets up her reading of the topology of the sublime
straightaway: a dichotomous, self-reflexive, edifying experience of the self within the larger
natural world.
However, McMahon argues that the sublime is culturally and temporally contingent, and
not a static ‘truth’; the latter being a notion more suitable to Kantian thought than to today’s
post-postmodern era of late, global capitalism, where there is no static truth. McMahon writes
that the sublime is “that aspect of experience that prompts a narrative about our place in the
world…”, but that “the content of [that] narrative of the sublime is culturally contingent”, and
not static. She further argues that “the experience of the sublime goes beyond mere cognition in
the meaning and significance we ascribe to it” (90-91); however, she does not explain what that
‘beyond’ may include, or to what it points. In this reading, McMahon is suggesting that the
sublime experience functions as a mirror of sorts, reflecting the tensions we encounter between
reason and intuition, or imagination, as it is given to us in our distinct cultural and temporal
context. “The meaning given to this encounter”, she continues, “will be based on cultural beliefs
and commitments which vary over time” (90). This contingency of meaning legislates that
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sublimity “go[es] beyond cognition”, to where “the significance of the object goes beyond what
is given in perception” (ibid.).
McMahon offers an excellent précis of Forsey’s overview of the suppositions intrinsic to
the architectonic of the Kantian sublime: “Kant takes the features of the sublime as given and
extrapolates from them certain features of the mind as if any concept of the sublime must
implicate the mental architecture of his account. [Forsey further argues] that in fact the concept
of the sublime does implicate a particular system of the mind, but neither Kant nor anyone else
can successfully formulate it because the concept itself frames certain contradictions…[from
which] two contradictions follow. First…that Kant’s system of the mind does not support the
features of the sublime; and secondly, that no system could [support these features], as the very
concept is incoherent” (81). Here McMahon hits on a crucial point of the concept of ‘the
sublime’, which is that all analyses of the sublime have thus far sprung from the same Cartesian
system of ‘I’, ’am’, and ‘other’, and the allied architectonic of mind. However, McMahon argues
here that the Kantian view of the mind is out-of-date, and that if we consider current research on
the empirical and philosophical aspects of perception, then a theory of the sublime will indeed
hold. Let us consider how she goes about making her argument.
First, McMahon takes issue with Forsey’s dismissal of Sircello’s hopeful conclusion to his
argument. Here, Sircello argued that our experience of the sublime could “provide us with a
sense of our cognitive limitations rather than actually giving us access to some aspect of reality
beyond our cognitive capacities” (83). (Kant refers to cognition (Erkenntnis) as ‘objective
perception’ or objective ‘representation with consciousness’ (Caygill 113). Cognition is, for
Kant, usually, but not always distinguished from thinking and knowledge.) I would ask, though,
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how would it be possible for us to have an experience of a cognitive limitation, all the while
recognizing that we were experiencing a cognitive limitation, which could only occur if we
knew, or were aware of, what was lying beyond that limitation? Otherwise, it would never be
recognized as a limitation, but merely as the normal state of affairs. We don’t know we are only
looking at shadows on the wall of a cave until we are shown the world which exists outside the
entrance to the cave. Prior to stepping outside the cave, our cognitive limitations are not
experienced as limitations at all, but rather comprise and illustrate our world as we know it, and
as it is given to us, there and then. And once we step outside, and experience life outside the
cave, returning inside the cave does not reinstate our cognitive limitations nor cognitive
dissonances. Life is never the same again.
McMahon disputes Forsey’s interpretation of Kant’s notion of “going beyond cognition”.
Kant is very interested in the issue of epistemological transcendence, Forsey writes. That is, he
gives attention to “the mechanism by which we realize our cognitive limitations and the positive
(moral) implications of this realization” (Forsey 323). The sublime, Forsey concludes here, “is
more than a feeling; it is an awareness of a part of ourselves that surpasses understanding: [as
Kant writes,] Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu konnen ein Vermogen des Gemüts beweiset,
das jeden Maßstab der Sinne übertrifft [the sublime is that, the mere ability to think which shows
a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of sense]” (323; CJ §25, ¶250, p. 81). McMahon
argues that Kant did not mean here that experiences of the sublime function without cognition,
but rather that “the experience of the sublime is constituted in large part by the ascription of
meaning and significance to the object and that this meaning is drawn from rational ideas”
(McMahon 84). Therefore, our being-in-the-world is “infused with the ideas of reason, and hence
generated by us” (84). We give shape to our experiences, McMahon argues, and accordingly
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give these experiences meaning. And this notion of ‘going beyond cognition’ “means attributing
more to the object than is given” (84) through our reason. “In experiences of the sublime”,
McMahon argues, “the rational ideas play this role which are associated with a broader cultural
basis (ideas with no intuition, as rational ideas are, are associated with our moral feeling)” (85).
Hence, McMahon holds that Forsey is misreading Kant on this point. McMahon argues that
‘going beyond cognition’ does not imply cognitive failure, but is, rather, “conditioned on a
cognitive capacity”, indeed a “path to the emergence of new awareness, new concepts” (86,
emphasis added). This seems purely fanciful to me. I am not sure Forsey interprets Kant
particularly well on this point, if she believes that Kant is saying that the sublime experience is
the result of cognitive failure; but certainly McMahon is off-track here with her argument that
the sublime moment of cognitive failure gives rise to new awareness and new concepts. How
does a new awareness and new concepts obtain from cognitive failure? This seems
fundamentally counter-intuitive.
McMahon continues her critique by drawing on the 2013 monograph by Emily Brady,68
the latter arguing that we do not experience a sense of superiority over nature in our experience
of the sublime, but rather “a sense of our integration into nature” (88). This sense of integration,
or, I suppose one could say, inseparability (?), Brady contends, produces the pleasurable aspect
of the classical narrative of the experience of the sublime. However, Brady departs from
McMahon by not tying her hermeneutic of the sublime discourse to a contingent historicity, and
instead argues that the sublime is both an aesthetic category and a marker of the ethical, “in that
it grounds [us in] a particular responsible attitude to the natural environment” (89). Brady’s
perspective, McMahon avers, is to regard the sublime as a vehicle for orientating oneself to the
world in a way that makes one feel at home in it. “The assumption”, writes McMahon, “is that an
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attitude, perspective, or outlook is required in order to want to know the world. The awe and
wonder of the sublime arouses a sense of something greater than ourselves, but fear turns to
pleasure in our sense of feeling part of this greater thing, which in Brady’s account is nature”
(89). For Kant, McMahon says, the tension between this ‘sense of something greater than
ourselves’, and the greatness which resides within us, points to the superiority, the very triumph
of our human reason over raw nature. For Brady, this sense of something greater than ourselves
is the natural world. And for McMahon, this sense is always already a contingent tension. The
key point that McMahon finds lacking in Forsey’s and Brady’s accounts of the sublime is the
superiority and triumph of human reason over all else. McMahon argues that if we treat the
sublime “as an experience of the world which orientates us in a way which works against
feelings of alienation, then we have a much broader structure to deal with” (89). And this can
only be accomplished if we acknowledge a contingent nature of the narrative of the sublime in
terms of its historical and cultural context.
This conclusion by McMahon strikes me as an attempt to first construct a known end point
to her argument, from which she constructs a subsequent logic to fit within it. It is true,
universally, that we, all humankind, do not feel at home in our world, nor particularly in our own
skins. This was true in Kant’s time, and is true now. The contingencies of culture and era do not
change this. Only their appearances change. And from this point, we could pursue no fewer than
two different routes of escape: try to further feather our nest, and hope to finally become
comfortable; or, we could look directly into the nature of this world, right now; into the
experience of the sublime, and into the ‘I’ doing the looking, to see what it is we might find. This
latter course is, I argue, the only antidote to feelings of alienation and discomfort, of dis-ease;
which will, in turn, disclose a world in which we experience phenomena directly without turning
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away towards the bias of pleasure, comfort, or limitation. We feel a sense of clarity wherever we
are, and whenever that might be; which is, of course, always now.
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Joseph Margolis
Dare I suggest that the canonical ‘sublime’ is no more than a version of the picturesque
—the occasion for a quaint eighteenth—or nineteenth-century frisson.
-Joseph Margolis

Joseph Margolis answers Jane Forsey’s paper with a brief, yet singular, and heterodox
responsum, situating his view of the sublime nevertheless within the broad, historical context of
the conversation, but especially as it has been framed by Kant. Margolis calls himself a
pragmatic anti-Kantian ‘Kantian’. (And he is clearly a brilliant one.) He sets out his task: to
suggest “an anti-Kantian proposal of what the ‘sublime’ (or whatever now shares the conceptual
space of the sublime, in our own day and way) might be said to have come to mean” (Margolis:
18). Margolis' anti-Kantian response is predicated on the central argument that “Kant was unable
to show that human knowledge and understanding could ever escape the deep (second-order)
conditionality of human inquiry itself, which (then) signifies an insurmountable limitation on the
least pretensions of objective knowledge. The whole of human knowledge and understanding is,
therefore, put at ineliminable risk at every point of supposed success” (18-9).
These risks, however, are viewed as essentially “benign” by Margolis, notwithstanding
what he calls their “genuine and ineluctable” threats and challenges to epistemological ‘security’,
and the skepticism they raise. But the key takeaway from this, Margolis concludes, is that any
notion of an “epistemological ‘security’ is forever breached—hence, that the formulation of an
adequate theory of the sublime is impossible to sustain: ‘epistemological transcendence’, as
[Forsey] rightly notes, cannot be rightly vouchsafed” (19). And from here, Margolis frames his
central thesis: “But that [impossibility of ‘epistemological transcendence’] means that what the
usual theories regularly champion is already—‘always already’—an ineliminable commonplace
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of the human condition itself! It cannot possibly be an exceptional or rare experience or
discovery—which is what the standard advocacy of the sublime is thought to require” (ibid.).
Now we are getting somewhere, somewhere down to earth! Not only is the sublime, as
historically postulated, impossible due to the incoherencies and contradictions inherent in its
very premise, but now Margolis proposes that the sublime is an ‘ineliminably commonplace of
the human condition’. Margolis' alternative view of the nature of the sublime includes the “utter
perilousness (the ineliminable uncertainties, reversibilities, possibilities of immense disaster,
risk, unheard-of contingencies, change, and the like) of human belief and commitment and
conviction and conditions of survival sustained through life and the whole of human history that
is the source of the sense and presence of the sublime… . Dare I suggest”, Margolis explains,
“that the canonical ‘sublime’ is no more than a version of the picturesque—the occasion for a
quaint eighteenth—or nineteenth-century frisson” (ibid.).
It is the mundanity, the abjection, the excitement, all the variegated experiences, both
phenomenological and emotional/psychological, which comprise the human experience that
Margolis argues constitute the sublime experience. Margolis is saying here that our experience of
life in its totality is, itself, sublime. But we do not realize it as such. This, prima facie, is a
radical, even revolutionary notion. (And without giving away the denouement of the current
project, this line of inquiry is precisely what I will be exploring in the following chapters.)
“What remains of the sublime”, Margolis concludes,
is, I suggest, the ordinary as extraordinary, the sheer viability of life in all its guises
and niches. If the experience of the sublime is at all close to what is essential to
human life, it would make no sense to suppose that seriously engaged philosophies
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could be instructively sorted as congenial or uncongenial to that sort of sensibility.
In Kant’s case, it’s the futility of the Critical vision itself that obliged Kant to treat
the sublime as paradoxical. But then, Kant succeeded at the edge of failure. How
many have followed him over the cliff? (ibid.)
Within Forsey’s subsequent rebuttal of Margolis’ thesis, she reveals a very telling bias as
an afterthought to a criticism of Margolis’ view of the sublime: “[Margolis] rejects the
moralizing aspect of a Kantian account:69 there is no prescription or reward in what Margolis
offers, unless our heightened awareness brings its own reward” (93). As I will argue in the
chapters that follow, a heightened, vivid awareness in the moment, is precisely the reward: the
experience of the sublime moment. Forsey, like Kant, fails to recognize this.
For Forsey, Margolis’ account of a quotidian sublime raises a central question, or what
she calls a paradox. She writes that “the heart of the question remains: what makes this kind of
[quotidian] experience [which Margolis defines as sublime] a particularly aesthetic one”, as it
does not necessarily contain or engender pleasure (94)? And striking at the heart of the matter:
“if not aesthetic”, Forsey asks, “then what, precisely, is it?” (95). Forsey proceeds to posit the
inextricable link between the aesthetic and pleasure, and to question the veracity of ‘negative
pleasure’ in what Margolis identifies as the human commonplace of uncertainties, reversibilities,
possibilities of immense disaster, change, etc., as experiences of the sublime. This is an
interesting move for Forsey, because she finds negative emotion, or ‘negative pleasure’, to
represent a troubling, if not incommensurable, proposition to the sublime-aesthetic equation.
Forsey lays out three possible means by which to resolve what she describes as the “paradox of
negative emotion”:
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1) First, “maintain the link between the aesthetic and pleasure, and claim that the sublime is
pleasurable”, but distinguishing “this pleasure from the pleasures of the beautiful, the
agreeable, the erotic and so on”;
2) Or, “divorce the aesthetic from pleasure, and argue that the sublime”, as well as experiences
encompassing the abject, “yield no pleasure at all but are nonetheless aesthetic for some other
reason (that needs to be determined)”; and
3) Third, “claim that as distinctly unpleasurable, the sublime and like negative experiences are
therefore not aesthetic at all. (94-5)
These three options yield no substantive solutions to Forsey’s earlier questions or
dilemmas. This interrogation, instigated by Margolis’ response, in fact reveals contradictions and
incoherencies within the very thesis of the aesthetic, in addition to that of the sublime as already
argued. Forsey questions the validity of an account of the sublime experience because she casts
doubt on it as an aesthetic, i.e. a pleasurable, experience. However, how is it that we (or she)
have come to equate the aesthetic solely with the pleasurable? Forsey states matter-of-factly that
“indeed the link between the aesthetic and pleasure is almost as old as the notion of the aesthetic
itself” (94). But is it? And even if it is, is it correct? To consider these questions, and apparent
paradoxes of what defines ‘aesthetics’, we will digress briefly from our main subject of the
sublime to briefly canvass a related, but no less problematic one: the aesthetic.
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IV.
The Aesthetic Problematic

Where did the notion of aesthetics come from, and what is its relation to the sublime? Can
we speak of an ‘aesthetic sublime’? Does the thesis of aesthetics hold up under scrutiny? I argue
in the conclusion to this brief section that the concept of aesthetics is as rife with problems as is
that of the sublime.
First, the backstory: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) created the term
aesthetics (from the Greek aisthētikós, ‘to perceive’; i.e., our sensory experience, and the
feelings it arouses), which made its way into the German philosophical lexicon through his
dissertation, Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus (Philosophical
Meditations on some Matters Pertaining to Poetry, 1735). In aesthetics, Baumgarten draws a
distinction between the abstract knowledge one gains through logic, on the one hand, and the
empirical knowledge gained through the sensory experiences combined with feelings related to
encounters with nature and les beaux arts, on the other. Susan Feagin glosses Baumgarten’s
‘aesthetic’ as “always intimately connected with sensory experience and the kinds of feeling it
arouses” (Feagin: 12), Noël Carroll adds that Hegel, in the latter’s Introductory Lectures On
Aesthetics (1835/1842), argues that “ ‘Aesthetic’ means more precisely the science of sensation or
feeling” (Carroll 2004: 423).
I will briefly survey three propositions of the aesthetic here:70 1) the aesthetic judgment, as
argued by Kant; 2) the aesthetic attitude, as argued by Schopenhauer; and 3) the aesthetic
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experience, as argued by Clive Bell. Following that, I present George Dickie’s argument contra a
normative understanding of ‘aesthetics’.
1) In Part I of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, titled Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant
argues that “the judgement of taste [i.e. the faculty of judging the beautiful]…is not a cognitive
judgement [neither a theoretical one nor a practical], and so not logical, but is aesthetic—which
means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective” (CJ §1, ¶203, p.
35, original emphasis). So while Kant establishes the judgment of taste as aesthetic and
subjective, and absent of all logic, that aesthetic judgment of taste is simultaneously
disinterested. Kant states: “The delight which determines the judgement of taste is independent
of all interest” (§2, ¶204, p. 36, my emphasis). And Kant then proceeds to discuss “three
different kinds of delight…the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good, [which] thus denote three
different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure…” (§5, ¶209, p.
41). Kant, of course, goes on, but what is of note in Kant’s analytic of aesthetics is that in his
discussing the aesthetic judgment, disinterestedness takes center stage, but not without an
acknowledgement of both pleasure and displeasure which can be found within the agreeable, the
beautiful, and the good: the three different kinds of delight. Kant’s gloss of the aesthetic differs
substantively from Baumgarten’s. Baumgarten argues that the aesthetic is defined by one’s
sensory experiences combined with feelings; while Kant argues that the aesthetic judgment of
taste is disinterested, completely neutral. It is difficult to imagine a completely neutral,
disinterested feeling of delight given by a sensory experience. Feelings are, after all, emotional
states and/or reactions.
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2) The theories of aesthetic attitude (and aesthetic experience) can be traced to Arthur
Schopenhauer in his The World as Will and Representation [Vorstellung] (1819/1844), and to
what he termed ‘aesthetic contemplation’. (It is interesting to note that Kant says that the
aesthetic judgment of taste “is simply contemplative, i.e. it is a judgement which is indifferent as
to the existence of an object, and only decides how its character stands with the feeling of
pleasure and displeasure” (CJ §5, ¶209, p. 41.). Kant’s notion of ‘contemplative’ in the CJ takes
on a different meaning from Schopenhauer’s ‘aesthetic contemplation’, however.)
Schopenhauer’s view of the aesthetic attitude, or ‘aesthetic contemplation’ as he often
refers to it, is imbued with what Schopenhauer calls ‘will-lessness’, or desire-lessness, and which
he describes in this way:
Inward disposition, the predominance of knowing over willing, can produce this
state [of will-less knowledge] under any circumstances. This is shown by those
admirable Dutch artists who directed this purely objective perception to the most
insignificant objects, and established a lasting monument to their objectivity and
spiritual peace in their pictures of still life, which the aesthetic beholder looks on
not without emotion; for they present to him the peaceful, still frame of mind of the
artist, free from will…”. (Schopenhauer §38, Book Three, p.120-21, original
emphasis)
It is this ‘will-less’, or desire-less, disposition of mind which is the aesthetic attitude that allows
the viewer to share with the artist a “will-less knowledge, [in which] they are both taken out of
the stream of time and of all other relations”, according to Schopenhauer (120). Schopenhauer
argues that we possess an “inner power of artistic disposition” which, while proceeding from an
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objective frame of mind, is facilitated by the “abundance of natural beauty” which can contribute
to, if not create the ground for, this aesthetic attitude. For Schopenhauer there is an attitude, or
state which exists “as pure contemplation, as being absorbed in perception, losing oneself in the
object, forgetting all individuality…; the state by means of which, at once and inseparably, the
perceived particular thing is raised to the Idea of its whole species…” (120). One might say
Schopenhauer’s ‘attitude’ is a transcendental cognition;71 I would describe it as the signifier of a
state of pure, unmediated cognition, a seeing and knowing that diverges significantly from an
‘aesthetic inattention’. This is not, however, how Kant defines his ‘disinterestedness’. And this
gloss goes well beyond Baumgarten’s sensory experiences and feelings.
3) The theory apropos of the aesthetic experience can be be traced to Clive Bell’s (18811964) discussion on what he proposes as ‘a complete theory of visual art’, found in his ambitious
1914 monograph, titled simply, Art. Bell writes that “The starting-point for all systems of
aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this
emotion we call works of art.[…] This emotion is called aesthetic emotion…” (Bell 107). Bell
then continues: “Great art remains stable and unobscured because the feelings that it awakens are
independent of time and place, because its kingdom is not of this world. […] The forms of art are
inexhaustible; but all lead by the same road of aesthetic emotion to the same world of aesthetic
ecstasy” (110). Perhaps by ‘ecstasy’, Bell is saying that art transports us to a similar state of
“pure contemplation, as being absorbed in perception, losing oneself in the object, forgetting all
individuality” as it did for Schopenhauer nearly a century earlier. And yet, Bell is referencing a
feeling and/or emotion, much like Baumgarten, rather than anything approaching nonconceptuality, as we find in Schopenhauer.
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Examining the three-fold proposition of aesthetics which I have just surveyed, viz., 1)
aesthetic judgment; 2) aesthetic attitude; and 3) aesthetic experience, we find nothing that
requires the aesthetic to express or embody the pleasurable, despite Forsey’s contention to the
contrary as cited above. Kant speaks of ‘delight’, but a disinterested delight. Schopenhauer does
not describe pleasure as an apt analogy for the aesthetic, but rather, in describing ‘Art’ as
synonymous with the work of genius, it is “like the ray of sun that calmly pierces the storm and
is not deflected by it; …like a rainbow, silently resting on [a waterfall’s] raging torrent”
(Schopenhauer 109; §36, Book Three).
To conclude this short section on ‘aesthetics’, I turn to the twentieth-century critic, George
Dickie. Theories and views on aesthetics have passed through many hands (and heads) since
Baumgarten, but it wasn’t until George Dickie launched a forceful polemic contra Baumgarten’s
thesis, and Kant’s, et al., that a sea-change in the conception of, and attitude about, the theories
of aesthetics occurred. Attacking the veracity of prevailing aesthetic attitude theories, Dickie
lambasts what he calls “that encrusted article of faith…[which marks] the vacuousness of the
term ‘aesthetic’ ” (Dickie 56, 64). In his essay, “The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude” (1964),72
Dickie argues that normative aesthetic attitude theories demand a conventional ‘attending to’ that
is both complete and disinterested; however, this ideal of ‘attending to’ never truly exists in our
lived experience. Our ‘attending to’ is always already partial, distracted, spotty, and filtered
through our own wholly subjective, ever-changing, discursive frame. Thus, Dickie argues that
theories of aesthetic attitude and experience rely on ‘straw dogs’ of attentiveness which cannot,
in fact, be substantiated, be they explications by Kant, Schopenhauer, or Bell. Something else is
going on which philosophers since Baumgarten have struggled to explain and define. We are
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thus left with another contradictory thesis which does not hold up under the scrutiny of common
experience and empirical reasoning, just as we have seen with the ‘sublime’.
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Conclusion
This is a key chapter to this project. The historical sublime, which I surveyed in Chapter
One, is revealed in this chapter to be riddled with incoherencies and contradictions, which I
argue make all claims about the sublime, as normatively theorized, consequently impossible.
To clarify this conclusion, I begin with an introduction of Guy Sircello’s critical
interrogation of the strata which constitute the historical sublime project, revealing
epistemological incoherencies and ontological contradictions, and which, Sircello concludes,
cannot be reconciled. Sircello identifies a central element in the sublime proposition: that of
epistemological transcendence, or inaccessibility. The normative discourse holds that the
“sublime presents the object of experience, i.e. the sublime, as epistemologically inaccessible”
(Sircello 545). Sircello explains that his interpretation of this epistemological transcendence is
that the “sublime experience represents something as existing that is inaccessible to the
epistemological powers of human beings, something on a level of being which therefore
transcends that of humankind and all of humankind’s possible environments, natural and
cultural” (545, original emphasis).
Jane Forsey elucidates the problematic this normative thesis presents, following Sircello’s
lead, by posing the question: “how [is it that] we can have an experience—and describe that
experience—which presents an object that is in no way epistemologically accessible? This would
be tantamount, [as] Sircello noted, to having a visual experience of an invisible object:
impossible” (Forsey 321, original emphasis). And this object of experience presents a further
problem, or complication: as Forsey argues, “it leaves open the question of what this [alleged]
object might be, or whether it indeed exists” (545, my emphasis). The ontological problem, as
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Forsey points out, arises from the fact that “rocks and mountains [and oceans, cathedrals, etc.—
all those things which supposedly give rise to the sublime] are not things we do not comprehend
or cannot comprehend; we would not describe them if we did not have access to them. When we
do identify them as sublime objects, we are not [and cannot be] treating them as [simultaneously]
inaccessible to rational thought” (Forsey 321). Therein lies the ineluctable contradiction: we are
saying in effect that an object which is accessible and knowable to us is also always already
inaccessible to us, by virtue of its transcendent nature, and is therefore unknowable. How can
that be? This is an utterly fallacious argument.
Joseph Margolis writes that he agrees with Forsey’s conclusion that the sublime, as
historically constructed, is blatantly implausible, and offers an alternate thesis. Margolis’
proposal (as he calls it) is, he says, a pragmatic, anti-Kantian one (as that is how he considers
himself): viz. that the sublime is “the ineliminable commonplace of the human condition itself!
The ordinary as extraordinary, the sheer viability of life in all its guises and niches” (Margolis:
19). And to put to rest any lingering confusion, Margolis avers that the “canonical ‘sublime’ is
no more than a version of the picturesque—the occasion for a quaint eighteenth—or nineteenthcentury frisson” (19). As I stated earlier in this chapter, this is a radical position, but one which
segues into my discussion of what a new reading of the sublime might be. What can Margolis
possibly mean when he says that the sublime is the ‘commonplace’ of the human condition
itself’? How can the ordinary be extraordinary? And why does the ordinary not feel
extraordinary? There is a missing ingredient in Margolis’ remarkable proposal which I will
discuss in the following chapter, and that is the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view of emptiness, or
śūnyatā; the experience of which is available all the time, in every moment. The experience of
emptiness is what has, I argue, sparked all the interest in the sublime, but no western philosopher
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has availed themselves of the scaffolding necessary to make sense of this singular experience.
An Indian philosopher in the second-century CE, named Nāgārjuna, created a rigorous philosophy
from which to interrogate this experience, and I will explore this in the following chapter.
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Chapter Three
What is Emptiness?
Introduction

What is the experience of the sublime telling us about ourselves and our world?
The routes to epistemological access to the ‘reality’ signalled by ‘the sublime’, as
historically traveled in pursuit of a coherent understanding of this experience, have proven
incoherent and contradictory. This, Guy Sircello has argued well. These routes are not simply
inadequate; they all end in hopeless cul-de-sacs. This is because the scaffolding of normative
western philosophy, upon which these various hermeneutics of the sublime and the sublime
experience have been built, was never designed for this task. It fails to cohere a true account of
this utterly uncommon phenomenological experience that apparently stretches beyond the limits
of its own imagination. Many critics tackling the sublime speak of it as a sense of awe; a lofty
emotion; or as that which exceeds the “limits of reason and expression together with a sense of
what might lie beyond these limits” (Shaw: 2). Others contend the sublime is some ‘thing’ which
the imagination and the understanding are unable to apprehend. John Milbank writes, albeit
contradictorily, that the sublime is “the absolutely unknowable void, upon whose brink we finite
beings must dizzily hover” (Milbank: 211). What is this “absolutely unknowable void” to which
Milbank refers? Is it unknowable? What is it that lies beyond the “limits of reason and
expression”? Is there a clue here to guide us in our pursuit of answers?
Two twentieth-century western philosophers have pursued such clues in unconventional
ways. These two are Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Both of these thinkers have argued
that there is more going on than just the phenomenological appearances of the world, and each
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took up a project to examine the flip side of that coin. For Heidegger, das Nichts, the ‘nothing’,
was posited to be on the other side of phenomenological appearances; for Sartre, it was le néant,
‘nothingness’. The impetus to explore this ‘nothing’, and ‘nothingness’, could be said to align
with what the sublime experience is thought to be, because the sublime experience could appear
to be the flip side of the known phenomenological coin. This opens up space for an investigation
into the “nothing else”, as Heidegger puts it; or perhaps Milbank’s ‘absolutely unknowable
void’. A new horizon, at least, has opened up where the well-worn scaffolding has finally been
eclipsed, and new thinking has begun. In the first part of this chapter I survey the projects of
these two thinkers who explore ‘the nothing’ and ‘nothingness’.
Having glimpsed the possibility of a new horizon, perhaps it is time to throw open
a window and let in some fresh air by examining an elegantly structured approach heretofore
excluded from this conversation that also speaks about ‘nothing’ and ‘nothingness’, and whose
basic premise is the examination of the very ‘openness of mind’ upon which the experience of
the sublime depends. The second part of this chapter proceeds from this proposition, presenting a
thesis using an altogether different philosophical scaffolding. For this I turn to two early and
important texts from the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical tradition, each elucidating the very
nature of consciousness that provides a wholly different perspective on Milbank’s ‘void’,
Heidegger’s ‘nothing’, and Sartre’s ‘nothingness’. This exploration will allow us to finally
understand the experience of the sublime by viewing it through the lens of ‘emptiness’, or
śūnyatā, as found in the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka Mahāyāna Buddhist project.
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I.
Heidegger and das Nichts

An exemplar of thinking some thing outside the realm of our familiar, quotidian cognitive
reality is found in the early twentieth century lecture by Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?
or, “What is Metaphysics?” (1929), when he raised the notion of the ‘nothing’ (das Nichts)
existing side-by-side with, while nevertheless distinct from, ‘being’. This view delves into the
question of being(s) and nothing, and, while perhaps it might seem unrelated to many of the
usual theses involving the sublime, I think it will prove profitable to do some critical analysis of
these terms and their underlying referents, and then examine if there are any intersections with
das Nichts and the ‘absolutely unknowable void’, beyond our limits of reason and imagination.
Heidegger begins this intriguing disquisition, delivered as his inaugural lecture to the
faculties of Universität Freiburg in 1929, by stating that “Our existence—in the community of
researchers, teachers, and students—is determined by science” (Heidegger 1993: 94); and
moreover, that science, precisely because of its exceptionality, gives this matter the first and last
word when it comes to the inquiry of beings and human existence, for “in the sciences we
approach what is essential in all things” (94). However, in following this track to its conclusion,
Heidegger states:
That to which the relation to the world refers are beings themselves—and nothing
besides.
That from which every attitude takes its guidance are beings themselves—and
nothing further.
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That with which the scientific confrontation in the irruption occurs are beings
themselves—and beyond that nothing. (95)
This then leads Heidegger to introduce his provocation: “What about this nothing else?”
(95, emphasis added), this ‘nothing besides’, this ‘nothing further’, that science chooses to ignore
and ultimately dismiss as, perhaps, irrelevant. Could this reference to ‘nothing besides…’ merely
be indicative of how we speak, or is there something more to it? “The nothing—”, Heidegger
contends, “what else can it be for science but an outrage and a phantasm” (96)? Science,
Heidegger contends, “wants to know nothing of the nothing”. But Heidegger wants to know,
“How is it with the nothing?” (96, emphasis added).
This is an unusual exploration, Heidegger concedes, because in asking this question, we
are implying that ‘nothing’ is, in fact, something which can be inquired into. We have, by asking
this question, turned ‘nothing’ into a ‘something’, which, as Heidegger suggests, is “quite
absurd”. However, while normative logic demands that contradictions be avoided, Heidegger
suggests that in this case the intellect must be employed if we are to adequately grapple with this
question of nothing. And in so doing, he arrives at a dilemma: “Is the nothing given only because
the ‘not’, i.e., negation, is given?” (97). Or, could it be the contrary? Is it ‘nothing’ which, in fact,
creates the space for negation and the ‘not’? Heidegger’s choice here can be found behind
Curtain No. 2: it is the nothing which affords the ‘not’.
In interrogating the so-called legitimacy of this question, only an experience of this
fundamental ‘nothing’, Heidegger says, can save the project. And this can only be affected
through the experience of, or attunement to, the singular and intrinsic mood of anxiety.
Heidegger describes this anxiety not as a fear of something or another, but rather as an anxiety
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“in the face of…, but not in the face of this or that thing” (100). Neither negation nor
annihilation obtains, but rather a “bewildered calm” arises, a “shrinking back before”, as he puts
it (102). Nihilation therefore becomes the essence of nothing, Heidegger argues, as “the nothing
itself nihilates” (103). Heidegger asserts that “in the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the
original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings—and not nothing. […] Without
the original revelation of the nothing [of anxiety], no selfhood and no freedom” (103). Without
the ‘nothing’ (of anxiety, presumably), the “revelation of beings in general” therefore becomes
possible (103). Herein lies the essence of this ‘nihilating nothing’, i.e. in the presentation of “Dasein [being there]… before beings as such” (103).
Let me attempt an elucidation of the above. It is important, Heidegger tells us, not to
confuse this “nothing of anxiety” with our common experience of ‘feeling anxious’. Heidegger
states that this ‘nothing of anxiety’ points toward what I take to be a potential experience of
being-nowness, where our experience is not of ‘this’, but rather opens non-reflexively to all that
is. “The saturation of existence by nihilative behaviour”, Heidegger argues, “testifies to the
constant though doubtlessly obscured manifestation of the nothing that only anxiety originally
reveals. […] Original anxiety can awaken in existence at any moment. It needs no unusual event
to rouse it. Its sway is as thorough-going as its possible occasionings are trivial” (105-06). I hear
echoes of Kant here, with Logos (Λωγψσ) pulling Being back from the brink as if ‘anxiety’ is a
signal for Being to (re)assert itself.
Heidegger then offers a further explanation of the main points of his argument, and writes
that:
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the nothing is neither an object nor any being at all. The nothing comes forward
neither for itself nor next to beings, to which it would, as it were, adhere. For
human existence, the nothing makes possible the openedness of beings as such.
The nothing does not merely serve as the counter concept of beings; rather, it
originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such. In the Being of beings,
the nihilation of the nothing occurs. (104)
‘Nothing’ is, therefore, the origination of negation, and not the other way around. Hegel is

correct, Heidegger maintains, when the former holds, in his Science of Logic,73 that “pure Being
and pure Nothing are therefore the same” (108); and yet Heidegger contradicts himself by
maintaining that “In the Being of beings, the nihilation of ‘the nothing’ occurs”. By this, I
understand him to mean that ‘the nothing’ does not/cannot exist simultaneously with Being,
although one could say that it is that which, in being, does not have being. But this seems like
spurious logic.
Heidegger reimagines the assertion ‘ex nihilo nihil fit’, to read: ‘ex nihil omne ens qua
ens fit’, or “from the nothing all beings as beings come to be”, regarding the nothing as perhaps
the primordial Absolute, positing a seeming existing manifold (108). Hegel argues in his Science
of Logic that “pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore the same”. The notion of ‘the same’,
das Selbe, does not seem to mean for Heidegger, or even for Hegel, that they are the same kind
of being, but rather that in themselves as opposites, they belong to the same, in much the same
way as non-duality is posited in Madhyamaka philosophy as being inseparable from appearances
of duality. But I am getting ahead of myself.
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There are several things about Heidegger’s argument to keep in mind. Importantly,
Heidegger argues that “the nothing [i]s the counter-concept to being proper, that is, as its
negation” (108). This is significantly different from Hegel’s notion of ‘pure being = pure
nothing’. Granted, Hegel didn’t take this farther but, prima facie, this view does not contain
Heidegger’s dichotomy, viz. nothing and being. Furthermore, this ‘nothing’ of Heidegger’s can
be experienced through an anxiety from which proceeds a “bewildered calm” or a “shrinking
back before”; there is no mention of any concomitant cognizant wisdom per se which sees and
knows, but instead a distinctly different calm bewilderment. (Moreover, the nothing for
Heidegger is still too caught up in the nothingness that ‘my being unto death’ reveals.) However,
within or from this “bewildered calm” comes forth a “clear night…of the original openness of
beings”. And without this “original revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom”.
‘Bewilderment’, ‘clear night’, ‘original openness’, ‘selfhood’, and ‘freedom’: these are strange
bedfellows, indeed. Heidegger has found a mountain path to somewhere (ending in little more
than a cul-de-sac?), but he never quite finds his ‘clearing’. And yet, he steps right up to the
threshold beyond which is the limitless openness that is the sublime experience; but then steps
back and away from that perfectly ‘clear night’ of ‘original openness’.
Heidegger states rightly that “The question of the nothing puts us, the questioners, in
question. It is a metaphysical question. […] Assuming that the question of Being as such is the
encompassing question of metaphysics, then the question of the nothing proves to be such that it
embraces the whole of metaphysics” (108-9). Yet, Kant writes that the application of reason
“beyond the empirical sphere results not in knowledge but in antinomies” and confusion
(Candrakīrti 7); this path leads not into the clearing, but deep into the Black Forest. This is the
fundamental problematic of Heidegger’s exploration of being and nothing.
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NISHITANI Keiji (1900-1990), a distinguished, early member of the Kyoto School, and a

student of Heidegger’s, unpacks the process of our unexpected confrontations with the ‘ground’
of nothingness, as Heidegger puts it, in a much different and altogether clearer way, while
foreshadowing our discussion of ‘emptiness’. Nishitani explains that
normally we proceed through life, on and on, with our eye fixed on something or
other, always caught up with something within or without ourselves. It is these
engagements that prevent the deepening of awareness. They block off the way to
an opening up of that horizon on which nihility appears and self-being becomes a
question. When this horizon does open up at the bottom of those engagements that
keep life moving continually on and on, something seems to halt and linger before
us. (1982: 4)
In other words, there is a sudden opening in the ongoing, seemingly never-ending script of our
life, where ‘self-being’ becomes, and remains, a question. In this sudden opening, our experience
shifts. This horizon of openness is free of any and all conceptuality. It is not a void, nor a
nothing, nor nothingness; a horizon of boundless freedom opens.
When Heidegger states that “in the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original
openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings—and not nothing”, Heidegger resolves his
nothing/negation dilemma much like Kant does with his application of reason to the limits of
imagination. Nishitani, however, is proposing that we allow “self-being” to remain a question, as
in fact Heidegger suggests early in his project, and not relegate ‘the nothing’ to a mere shadow.
II.
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Sartre and le néant

In Being and Nothingness (L’être et le néant) (1943), Jean-Paul Sartre examines
nothingness vis-à-vis being in Part One, under the heading “The Problem of Nothingness”.
Immediately we are given to understand that ‘nothingness’ must somehow be a ‘problem’. But
problem might just mean question, and I think it does here for Sartre; as in, how do we think
being and nothingness? Sartre posits that “it is not profitable first to separate the two terms of a
relation in order to try to join them together again later” (Sartre 1992: 33). So, from the very
beginning, it seems that Sartre is arguing that ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’ are intrinsically
inseparable as a relation. However, he hedges himself here by maintaining that they are
dialectical. Notwithstanding, to assert that this view is dialectical, or that it resolves in a
dialectic, is problematic. We will see why.
Taking his cue from Heidegger, Sartre introduces the argument that it is time “to open
our eyes and question ingenuously this totality which is man-in-the-world” (34). And this is
precisely what he sets out to do in his project. Sartre sets the stage with an investigation into the
notion of being, writing that “the concrete is man within the world in that specific union of man
with the world which Heidegger, for example, calls ‘being-in-the-world’ ” (3). The ‘being-in-theworld, which Sartre calls the ‘for-itself’, gives meaning to the ‘in-itself’, the noumenon, by
looking to our interactions in and with the world to sustain a sense of meaning in our lives. The
‘for-itself’, however, is pure nothingness, nullity; a store of content with no true meaning. And
yet, we need to become conscious, and conscious of having some meaning. “All of our activity”,
Hubert Dreyfus says, “which subsequently flows from this need is an attempt to cover up the
nothingness that is the ‘in-itself’, and delude ourselves into thinking we have an identity, or some
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kind of meaningful content to our lives”. Dreyfus has said that Sartre’s position is much more
nihilistic than Heidegger’s, because “in Sartre you don’t have the sense that you are ‘thrown
into’ a world which is already meaningful and has a tradition, in which you have grown up, and
in which you can’t get out. And that much meaning is never gotten rid of in Heidegger. But in
Sartre, that whole meaning is called into question, as just something we project, in order to cover
up [that] there isn’t any meaning”.74
Sartre sets up two questions in his attempt to explain the correspondence of a ‘manworld’: first, “1) What is the synthetic relation which we call ‘being-in-the-world’?; [and] 2)
What must man and the world be in order for a relation between them to be possible?” (34).
Sartre continues: “This man that I am—if I apprehend him such as he is at this moment in the
world, I establish that he stands before being in an attitude of interrogation. […] Every question
presupposes a being who questions and a being which is questioned” (34, 35). Sartre here is
setting up a problematic subject-object dichotomy.
But there is more, and for this writer, the water gets murkier. Sartre states that “what
being will be must of necessity arise on the basis of what it is not. Whatever being is, it will
allow this formulation: ‘Being is that and outside of that, nothing’ ” (36, original emphasis). Hence
Sartre’s key move here: he thinks ‘nothing’ relative to, or in connection with ‘being’—and
beyond ‘being’ there is a (relational) nullity, or the complete negation of being; there is merely,
he argues, non-being. Sartre’s project accedes to conceive nothingness as nothing whatsoever.
Not unlike a poor philosopher’s bank account balance. However, we cannot think utter ‘nothing’;
we cannot truly imagine utter ‘nothing’. To argue that we can, in fact, think ‘nothing’ engages
one in the same epistemological incoherence that we encountered in our earlier examination of
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the sublime. ‘Nothing’ will always come up as ‘something’ in whatever conceptual construct we
might entertain. And that ‘something’ is, at the very least, an awareness of the nothing. Sartre’s
complete nullity, or nihility is, I argue, a fundamental problematic in his project.
Exploring Sartre’s ‘nothingness’ a little further, we turn to another question which Sartre
poses: “Is negation, as the structure of the judicative proposition, at the origin of nothingness? Or
on the contrary, is nothingness, as the structure of the real, the origin and foundation of
negation?” (38). This is remarkably similar to Heidegger’s question on this topic, as we saw
above. Either way, it is clear that nothingness is, for Sartre, separate and distinct from negation.
Sartre says that “negation is a refusal of existence. By means of it, a being (or a way of being) is
posited, then thrown back to nothingness” (43). In other words, nothing is the absence of something positive. Sartre’s nothingness is the utter lack of being; for Heidegger, however, it remains
more than a lack; it is contra being.
Sartre writes:
In a word, if being is everywhere, it is not only Nothingness which, as Bergson
maintains, is inconceivable; for negation will never be derived from being. The
necessary condition for our saying not is that non-being be a perpetual presence in
us and outside of us, that nothingness haunts being. But where does nothingness
come from? (43-44)
Contending that non-being is not the opposite of being, i.e. its antithesis, Sartre maintains that it
is its contradiction. “This implies,” he says, “that logically nothingness is subsequent to being
since it is being, first posited, then denied” (47). Which gives rise to several questions: Who,
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then, first posits being, and subsequently denies it? And, if nothingness is truly nothing, how can
it come from simply an act of denial?
Leaving that to one side for the moment, Sartre continues, quoting from Hegel’s Treatise
on Logic (1808-11): “Is Nothingness not in fact simple identity with itself, complete emptiness,
absence of determinations and of content? Pure being and pure nothingness are then the same
thing. Or rather it is true to say that they are different; but ‘as here the difference is not yet a
determined difference—this difference can not be named; it is only a pure opinion’ ” (45).75
Hegel then concludes “…there is nothing in heaven or on earth which does not contain in itself
being and nothingness” (46, original emphasis). Sartre, however, takes issue with Hegel’s notion
of nothingness, and argues that “when Hegel writes, ‘(Being and nothingness) are empty
abstractions, and the one is as empty as the other,’ [Hegel] forgets that emptiness is emptiness of
something. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is
empty of being. In a word, we must recall here, against Hegel, that being is and that nothingness
is not” (48, original emphasis). Sartre goes on to say that we must not regard being and non-being

as equal, for they are not equal; being always presupposes, and precedes, non-being. Non-being,
he argues, first requires being in order for negation (Sartre’s nothingness) to proceed; and, nonbeing does not give rise to being, as though arising from an originary abyss. For Sartre, ‘ex nihilo
nihil fit’ simply does not obtain.
In Sartre’s exegesis of nothingness, he argues that it is non-being which succeeds the isness, or being of being, by means of negation. Sartre conceives of nothingness as utter and
complete vacancy, blankness. But how could it be, that ‘being’ could be utterly negated, even
hypothetically? What would exist, or not exist, in such a schema? And who would know? And
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how? Sartre states, somewhat confusingly, that “Nothingness, if it is supported by being,
vanishes qua nothingness, and we fall back upon being. Nothingness can be nihilated only on the
foundation of being; if nothingness can be given, it is neither before nor after being, nor in a
general way outside of being. Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm (56).”
Ten pages earlier, Sartre wrote that “nothingness is subsequent to being since it is being, first
posited, then denied”; now he contends that nothingness, when given, is neither before nor after
being. This is very confusing philosophy.
It should be clear by now that Sartre’s dialectic of ‘nothingness’ and ‘being’ is not
helpful for our understanding of the sublime, and yet, Sartre’s and Heidegger’s notions of
‘nothingness’ and ‘nothing’ continue to have agency in western thinking to an extent that this
brief review is, I think, in order. Their projects have opened a door—however slightly— to
thinking what the experience of emptiness might be, amplifying the terms ‘nothing’ and
‘nothingness’ within the vocabulary of western thought, and edging ever closer to Milbank’s
“absolutely unknowable void” lying beyond the “limits of reason and expression” . We will, in
the sections which follow, embark on a journey well beyond the self-imposed limits of our own
reason and expression.

110
III.
Is Emptiness the Key to the Sublime?
Emptiness is not nothing, it’s everything, everything at once.
-Red Pine

What is emptiness? And why is it important? These are the $64,000 questions, and ones
which have been at the center of Buddhist philosophical debates and written commentaries for
more than 2,000 years. Emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā) is, in fact, the foundational view on which rests
the whole of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy and praxis.
To define emptiness, or śūnyatā, is clearly not a simple matter. Jay Garfield defines
‘emptiness’ as the “Buddhist technical term for the lack of any independent existence, inherent
existence, or essence in things” (Garfield 1995: 88). And Red Pine argues that “the word
‘emptiness’ does not mean nothingness. It is a double negative that stops short of establishing a
positive. Emptiness means indivisibility”. He explains: “Something that is empty of selfexistence is inseparable from everything else, including emptiness. All separations are
delusions.…everything occupies the same indivisible space, which is emptiness, and the same
indivisible time, which is also emptiness, and the same indivisible mind, which is emptiness
again. Everything is empty, and empty is everything” (Red Pine 2004: 77). The Sanskrit word
śūnya has been variously translated as: ‘empty’, ‘hollow’, or ‘zero’. “What is hollow, void, or
zero”, Red Pine writes, “is the existence of a self. But if there is no self-existence, there is also
no non-existence. According to Mahāyāna Buddhism, this is the second greatest of all delusions,
the belief that nothing exists. Emptiness does not mean nothingness. It simply means the absence
of the erroneous distinctions that divide one entity from another, one being from another being,
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one thought from another thought. Emptiness is not nothing, it’s everything, everything at once”
(69). But nothing you can grasp or touch.76
Emptiness is an elusive target to pin down, because any attempt at reification is, in the
end, nothing less than a fool’s errand. This is why we find in the classic texts dealing with
emptiness elaborate explanations of what emptiness is not, rather than exegeses explaining what
it is. This follows in part because, as Red Pine explains, “Buddhism is better understood as a
skill, or an art to be practiced and perfected, rather than as information or knowledge to be
learned and amassed” (80). I would add to Red Pine’s comment that the philosophy of emptiness
can only be fully grasped when the study of the epistemology and ontology of this project is
married to the practice of meditation, because meditation is the only way to cut through
conceptual, discursive mind and truly know emptiness. “Meditation is concerned with trying to
see what is. [We might call this process] ‘working meditation’ or extrovert meditation” (Trungpa
1970: 51-2). Emphasis simply on information or knowledge, ‘learned and amassed’, “veils the

[innate] clarity of our consciousness” (53), thus becoming an obstacle to developing prajñā, i.e.
transcendent knowing, and the experience of emptiness altogether.
The earliest writings on emptiness have come down to us in the form of the corpus of
Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, or Transcendent Wisdom treatises, the earliest of which is thought to date
from the first century BCE;77 however, their provenance is far from clear. Currently, the Tibetan
tradition counts a total of twenty-three Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra texts within their contemporary
canon,78 including the very short Sūtra of the Heart of Prajñāpāramitā, or Heart Sūtra, which I
will be discussing below, and which is, perhaps, the most recognizable work within the entire
corpus to Westerners (or to all non-scholars, East or West).79 The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras treatises
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are considered mandatory root texts within curricula of contemporary Tibetan monastic colleges
(shedras, Tib. shad grwa), as well as for any serious effort at arriving at an informed
understanding of the concept of emptiness. These root texts deal with and expound foundational
tenets of Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy; they are crucially important.
While the dating and provenance of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras literature is uncertain,
some of the earliest treatises are believed to have preceded Nāgārjuna’s second-century CE
works, including his seminal Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, by two or three centuries.80 The
Prajñāpāramitāsūtras illuminate the Buddha’s teachings on what can be understood as “the true
reality that is beyond speech, thought, and expression—[that is, the reality or purity of] all
phenomena from form up through omniscience[, which are] utterly devoid of any intrinsic
characteristic or nature of their own” (Brunnhölzl 2010:28). The Sanskrit word prajñā is translated
as ‘highest knowledge’, or ‘wisdom’. Trungpa explains that prajñā is “knowingness rather than
actual knowledge” as such (Trungpa 1970: 65, original emphasis). Prajñā indicates “intelligence in
its original sense of being able to know or cognize, which entails the capacity to clearly
discriminate…In a general way, prajñā can be said to be the basic inquisitiveness and curiosity
of our mind, which is very precise and playful at the same time” (Brunnhölzl 2010:28-9).
However, we invariably find with further investigation that “prajñā is [in fact] threatening to our
ego and to our cherished belief systems, since it undermines our very notion of reality and the
reference points upon which we build our world” (30). By virtue of prajñā, we interrogate who
we are and what we are, and moreover, what the premises are upon which we have constructed
our world and self-identity, and self-consciousness; all of which suddenly appear very
questionable. Though Sartre arrived at a seemingly similar conclusion, his ‘nothingness’ was
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essentially incapacitated by nature; Buddhist ‘emptiness’, however, is naturally infused with
cognizance.
Investigating further, and to elucidate the concept of ‘transcendent prajñā’, we find that
prajñā is traditionally divided into three sections, or levels: 1) mundane prajñā; 2) prajñā that
transcends worldliness or, you could say, metaphysical wisdom; and 3) prajñā that “is
transcendent wisdom, which views all things, whether mundane or metaphysical, as neither
permanent nor impermanent, as neither pure nor impure, as neither having a self nor not having a
self, as inconceivable and inexpressible” (Red Pine: 30). Mundane prajña is a thorough, classical
education: “you learn to appreciate the arts, medicine, philology, and philosophy” (Trungpa 2014:
263). The point being that one is not simply looking to better oneself for one’s own benefit alone,

but rather that one is cultivating the discipline of worldly—dare we say classical?—education
and knowledge so as to be of service and benefit to all humankind. The second level of prajñā
transcends worldliness; this metaphysical wisdom understands emptiness, seeing through the
fiction that we call the ‘self’. The whole thing is understood. And the third type of prajñā, as Red
Pine described above, is the prajñā which is transcendent; this transcendent prajñā eclipses all
dharmas.81 “Dharmas, or all things, are [inherently] free from dualism and free from theistic
concepts. They have no origin; they just arise.” Yet, at the same time, there is, always already, “a
sense of cognition. Cognition is like clear light; it is brilliant light shining through” (264). It is
this third level of prajñā that points to prajñāpāramitā (i.e. the mastery or excellence of prajñā).
Thus, the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras say:
If you think, ‘I cultivate prajñā’; ‘prajñā is this’; or ‘it is for the sake of
such and such’, this may well be prajñā, but it is not prajñāpāramitā.
(Brunnhölzl 2010: 31.)
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Therefore, it is said not that one develops the view and mastery (pāramitā) of emptiness, nor the
excellence of the nature of phenomena, but rather that one develops the pāramitā of inherent
wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), which sees and knows the nature of all phenomena, which is allpervading emptiness (see 36). Mervyn Sprung explains that prajñāpāramitā is “the consummate
awareness of the way things are, which is the way they are; awareness which surpasses or
transcends the everyday mode of awareness; it is not any kind of ‘wisdom’ [as such], it describes
the way of an enlightened being” (Sprung 272, original emphasis).
Turning to the short Heart Sūtra of Prajñāpāramitā—also known by its earliest Sanskrit
title, the Prajñāpāramitā hṛidaya, or more commonly, the Heart Sūtra—we find a remarkable
distillation of the complete corpus of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras literature into 35 lines of English
text. Monier-Williams’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary translates hṛidaya as “the heart or center or
core or essence or best or dearest or most secret part of anything” (Red Pine 36).82 The Heart
Sūtra then is the essence, the core, and most distilled rendering of the complete
Prajñāpāramitāsūtras corpus. Red Pine has produced a superb, annotated translation of this
‘shorter’ and oldest known Heart Sūtra text from Chinese editions,83 and I will be referring to
this work in the following discussion. Within this apparently sparse version, we find that the
‘essence, the core, the heart’ is all there.
The intention of the Heart Sūtra is an important ingredient to understanding the nature of
its radically negative dialectic. This short, pithy text is to be understood, first, as a practice
manual; and secondly, as a philosophical argument against the prevailing Buddhist school of
thought at the time, that of the Sarvāstivādins, which held that dharmas, or all existents,
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including time, have an inherency of their own. Thus, the Sūtra adopts a negative dialectic in
refuting these erroneous beliefs, while resisting the advancement of any counter or alternative
view, declaring instead that all views are, in fact, empty. In the following discussion, I will look
at lines 6-20 of this Sūtra, which are the most germane, and central, to our investigation into the
Mahāyāna Buddhist view of emptiness.
Beginning with line 6, the Sūtra makes its most well-known, if not least understood,
argument:
form is emptiness, emptiness is form;
emptiness is not separate from form, form is not separate from emptiness;
whatever is form is emptiness, whatever is emptiness is form.84
These three lines can be said to be the very heart of the Heart Sūtra. Emptiness is neither a
cloudless sky, nor a blank page, nor a deep abyss, nor an empty room; nor could you say, for
instance, that is it the apparently lifeless surface of the Moon. Emptiness is everything and
everywhere: you, me, and a Jackson Pollock ‘drip’ painting. All of it: emptiness. How can this
be, and what are the implications of this proposition? As the Sūtra unfolds, the project is further
explained.
In line 12, the Sūtra asserts that the five constituents, or aggregates of what we consider
to be our personality and our experience of ‘me’, known as the skandhas,85 are, likewise, said to
be empty:
Therefore, Śāriputra, in emptiness there is no form,
no sensation, no perception, no memory and no consciousness;
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Each of these constituents are as empty as our own form, or body. The Perfection of Wisdom in
Twenty-five Thousand Lines recounts the Buddha as saying to Śāriputra: “Form is simply a
name. Likewise, sensation, perception, memory, and consciousness are simply names. Śāriputra,
the self is simply a name. There is no self that can ever be found. And it cannot be found because
it is empty” (Red Pine 87). Empty of what? Empty of any inherent self-existence. One could
perhaps go out on a limb here and say that these sūtras are anticipating Foucault and his rigorous
archeology of the function and effect of language and names, and his assertion that names are but
empty signs, unable to express the essence of what they signify.86 Be that as it may, the skandhas
may be considered as “five ways of considering our world and looking for something we can call
our own. If we are going to find anything real,” Red Pine argues, “this is where we are going to
find it” (65). But there is nothing here that we find to call our own, because there is nothing
sufficiently solid to hold on to. Each of the skandhas is refuted as being something real or
substantial; what we see, remember, or believe are simply names, signs, and nothing more nor
less. The skandhas seemingly manifest, and yet they are illusory insofar as they do not hold up as
any independently self-existing ‘thing’ or independent entity under scrutiny. There is complete
and utter “absence of anything permanent, anything pure, anything separate, anything complete
unto itself” (71).
As the Sūtra continues, it refutes all manner of reification of every ‘thing’ we might
possibly consider. Lines 14 through 16 state:
No eye, no ear, no nose, no tongue,
No body and no mind;
No shape, no sound, no smell, no taste, no feeling and no thought;
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Here, the Sūtra proceeds to list, through a process of negation, the twelve āyatanas, which are
the six sense organs or sensory powers (indriya), and their correlative objects (vishaya) or, the
“territory or dimension [or] domains in which our powers of sensation function” (103). Red Pine
notes that these first six, which are the five sense organs or powers plus the mind, are often
referred to as the ‘Six Roots’ in the Chinese tradition. This is because these manifold sensory
powers, these roots, nurture and feed “the countless obstructions of mistaken identity [which]
never end” (102), just as the roots of a tree sustain the trunk, limbs, and leaves. “These ‘Six
Roots’ of our knowledge are centered on the mind” (102). And when one awakens to the
‘egolessness’, or intrinsic insubstantiality of these six roots and their objects, true emptiness
dawns. Then it becomes clear that the distinctions to which we hold, and which we believe to
exist between the seemingly manifold āyatanas, are mere fictions. “Just as our ear turns out to be
nothing but a construct, and likewise sound, neither can we isolate anything we might call our
mind or thought, much less our self. This is what an examination of the [āyatanas] teaches us”
(104). There is “no eye, no ear, no nose…” etc., because, as Trungpa explains, “your eye is just

an eye, it’s not your eye; your nose is a nose, but it’s not your nose. Nobody is you. Through the
whole system of your body, every part has its own name, its own place. It is made out of a lot of
things, but there is no such thing as you” (Trungpa 2003b: 317). That is the discovery of emptiness
employing the tool of prajñā. A simple test of this assertion is to sit still, and directly experience
your own mind. The constant flickering of thoughts, and the utter inability to ‘pin anything
down’, is immediately apparent.
The Sūtra then moves on, in line 16, to consider the dhātus, or the eighteen elements as
classified in the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins.87 The eighteen dhātus are the six sense
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organs, their consonant sense objects (which together are the twelve āyatanas), plus their
corresponding six consciousnesses (vijñānas). Thus, the Sūtra continues:
no element of perception, from eye to conceptual consciousness;
These six consciousnesses, which correspond to the twelve āyatanas, arise simultaneously with
the āyatanas, and are comprised of the correlative consciousnesses of the visual, auditory,
olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and conceptual senses. In the Tibetan Mahāmudrā tradition, two
additional consciousnesses are added to the above six. The seventh consciousness, often referred
to as the klésha88 consciousness, “has the nature of ignorance, cloudiness, confusion. This cloudy
mind is an overall structure which runs right through the six sense consciousnesses” (Trungpa
2003: 239). The eighth consciousness is known as the alāya-vijñāna, or the all-ground

consciousness. It is the “common ground or the unconscious ground of all this. It is the ground
that makes it possible for all the other seven [consciousnesses] to operate” (240). A characteristic
of this eighth consciousness, the alāya-vijñāna, is bewilderment, and this becomes the basic
ground for ego. And as “ego develops, freedom and imprisonment begin to exist; that relative
situation contains the basic quality of ignorance” (241).89 This stems from the mistaken
identification with what we call ‘me’, or ātman, viz. an inherent self-nature.
Returning to the Sūtra, lines 17 and 18 then continue:
no causal link, from ignorance to old age and death,
and no end of causal link, from ignorance to old age and death;
These lines address the view of the Twelve Links (nidānas) of interdependent coörigination
(pratītyasamutpāda) by negating them, and then proceed to negate the negation, as has been the
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case earlier with the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas, and the eighteen dhātus. Here, the
“twelvefold chain of causation [describes] the way in which suffering arises from ignorance and
the actions motivated by ignorance” (Rabten 142). Trungpa explains: “The process begins with
ignorance and ends with death and then death produces ignorance again. It goes on and on”
(Trungpa 2003b: 316). The logic of interdependent coörigination leads us to recognize that there is

no thing that exists independently; every single thing (or no-thing) exists in inter-dependence
with everything else. In other words, there is no singularity as such at all. This inter-dependence
is the very definition of the emptiness of all beings and all phenomena. The Sūtra takes this
reasoning one step further, negating its negation, to assert that there neither is nor is not, in
emptiness, a causal link ultimately. We will see that Nāgārjuna discusses this in detail in his
MMK, which we will examine below.
Lines 19 and 20 complete the Sūtra’s repudiation of the Sarvāstivādin’s abhidharma logic
through its ongoing negative dialectic. First, each of the Four Noble Truths, or Realities, are
repudiated in line 19:
No suffering, no source, no relief, no path;
The Four Noble Truths (āryasatya) argue in turn that, first, our being-in-the-world is defined by
suffering (duḥkha), or a dis-ease or unsatisfactoriness which pervades our everyday experience
(saṁvṛti); that, secondly, the source of this duḥkha or unsatisfactoriness is our unrelenting desire
or passion or thirst (tṛṣṇa) for ‘other’, for that thing, person, or condition which we don’t
currently possess; thirdly, that it is indeed possible to attain to a cessation (nirodha) of this
duḥkha which is caused by our unceasing desires, aversions, and dullness or cloudiness of mind,
our ignorance; and finally, that there is a path (mārga) one can undertake of systematic methods
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and disciplines by which to arrive at the goal of cessation of all suffering and ignorance, and thus
put an end to the delusion which gives rise to the misunderstandings and related sufferings of
‘me’ and ‘mine’. “In the Testament Sūtra, the Buddha says, “The moon can turn hot, and the sun
can turn cold, but the Four Truths are not subject to change” (Red Pine 118). But why the negation
of these truths in the Sūtra, i.e., no suffering, etc., if indeed they are truths? Red Pine explains
that “in the traditional formula of the First Truth or Reality, suffering is equated with the five
skandhas, with which it is necessarily co-extensive. But since [the Sūtra argues that] the five
skandhas are empty of self-existence, suffering must also be empty of self-existence. It therefore
logically follows that if suffering is empty of self-existence, there is no self that suffers. Thus, in
emptiness there is no suffering, no source of suffering, no relief from suffering, and no path
leading to relief from suffering” (119-20). This Sūtra is an example of the progressive stages of
development of Buddhist thought: the Four Noble Truths being commonly accepted as an
important stepping stone in a process leading to the radical dialectic of the Heart Sūtra, and the
equally radical logic of the prajñā of emptiness.
Finally, in line 20 of the Sūtra, we find a repudiation of the early Sarvāstivādin emphasis
on the study of dharmas, or phenomena, and the Four Truths as a path which leads to the
cessation of suffering and the realization of wisdom. It reads:
No knowledge [jñāna], no attainment and no non-attainment.
Red Pine explains that the “Sarvāstivādins relied on the twin dharmas90 of attainment and nonattainment to explain how all dharmas [or, explanations of how things work—on a mundane, or
perhaps quotidian level] could exist in the three periods of time, and thus how time itself could
exist. Attainment and non-attainment are what make the present, the past, and the future entities
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of the mind possible [in their project]. Without attainment or non-attainment there cannot be any
dharmas” (124-5, emphasis added). This view is predicated on the Sarvāstivādin position that
holds that, “however we might characterize our experience, at any given moment it includes one
of these two dharmas of attainment or non-attainment” (124). But this tenet has been utterly
refuted here: there can neither be attainment nor non-attainment in emptiness. There is, however,
a clarification, which is prajñā, or wisdom; it is itself uncovering itself.
The Heart Sūtra is an extraordinary dialectical work of philosophy, unlike anything ever
thought by Western thinkers. In thirty-five trenchant lines of verse, a radical ontological view of
self and other is expounded. This Sūtra, as well as Nāgārjuna’s Root Stanzas of the Middle
Way—which I will be discussing in the section that follows—assert that our lives, our world, are
empty of any kind of self-arising singularity. The experience of emptiness arises in precisely
those moments that cannot be reduced to simple (or obscure) conceptualizations: complete
unobstructed openness, clarity, and non-thought. This is none other than the true nature of our
mind. Complete emptiness. As Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso explains, “the true nature of reality
cannot be described by any conceptual fabrication, by any conventional term or expression.
Emptiness ultimately means that genuine reality is empty of any conceptual fabrication that
could attempt to describe what it is” (Gyamtso 2003: xi). Emptiness is not ‘like’ something. There
is nothing conceptually comparable. Emptiness is.
The key to the sublime is the non-conceptual, or pre-conceptual open experience of
emptiness. No western philosopher or theologian has been able to account for the experience of
the ‘sublime moment’ in any way remotely approaching the cogency of the YogācāraMadhyamaka project. For example, the theologian John Milbank has argued that transcendence
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has been re-conceptualized in modernity as sublimity, viz. “as the absolutely unknowable void,
upon whose brink we finite beings must dizzily hover” (Milbank: 211). But this is a fallacy.
There is no ‘brink’, nor an ‘unknowable void’. Emptiness is neither a ‘thing’ nor not a ‘thing’.
And yet, it is completely knowable, and always already available to our experience.
Kant writes in the “Analytic of the Sublime” that “the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure
that only arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital
forces…” (Kant 2008: §23, ¶245, p 75-6). Kant gets this wrong. He does not explain the nature
of his ‘momentary check’, but only analyzes what he avers comes afterward. But clearly, Kant’s
‘momentary check’ is an experience of emptiness. If we are to understand this ‘gap’ of nonconceptual openness which occurs at the sublime moment, before it is abstrusely explained away
as “ideas of reason…” (ibid.), we must turn to the Heart Sūtra and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās,
and their elucidations of emptiness, śūnyatā. This is where we find the morning sun illuminating
the obscurity in which the ‘sublime’ has dwelled for centuries. The key to understanding the
sublime is in understanding emptiness.
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IV.
Nāgārjuna and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās

[Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikās] is a work relevant to the most vital problems of philosophy as these engage thinkers of
our own time, whatever their language and cultural background. Its thought is rigorous, fresh and often disconcertingly
contemporary. …There should be no insuperable difficulty in seeing its incisive relevance to the questions now obsessing us in
the West.
-Mervyn Sprung

In this section I look at three chapters from Nāgārjuna’s extraordinary work on
Madhyamaka, or Middle Way philosophy as I continue to parse this challenging notion of
emptiness before considering the dialectic of normative notions of the sublime. Nāgārjuna
(approximately second century CE) is “generally agreed, whether grudgingly or admiringly, to be
the acutest intellect in Buddhist history” (Sprung 1979:1). And in this treatise, Nāgārjuna “thinks
his way relentlessly through to the conclusions he found implicit in Buddha’s promise of
freedom (nirvāṇa) for all beings” (1). The work as we know it comes down to us untitled, but is
known most commonly as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (MMK), or Root Stanzas of the Middle
Way; it is also known by its alternative Sanskrit title, the Madhyamakaśāstra, or Treatise on the
Middle Way.91 The MMK is a work composed in pithy, often abstruse verses, of 27 chapters,
which might fill 107 or so pages of English text.92 Its central topic is emptiness, and “in fact, the
terms Middle Way and emptiness are synonyms. Middle Way means that the true nature of the
phenomena we experience lies in the middle, between all possible extremes that can be
conceived of by the intellect”, be it nihilism or eternalism (Gyamtso xi).
This treatise by Nāgārjuna is a “work relevant to the most vital problems of philosophy as
these engage thinkers of our own time, whatever their language and cultural background. Its
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thought is rigorous, fresh and often disconcertingly contemporary. …there should be no
insuperable difficulty in seeing its incisive relevance to the questions now obsessing us in the
West” (Sprung 2). In the following section, I offer a glimpse of this ‘incisive relevance’ found in
the MMK and the dialectic I am taking up in this project, namely that of the sublime and
emptiness.
Andrew Tuck counts three distinct hermeneutic “styles” which have prevailed since the
mid-nineteenth century, as Western scholars have engaged (and mis-interpreted) Indian
philosophy generally, and Nāgārjuna’s project in particular; viz., 1) viewing Indian thought as
directed to the dilemma of appearance vs. reality; 2) arguments regarding causal efficacy and
logical accuracy; and 3) viewing Nāgārjuna’s project as concerned primarily with language, “and
the limits of philosophical discourse” (Tuck: v-vi).93 I will avoid these hermeneutic ‘styles’ here.
Rather, I will be turning to the contemporary Tibetan scholar, Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso, and
the preëminent interpreter of Nāgārjuna, the sixth-century Indian scholar, Candrakīrti, both of
whose hermeneutics follow the original intent of the work—or so I argue. The three chapters of
the MMK that I will be discussing are chapters 1, 24, and 25.
Nāgārjuna begins his treatise with a pith explication, in verse 1 of chapter 1, of dependent
arising, also referred to as ‘dependent coörigination’ (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda). From the logic of
dependent arising proceeds the view and understanding of emptiness. And alternatively, the logic
of emptiness obtains from an understanding of dependent arising. In other words, the two
proceed hand in hand. Nāgārjuna writes:
Not from itself and not from something else,
Not from both and not without a cause,
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Does any thing whatever,
Anywhere, at any time, arise.94
Nothing ever arises independently, in and of itself. From this follows that no individuated thing
ever arises. “They do not arise from themselves, from something other than themselves, from
both themselves and something other than themselves, and they do not arise without any cause at
all” (Gyamtso: 5). As we scrutinize the situation, we find that nothing ever arises independently to
which can be attributed an own-nature; but rather everything, all phenomena including ourselves,
appears only in dependence upon an infinite manifold of causes and conditions; our own birth,
for example. Thus, Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso, the eminent scholar and meditation master of the
Tibetan Karma Kagyü school, concludes that “we realize that nothing exists independently with
a nature of its own, [and] that there is nothing truly there. Everything is like a dream and an
illusion” (4). This is the very heart essence of what is meant by ‘emptiness’.
Gyamtso cites an example of a seed and a sprout: “If the sprout truly arises from the seed
that is different from itself, then the sprout and seed would have to exist simultaneously in order
to be different from each other. If only one existed at any one time, it would not have the other
one there to be different from” (7). Another example of this is our human conception, originating
in dependence on the causes and conditions of the fertilization of an ovum by a spermatozoa,
from which arises an embryo. The sperm, ovum, and embryo obviously do not exist
simultaneously; the embryo does not arise independently of the ovum, nor the sperm. All three
are quite obviously inter-dependent. And this interdependence of causes and conditions can be
traced back and back reductio ad absurdum.
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The erroneous notion of an arising from ‘other’ is our most common supposition. “What
then,” Gyamtso asks, “is the nature of the arising that we see happening in the world all the
time?” It is, he answers, “mere [empty] appearance, just like the arising that appears to happen in
dreams” (8). This mere empty appearance, then, is no empty page, nor empty café. We are not
talking about a vacancy or an absence. This is true emptiness, empty of any essence or ownbeing; from which follows that everything we see and experience is so interconnected, so
conditional, so utterly lacking an independent being-ness that it is best described as emptyappearance. The display of phenomena certainly seems to appear, and yet it has no more ‘reality’
than does a dream. “We have to begin to see that the true nature of reality is not as it
superficially appears to us to be,” Gyamtso argues (9). Because what appears is, in truth, no less
superficial than a dream. This, then, is the view of the inseparability of interdependent arising
and emptiness.
Chapter 24 of the MMK, ‘An Examination of the [Four] Noble Truths’, is a key chapter,
and is central to Nāgārjuna’s project. Continuing his negative dialectic, Nāgārjuna writes in verse
18:
Whatever is dependently arisen
This has been explained as empty.
In dependence upon something else it is imputed [as existent],
This is the Middle Way indeed.
Everything, in other words, is dependently arisen, and thus empty of any inherent, individual
existence. Dependent arising, and emptiness, are empty as well, as they have been merely
imputed—depending on something else—as existing. Emptiness is no other than emptiness.
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Gyamtso explains that Nāgārjuna is arguing here that “emptiness, dependent arising, and
the Middle Way all have the same meaning” (157). Turning to Candrakīrti,95 and his exegesis of
this verse,96 Candrakīrti substantiates Gyamtso’s hermeneutic, stating that “the ‘emptiness of that
which is beyond extremes’ refers to the Middle Way, emptiness, and dependent arising. All three
of these share the quality of transcending extremes. They too, however, are empty of their own
nature, and that is the emptiness of that which is beyond extremes” (157-58). It might be tempting
to reify the notion of ‘emptiness’, turning it into a ‘some thing else’, as Heidegger, Sartre, and
others have done; distinct from what might be considered not empty, or a true existent with
characteristics. But in his commentary, Candrakīrti dashes any hopes of this, declaring that even
emptiness is ‘empty of own nature’.
The 19th verse of this chapter doubles-down on this assertion:
Because there’s nothing that is not
Dependently arisen,
There is nothing
That is not empty.
This verse argues for the inseparability of emptiness and interdependent arising of all
phenomena. And as everything in saṃsāra97 and nirvāṇa98 is interdependently arisen, it is
therefore always already empty. Turning again to Gyamtso, he explains that “since it is the case
that all inner and outer phenomena are dependently arisen mere appearances, there is not a single
one of them, either on the inside or on the outside, that is not empty” (158).
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I would add here that the very notion of ‘emptiness’ is merely a dependently-arisen
conceptual construct, and as such is therefore also empty. There is complete emptiness:
spaciousness, openness, and utter clarity; but not vacancy or void, nor some one doing the
experiencing.
Chapter 25 is titled “An Examination of Nirvāṇa”, wherein Nāgārjuna explains that the
true nature of nirvāṇa is “like the nature of all other phenomena, [in that it] cannot be described
as being existent or nonexistent because it is beyond [i.e., it transcends] all conceptual
fabrications…this is the ultimate description of genuine reality” (Gyamtso 162-3). Nāgārjuna
clarifies the nature of nirvāṇa in the third verse from this chapter:
Nothing to abandon, nothing to attain,
Nothing extinct, nothing permanent,
No cessation, no arising—
This is how nirvāṇa is taught to be.99
Gyamtso draws a comparison between this verse above and lines 10 and 11 in the Heart Sūtra,
which read:
Here, Śāriputra, all dharmas are defined by emptiness
not birth or destruction, purity or defilement, completeness or deficiency.
In this brief passage from the Heart Sūtra, all phenomena (i.e., dharmas) are said to be empty of
any intrinsic characteristic whatsoever. And in the third verse above, from chapter 25 of
Nāgārjuna’s treatise, nirvāṇa is said to be empty of all characteristics as well. Their meanings
coincide in undifferentiated emptiness; nirvāṇa and all dharmas, or phenomena, in saṃsāra,
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everything held to be real, are indistinguishable in emptiness. That is to say, nirvāṇa and
saṃsāra neither diverge nor conjoin in their empty interdependent arising, or coörigination.
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V.
Batchelor and His ‘Everyday Sublime’
“…mindfulness is a constant challenge to live one’s life from the perspective of a groundless ground of nirvanic
contingency instead of the superficially consoling convictions of one’s place. Such a groundless ground is
simultaneously fascinating and terrifying; it both intrigues and unsettles you. It is nothing other than the everyday
sublime.”
-Stephen Batchelor

It is not just nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western philosophers who have
gotten ‘emptiness’ wrong when investigating the concept of ‘nothingness’ or ‘nothing’. It is a
difficult concept which also beguiles contemporary Western thinkers who consider themselves
‘comparative philosophers’, and have done, perhaps, a little academic study of Yogācāra and/or
Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy. Stephen Batchelor is one such interpreter, and I will briefly
examine his views on emptiness (and the sublime), as presented in his essay “The Everyday
Sublime” (2014).
Batchelor begins by stating that his view of meditation is that it “originates and
culminates in the everyday sublime” (37) and has nothing in common with what he terms ‘New
Age’ conceptions of achieving altered or higher states of consciousness, awareness, or
concentration. “The mystical”, Batchelor argues, “does not transcend the world, but saturates it”
(37). To substantiate this view, Batchelor quotes from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-

Philosophicus (1922): “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists”
(§6.44). Which may be all well and good, standing as a good one-liner for any manner of

purposes; however, Wittgenstein’s two verses immediately preceding Batchelor’s selection more
fully fill out the former’s thought. Beginning in §6.432, Wittgenstein writes: “How the world is,
is completely indifferent for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. The facts
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all belong only to the task and not to its performance”. And Wittgenstein’s verse immediately
preceding speaks of “the temporal immortality of the human soul…” (§6.432, 6.4321, p. 107, all
original emphasis). This more complete contextualization of a fragmentary extraction from

Wittgenstein, speaking to the theistic concerns of humankind vis-à-vis God, immortality, and the
human soul, makes for a very curious effort at substantiation of Batchelor’s point (which
presumably is a non-theistic one, as Batchelor often characterizes himself as a ‘Secular
Buddhist’). Questionable fragmentary extractions from works by various well-known
philosophers is not an uncommon feature of Batchelor’s writing; designed, no doubt, to lend
scholarly ‘heft’ to his often-dubious assertions.
Batchelor next proceeds to define ‘the sublime’ by turning to the familiar litany of
eighteenth-century markers for the sublime experience, writing: “…sublimity brings the
thinking, calculating mind to a stop, leaving one speechless, overwhelmed with either wonder or
terror”. And yet, Bachelor continues, when the “sublime is banished or forgotten…life is
rendered opaque and flat…reduced to the repetition of familiar actions and events…” (37). This
statement about life rendered ‘opaque and flat’ is never explained, which muddies its context.
However, in continuing, Batchelor argues that ‘the everyday sublime’ may be the experience of
our mere quotidian life if experienced from the perspective of the foundational Four Noble
Truths as expounded by Śākyamuni Buddha, which, remarkably, Batchelor has renamed, and
redefined, as the “Four Tasks”. This is remarkable because the Four Noble Truths are not tasks at
all; they are explanations of universal human experience. Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso explains
that the Four Noble Truths “present a basic outline of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa in terms of causes
and results” (Gyamtso 2003: 155). Nevertheless, Batchelor states that “in the light of the Four
Tasks, meditation is the ongoing cultivation of a sensibility, a way of attending to every aspect of
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experience within a framework of ethical values” (Batchelor 38, original emphasis). Batchelor does
not offer, at least in this essay, a definition or description of what this “framework of ethical
values” is, who created the framework, or what relevance it might have for the “ongoing
cultivation of a sensibility”, or for anything else. As his subsequent treatment of the ‘Four Tasks’
[sic] is not particularly relevant to our discussion about the sublime, I will not belabor it here.
Suffice it to say that I view his hermeneutic as a complete misconstrual of this unquestionably
foundational tenet of Buddhist philosophy. The Four Noble Truths are not tasks, but rather an
examination of our fundamental experience of ‘self’: the truth or the reality of suffering; the truth
or reality of the origin of suffering; the truth or reality of the cessation of suffering, and the truth
of a path or way through which we can accomplish the cessation of suffering.100 Certainly to
undertake the study of Buddhist philosophy is a task, and an arduous one at that; as is the path to
accomplish the complete and utter cessation of suffering through the cultivation and
development of wisdom which realizes emptiness and compassion. But these are foundational
truths, and have nothing to do with task-oriented activities to pencil in your weekly to-do
calendar.
Batchelor next weaves a story of the Buddha’s annual monsoon-season retreats into a
description of his concept of the ‘everyday sublime’: Buddha’s ‘sacred dwelling place’, which
Batchelor says is brahmavihāra in Sanskrit, refers to, according to Batchelor, “the everyday
sublime that is revealed when the mind becomes still and focused through settling into the
rhythm of one’s breathing. The sacred is not found in a transcendent realm beyond oneself or the
world, but is disclosed here and now once the mind relaxes…” (40).101 And once the mind
relaxes, Batchelor says, our experience of the “world is excessive; it is not a manageable place. It
pours forth relentlessly, voluptuously, but is gone by the time you reach out to seize it and freeze
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it” (40). These are two truly extraordinary sentences (amongst many), which are completely
incomprehensible to this Buddhist practitioner of meditation. In other words, I think that
Batchelor is saying here that when one relaxes one’s mind, as Buddha did in what Batchelor calls
his ‘sacred dwelling place’, and when the mind becomes “still and focused”, then the “everyday
sublime is disclosed”; and yet, it “pours forth relentlessly, voluptuously…”! ‘Voluptuous’ traces
its etymology to the Latin (Pliny, etc.) voluptuōsus, meaning indulgence in sensual pleasures, or
gratification of the senses; synonymous with: sybaritic, dissolute, licentious.102 Can Batchelor
mean that this is what we are after (or in for?) if we follow his prescription to relax our mind into
the natural rhythm of breathing, and thus enter into what he indicates is meditation: a dissolute
licentiousness? Is this, then, also a signifier of the (his) everyday sublime, in which we expect to
encounter a world that “is excessive…not a manageable place”? Is not this ‘unmanageable place’
an experience which is always already a too common, everyday experience, filled with a
nagging, disquieting confusion? But without skipping a beat, Batchelor goes on to say that in
retreating to the wilderness, “one is able to recover a natural dignity based on one’s awed
participation in, and indebtedness to, life itself. The solitude of the natural world thus becomes a
metaphor for emptiness, a sublime revelation of selflessness, an abode of freedom and ease” (41).
This passage is absurd, and utterly meaningless. What is our indebtedness to life, and to whom
do we owe this debt? Who is sublimely revealing selflessness? And to whom? It is wholly
unclear from Batchelor’s romanticism here if he intends that one is, in fact, experiencing
emptiness while in the solitude of the ‘natural world’; or, a sublimity of selflessness (whatever
that might be); or, that there is something that merely stands as ‘a metaphor’ for these concepts,
viz. solitude.
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For Batchelor, mindfulness meditation seems to be the key to ‘revealing’ an experience
of the sublime. He writes: “The transformative power of Gotama’s [sic] teaching originates in
opening one’s heart and mind unconditionally to the everyday sublime” (43). And, Batchelor
argues, it is through mindfulness meditation that one comes into contact with this everyday
sublime, whatever he imagines that to be. “Mindfulness allows us”, Batchelor contends, “to open
up a gap between…[someone’s] angry words and my feelings about them, which usually appear
so fused together that they are hard to disentangle. In nurturing this gap, one learns how to dwell
calmly and vividly in its space, which, I would argue, is the ‘clearly visible, immediate and
inviting’ space of nirvana itself” (43). But again, Batchelor does not elucidate on the procedure
for “nurturing this gap”, nor for “dwelling calmly and vividly in its space”, etc. Batchelor further
states that “nirvana is…reached…by paying close, uncompromising attention to our fluctuating,
anguished bodies and minds…nirvana, wherein lies the source of one’s freedom” (44, 46). It is
truly remarkable that we have now hurtled headlong with Batchelor from mindfulness into
nirvāṇa, the source of one’s freedom. Batchelor’s use of the words nirvāṇa, emptiness, and
everyday sublime seems all but interchangeable in the passages quoted above, with little
mindfulness, or even understanding, paid to their very unique and singular definitions and
markers.
“It almost sounds too easy” (45), Batchelor exclaims! And he does, indeed, make it—
nirvāṇa? emptiness? the everyday sublime?—sound too easy. However, he then directly
performs a stunning about-face, conflating what he has just described as “too easy” with
something altogether unintelligible, saying “…mindfulness is a constant challenge to live one’s
life from the perspective of a groundless ground103 of nirvanic [sic] contingency [!] instead of the
superficially consoling convictions of one’s place. Such a groundless ground is simultaneously
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fascinating and terrifying; it both intrigues and unsettles you. It is nothing other than the
everyday sublime” Batchelor reveals (46, my emphasis). Unfortunately, Batchelor’s ‘groundless
ground of nirvanic contingency’ throws an utterly unintelligible wrench into the whole “almost
too easy” works, which he has explained at length as involving nothing more complicated than
the foundational meditation technique of attending to one’s breath. It remains unclear, however,
how we get from an attending-to of our breath to a “groundless ground of nirvanic contingency”,
which Batchelor declares is “nothing other than the everyday sublime”. This is not just
extraordinarily weak, pseudo-philosophical argumentation; this is complete and utter
incoherence, and thoroughgoing word-play absurdity.
In his conclusion, Batchelor states that mindfulness meditation, as he has presented it, is
“a way of penetrating into the mystery that there is anything at all rather than nothing.104 When a
problem is solved, it disappears, but when mystery is penetrated, it only becomes more
mysterious. In this sense, mindfulness serves as a doorway into a way of life that embraces the
overwhelming totality of what it means to be a sentient human creature” (47). In other words, if
we take at face value what Batchelor says above, he is arguing that, through mindfulness,
mystery penetrated becomes more mysterious, while the experience of the human creature105
embraces a totality which is, nevertheless, overwhelming. This again makes no sense. Batchelor
is contradicting himself, as he stated earlier that meditation “as a sensibility…enables one to
cultivate an understanding of moment-to-moment experience much as one develops an
appreciation of art or poetry or nature” (39). However, Buddhist meditation is not goal-oriented;
Batchelor has misconstrued the most fundamental and central Buddhist practice and praxis; and
furthermore, this has neither a bearing on, nor a relationship to his ‘everyday sublime’, nor to
‘emptiness’. Nor does this have anything to do with nirvāṇa whatsoever.
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Stephen Batchelor is a widely published contemporary Western interpreter of Buddhism,
advocating from an apostatical perspective. Batchelor’s modus operandi is to employ
confounding rhetoric as a tool to defend his unorthodox (and often incoherent) construals, rather
than to inform of learned, authentic Buddhist philosophy. Timothy Morton characterizes this
approach well, writing that “Non-philosophy provides non-Buddhism with a way of being above
(meta) Buddhism while still making Buddhist assertions that claim to be more correct than what
it calls ‘X-Buddhism’” (Morton 2015: 188). Batchelor’s logic confounds as that of a nonBuddhist, X-Buddhist, or anti-Buddhist sort, and consistently comes up not only short, but
surprisingly maladroit, matching his ersatz scholarship and ‘philosophy’. This obfuscates his
understandings of even the most fundamental of authentic Buddhist philosophical tenets—
including emptiness—within his theses on such subjects as the the Four Noble Truths and what
he refers to as the ‘everyday sublime’.
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VI.
Morton and Žižek

Another contemporary writer and thinker who engages, often-times questionably, the
concept of ‘emptiness’ is Timothy Morton. In his essay “Hegel on Buddhism” (2007), Morton
writes of what he perceives to be a “Buddhaphobia” within Western philosophical circles, and
which he argues is traceable to Hegel’s early writings on Buddhism as well as to the widely
misunderstood thesis of emptiness by nineteenth-century Western philosophers—which, in
concert with prajñā106 and upāya,107 underpins all Buddhist philosophy and praxis. Morton cites
several influential thinkers subsequent to Hegel who are equally guilty of ‘Buddhaphobia’,
including Schopenhauer, who held the “view of Buddhism as annihilation of desire; Nietzsche
[and his] critique of Buddhism as a consumption of the soul; the nuancing and critique of “I = I”
in Sartre; [and Heidegger’s] reifying view of Being and his concomitant later interest in Zen”
(Morton ¶1, 15).

Morton’s own ideas regarding fundamental tenets of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy are
sometimes mistaken, however; take, for example, his Madhyamaka view of emptiness. In ¶4, he
writes that his investigations in this essay into notions of emptiness which Hegel described in his
writings is found to be “crucial for [Hegel’s] argument, since it demonstrates that Hegel’s idea of
nothingness drastically reduces emptiness to what Buddhism itself ironically considers a rather
substantial thing in which one has to believe” (original emphasis). This characterization of the
Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness as a thing in which to believe is a remarkable claim,
which calls into question Morton’s standing as a credible commentator on all things Buddhist.
Further, Morton cites the longer of the two recensions of the Heart Sūtra, that of 25 ślokas,108 as
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the “main Buddhist text on emptiness”. This is incorrect. The Heart Sūtra is the most widely
recognized treatise on emptiness, or śūnyatā, and it is often chanted daily by Mahāyāna Buddhist
practitioners, but it is by no means the principle text on the subject. Rather, Nāgārjuna’s Root
Stanzas on the Middle Way, or Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (MMK); Candrakīrti’s two
commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s treatise, Introduction to the Middle Way109, or
Madhyamakāvatāra, and Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way, or the Prasannapadā; and
Maitreya/Asaṅga’s treatise on the Prajñāparamitāsūtras literature, The Ornament of Clear
Realization, or Abhisamayālaṃkāra, are four foundational texts which address the YogācāraMadhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, or śūnyatā, and which are studied intensively and at
length in the Tibetan Buddhist monastic philosophical colleges, or shedras (bshad grwa), of all
four schools both within Tibet as well as throughout the Himalayan region of the Tibetan
diaspora.110 Nāgārjuna’s treatise, the MMK, is the commonly acknowledged foundational text of
Mahāyāna Buddhism and Madhyamaka philosophical thought on emptiness.
Morton next takes on Slavoj Žižek, a noted contemporary antagoniste of (arguably a
‘New Age’ iteration of) Buddhism, whose “drastically distorted remarks…on ‘Western
Buddhism’, in Critical Inquiry and elsewhere, continue the equation of emptiness with
nothingness, and nirvāṇa with the realization of this nothingness. [Irony notwithstanding,]
Lacanian (and therefore Sartrean, and therefore Hegelian) notions of nothingness inform
[Žižek’s] view of why the Christian legacy is worth fighting for…” (Morton ¶15). This is a
perceptive criticism of Žižek’s radical misconstrual of Madhyamaka emptiness as well as the
foundational Buddhist thesis of nirvāṇa, and by association, its counterpoint, saṃsāra. Morton
dismisses Žižek’s contemptuous view of nirvāṇa—which Žižek characterizes as a “primordial
Void”—arguing that the ‘primordial Void” is every bit as much a Judaeo-Christian concept as a
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Buddhist one. However, Morton gets it wrong here; there is no “primordial Void” in the
Yogācāra-Madhyamaka Buddhist project. This is, unfortunately, as significant a
misunderstanding on Morton’s part as it is on Žižek’s, and its correct understanding is
fundamental to the comprehension of the true nature of emptiness. “It is as if” Morton writes, “in
[Christian] translation, Buddhism is thought to stop at the mysterious void that pre-exists God’s
act of creation. [This] translation yanks emptiness towards the void, then blames it for being
nothingness” (¶15). Here, however, Morton offers an insightful critique of the Judeo-Christian
idea of emptiness, or nothingness, which explains why it has neither been understood nor
explored within Western philosophizing about Being. This common misunderstanding places
emptiness ‘behind’, or ‘outside of’ things; but it is neither a void ‘thing’, nor is it located behind,
in front of, nor inside nor outside something else. Emptiness is, in short, everything, everywhere;
there is no ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’.
Morton asserts, in the same paragraph, that “certain Buddhist views do tend towards
nihilism…” (my emphasis). This is an all too common, and widely mistaken trope levelled at the
Buddhist view of emptiness by those who have not done the requisite work to understand both
the fundamental basis as well as the multiple complexities of this project. Žižek suffers from this
malady as well. Buddhism understood is not nihilistic. But neither is it eternalistic; it charts a
‘middle way’ beyond the extremes of nihilism and eternalism. Morton writes in his concluding
remarks in this paragraph, that “the notion of emptiness is inseparable from compassion”. I
would say that emptiness is inseparable from clear, vivid awareness, with prajñā and compassion
arising from that clear awareness. This is an important distinction.
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Finally, with regard to Hegel—the central character of Morton’s monograph—Morton
writes that his subject reifies the ‘nothingness’ he refers to as something “truly existent, in the
sense of being single, independent and lasting” (¶30), and with which he can identify. In other
words, emptiness, or nothingness, as understood by Hegel, is something after all. And, it seems
that emptiness is something for Morton as well. However, Nāgārjuna demonstrates decisively
that emptiness is itself empty, and not some-thing. It has been exceedingly difficult, throughout
history, for Western thinkers to think outside the theistic fishbowl in which they swim, which
affords no possibility of thinking ‘emptiness’ beyond an existential, abyssal void. An alternative
scaffolding has never been constructed in the west upon which to examine emptiness.
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Conclusion

Emptiness is neither das Nichts, the nothing, nor le néant, nothingness.
What is it that lies beyond the “limits of reason and expression”? And how do we know?
Is there a clue here to guide us in our pursuit of answers? Yes, there is.
Looking at recent notions that sound like Milbank’s, albeit contradictory, “absolutely
unknowable void”, which lies beyond our limits of reason, I surveyed ideas which have famously
been put forward by Heidegger and Sartre, using the signifiers ‘nothingness’ (das Nichts), and
‘the nothing’ (le néant), respectively. Looking first at Heidegger’s project, we see that the early
Heidegger became intrigued, as he puts it, that science concerned itself with being, and nothing
else. Heidegger wanted to know about this ‘nothing else’. The route Heidegger charted in his
explorations was to first ask: “Is the nothing given only because the ‘not’, i.e., negation, is
given?” (Heidegger: 97). Or, could the nothing precede and presuppose the ‘not’? While choosing
the latter, Heidegger remains distant from his purported goal of defining just what this nothing
is—or isn’t. His search for an experience of nothing leads him to assert that an attunement to
nothing is reached through or, by consequence of an anxiety “in the face of…” inherent in all
beings. And in this anxiety, a ‘bewildered calm’ arises, a “shrinking back before”, as he puts it
(102). Heidegger asserts that from this it follows that nihilation becomes the essence of nothing,

that “in the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises:
that they are beings—and not nothing” (103). Which leaves me wondering: what is it then, that is
nothing? And, furthermore, what are beings? Heidegger never pursues these questions in a way
which would satisfy a Mādhyamika philosopher. A portion of the passage which I have
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previously quoted above, from Heidegger’s “What is Metaphysics?”, reads: “the nothing makes
possible the openedness of beings as such. The nothing does not merely serve as the counter
concept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such” (104). From
this, I think it is quite clear that for Heidegger, ‘the nothing’ (das Nichts) is interchangeable with
‘the Absolute’; from the ground of the Absolute, which is their inherent essential-ness, the
‘openedness’ of beings arises. As this section proceeds, and I untangle the Madhyamaka view of
emptiness, it becomes clear that Heidegger’s view is clearly at odds with the Madhyamaka view.
Heidegger risks reifying, or perhaps deifying, ‘the nothing’, according it an ‘originator’ status,
even if he might deny the suggestion of such an inculpation.
In Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Sartre introduces the argument that it is time “to open
our eyes and question ingenuously this totality which is man-in-the-world” (34). And this is
precisely what he sets out to do in his project. However, I am not sure that he ever truly
succeeds. Some of his questions are insightful; others beg for answers which clarify rather than
confuse. For instance, Sartre poses two questions at the outset of his project: “What is the
synthetic relation which we call ‘being-in-the-world’?”; and, “What must man and the world be
in order for a relation between them to be possible?”. I find these to be promising questions, but
am ultimately disappointed by the direction Sartre takes in response, which often resembles a
mountain road with multiple switchbacks and the occasional mudslide.
Sartre examines ‘being’, ‘being-in-the-world’, and ‘nothingness’, his tripartite construct
of the human experience, as he explores his ‘synthetic relation’. Being, he maintains, is defined
by what it is not. And whatever being is (our being as a case in point), we find that we are
circumscribed by nothingness. The possibility of non-being stipulates any questions we might
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entertain about being. And non-being will constrain the reply. As if that is not confusing enough,
Sartre concludes that “Being is that and outside of that, nothing” (36). Sartre enters squarely into
nihilistic territory here, and spends the rest of Being and Nothingness residing there.
I then shifted gears to examine what, exactly, the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka Buddhist
concept of emptiness is; first turning to the Heart Sūtra in 18 ślokas, and then to the
Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (MMK) by Nāgārjuna. The Heart Sūtra, and Nāgārjuna’s MMK,
assert that “the true nature of reality cannot be described by any conceptual fabrication, by any
conventional term or expression”. Thus, explains Gyamtso, it obtains that “it is not existent, not
nonexistent, not something, not nothing, not permanent, not extinct…Emptiness ultimately
means that genuine reality is empty of any conceptual fabrication that could attempt to describe
what it is” (Gyamtso 2003: xi). The postulation of dependent arising, pratītyasamutpadā, opens a
door for our understanding of emptiness. Every thing arises in interdependence with other things.
Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso says:
Emptiness does not mean complete nothingness, it means dependent origination.
Emptiness and dependent arising have the same meaning. Therefore, when
emptiness is possible, everything is possible. Everything in samsara and nirvana are
all perfectly free to arise due to the coming together of their causes and conditions.
If things were not empty, however, if they were not dependently arisen, then nothing
would be possible. If things truly existed, they would never change. They would
have their own nature that did not depend on causes and conditions, and therefore
causes and results would not exist. Nothing would ever arise or cease. There could
be no perception or knowledge” (Gyamtso 156-7).
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No thing is unitary, singular. Therefore, no thing has any unitary essence. Every thing is empty.
In the final section of this chapter, I surveyed two western interpreters of Buddhist
philosophy, Stephen Batchelor and Timothy Morton, who demonstrate just how difficult this
philosophical turn is, and how easily one can go astray, even with the best of intentions. Stephen
Batchelor’s essay “The Everyday Sublime”, sheds no profitable light on the sublime, everyday or
otherwise. Batchelor’s essay is a word-salad of contradictions and incoherencies. I will leave it at
that.
Timothy Morton’s essay, “Hegel’s Buddhism”, looks at Hegel’s misguided writings on
Buddhism in general, and his confused notions of nothingness, or emptiness, in particular. Slavoj
Žižek briefly enters the conversation, and his dismissive and misinformed comments about the
Buddhist project altogether are quickly dispatched by Morton. However, Morton’s perspectival
comments on the treatment of emptiness, first by Hegel, and later by Žižek, reveal Morton’s own
unfortunate and apparently misinformed scholarship and understanding of this foundational
principle of the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophical project. Morton joins a legion of Western
thinkers who do not seem to truly understand the vast and profound philosophical implications
underlying the notion of Buddhist emptiness, nor the extraordinary radicalness inherent in this
philosophical project.
As Mervyn Sprung has written so eloquently, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka project is a
work relevant to the most vital problems of philosophy as these engage thinkers of
our own time, whatever their language and cultural background. Its thought is
rigorous, fresh and often disconcertingly contemporary. If we can treat the details
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of the historical matrix of the [Madhyamaka project] with the tolerance we exercise
toward ancient and medieval Western philosophical writing, there should be no
insuperable difficulty in seeing its incisive relevance to the questions now obsessing
us in the West (2).
We should find no problems moving between the ‘great questions’ posed by our predecessors of
Ancient Greece or of Ancient India. All coalesce in addressing the most pressing dilemmas we as
human species face. The answers to some of these questions can be found in the YogācāraMadhyamaka project.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Empty-Sublime:
From Boileau to Neuroscience and the Middle Way Between the Two
I got plenty o’ nuttin’, and nuttin’s plenty for me…
- Porgy and Bess 111

In this chapter, I look at the dialectic of what I am calling the ‘empty-sublime’, which
consists of, on the one hand, the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view of the empty and luminous nature
of all phenomena (ourselves included), and on the other hand, Western conceptions of the
sublime and the sublime experience. The repercussions which follow from this dialectic exercise
conclude this chapter.
First, I briefly review Boileau-Despréaux’s contribution to the conversation about the
sublime, with his introduction of the notion that the sublime goes well beyond an oratorial or
linguistic device, and is, in fact, a critical, philosophical concept. This marks the starting point of
the modern interest in the sublime. Then I briefly summarize Michel Foucault’s thoughts on the
very limited and circumspect nature of Western ideas and philosophy, which, by his account, has
always abhorred incommensurability with its own history and traditions. This prejudice bears
directly on the modern, Western hermeneutic of the sublime, on experience, and on
consciousness. In Part II, I visit Herman Melville’s great novel, Moby-Dick, to appropriate as
dialectic metaphor the distinct visions produced by the two different eyes of the Great White
Whale, situated as they are on opposite sides of the leviathan’s massive head, with darkness
towering between. This Cetacean image serves as an apt metaphor in our dialectical examination
of, on one side, the sublime, and emptiness on the other. What then follows is a game of
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dialectical ping pong, presenting in direct juxtaposition views from each eye. The categories of
ideas follow this outline:
enthusiastic passion + terror

/

complete and lucid openness;

consciousness = experience

/

consciousness is a false reality;

‘transcendental illusion’

/

non-conceptual mind;

nihilism, eternalism

/

the Middle Way;

perception and nature of phenomena /

the empty-sublime,

placing Western philosophical arguments on the left, and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka logic on the
right.
Starting then in Part III, I look at the next significant development in the philosophy of
the sublime after Boileau, turning to the now-obscure British critic and theist John Dennis, and
his re-formulation, or ‘refinement’ in theistic terms, of Boileau’s and Longinus’ sublime, which
adds, perhaps for the first time in the history of the idea of the sublime, an element of Divine
terror to the mix. Part IV turns to the modern (or postmodern) scientific view of neuroscientist
Christof Koch, whose thesis about consciousness asserts the view that experience is
consciousness, and vice versa. This is a surprising echo of Kant’s isogesis of ‘experience’ in his
first Critique. The discussion of (the faculty of) experience is important—in fact, key—because
the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view of experience is the ground for my argument: viz. that what is
referred to as a ‘sublime experience’ is an experience of ‘emptiness’. Experience takes on a role
of immanence in Koch’s view, which I discuss in more detail in Part V, where I look again, by
way of a dialectical frame, at the faculty and function of reason as postulated by Kant, and then
as advanced by Nāgārjuna some fifteen hundred years earlier. Understanding the limits of the
rational mind opens the door to an understanding of the view of emptiness. Part VI examines the

148
views of the ‘four extremes’: eternalism, nihilism, affirmation, and negation; each serving in its
own way to obscure the possibility of the empty-sublime shining through. It is the Madhyamaka
‘middle way’ postulation, situated between these opposing, commonly held, and ‘extreme’ views
of ‘reality’ which is able to dispel the obscuring clouds of dubiety. And finally, in Part VII, I
examine views of perception of phenomena, our construct of the scaffolding of ‘I’ and ‘other’,
and our experience of phenomena which, I argue, lie at the very heart of the sublime/emptiness
dialectic.
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I.
Boileau and Foucault

The concept and experience referred to as the sublime was first articulated by ‘Longinus’
in his first-century CE treatise, Περὶ Ὕψους, Peri hupsous or hypsous.112 Some fifteen hundred
years later, the most influential, though not the first French translation of Longinus’ exposition,
appeared with the title Le Traité du sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours. Traduit du grec
de Longin, by Boileau-Despréaux (1674),113 along with his pivotal, and subsequently
controversial “Préface”. Boileau-Despréaux’s isogesis established the sublime as far more than a
mere rhetorical device; with his commentary, Boileau gave birth to a sublime as a critical,
philosophical concept. Various readings and interpretations ensued in the following centuries,
authored by, amongst many others, Dennis (1704), Addison (1712), Burke (1759), Kant (1764,
1790), Schiller (1795), et. al., right up to Barnett Newman (1948), Paul Crowther (1989), and Jean-

François Lyotard (1991).114 Notwithstanding this veritable parade of significant and often
noteworthy scholarship, I argue that they all, remarkably, miss the mark. These various
hermeneutics have each been, when examined closely and without prejudice, epistemologically
incoherent and ontologically contradictory, as I have argued in Chapter Two. If we accept that
these earlier arguments, beginning with Boileau, are untenable, as first asserted by Guy Sircello
some twenty-five years ago, and I do, then what is going on? What is this ongoing dialogue and
fascination surrounding the sublime all about, really, and why can we not, finally, make some
sense of what has been called ‘the sublime experience’?
To set the stage for this chapter, which asserts that we need to approach the
understanding of the sublime from an entirely different perspective, I want to first turn to Michel
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Foucault, who, not unlike Steve Jobs, advocates for ‘thinking different’. Foucault, in Les Mots et
les choses (1970), cites a passage by José Luís Borges,115 who writes that in a “certain Chinese
encyclopædia”,116 it is stated that animals are divided into some fourteen categories, viz.:

(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens,
(f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied,
(j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having
just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies. (Foucault
1994: xv, original emphasis)

Foucault then writes: “In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great
leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system
of thought, is the limitation of our own [system, i.e.], the stark impossibility of thinking that”
(xv, original emphasis). It is this impossibility—this incommensurability—of thinking that,
through or from the limitations of our self-imposed (Western) acculturated and historically
constituted system(s) of thought, over centuries, which renders impossible our thinking of
emptiness, or śūnyatā, which stands as perhaps the very epitome of ‘that’ in Western
philosophical thinking. This is because such thinking, as Foucault argues, finds
all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the thought that bears the
stamp of our age and our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all
the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing
things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our ageold distinction between the Same and the Other”. (xv, original emphasis)
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And this line of thought is not just disturbing, threatening the collapse of the distinction between
the Same and the Other, but more importantly, threatens the very foundations upon which we
have constructed the entire scaffolding of ‘my-self and other’, of our entire world view, and our
place within it. The stakes are very high, indeed.
In this chapter I explore the dialectic of the experience of emptiness, or śūnyatā, as found
in the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and Mahāmudrā philosophical traditions, on the one hand, and the
experiences described in Western conversations of the sublime on the other, employing as a
metaphor of apparent incommensurability the distinctly different images seen by the two eyes of
the Great White Whale found in Melville’s Moby-Dick. Perhaps if we look directly at the
experience of ‘emptiness’, as well as what is called ‘the sublime’, rather than at the various
postulations and conjectures about them, we will arrive at an understanding of what the sublime
experience is; and, in turn, what can be understood of the experience of emptiness as well.
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II.
Evoking Moby-Dick

Investigating the sublime vis-à-vis emptiness recalls Melville’s description of the
two eyes of the Great White Whale. In Moby-Dick (1851), Melville observes that the leviathan’s
two eyes are
divided…by many cubic feet of solid head, which towers between them…this, of
course, must wholly separate the impressions which each independent organ
imparts. The whale, therefore, must see one distinct picture on this side, and another
distinct picture on that side; while all between must be profound darkness and
nothingness to him.
So long as a man’s eyes are open in the light…it is quite impossible for him,
attentively, and completely, to examine any two things—however large or however
small—at one and the same instant of time; never mind if they lie side by side and
touch each other. But if you now come to separate these two objects, and surround
each by a circle of profound darkness; then, in order to see one of them, in such a
manner as to bring your mind to bear on it, the other will be utterly excluded from
your contemporary consciousness. How is it, then, with the whale? True, both his
eyes, in themselves, must simultaneously act, but is his brain so much more
comprehensive, combining, and subtle than man’s, that he can at the same moment
of time attentively examine two distinct projects, one on one side of him, and the
other in an exactly opposite direction? If he can, then is it as marvelous a thing in
him, as if a man were able simultaneously to go through the demonstrations of two
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distinct problems in Euclid. Nor, strictly investigated, is there any incongruity in
this comparison. (Melville: 262-63)117
Following Melville’s lead and his perspicacious narrative, this chapter will serve as an
apposite metaphor for our investigation into the ‘sublime’ and ‘emptiness’. We are examining
what, at first blush, appears to be two, very distinct, and seemingly unrelated, eyes in the head of
a philosophic, sublime whale, the locations of which lead us to believe that there is a towering,
incommensurable no-man’s land separating the one eye’s perspective from the other. But I am
arguing that this is not the case with the sublime and emptiness, because the sublime experience
has been misunderstood and misinterpreted from the start. In the following, I will explain why,
through examining several strands of the sublime-emptiness dialectic—where one eye seems
wholly separate and distinct from the other eye, proffering a wholly discreet vision of what it
sees from that of its opposite—this apparent difference, upon further examination, may not be
different at all.
The Yogācāra-Madhyamaka ‘eye’ which perceives emptiness is but one perspective
which has been ‘excluded from…contemporary consciousness’ and Western philosophical
consideration due to its provenance and incommensurability with normative Western
philosophical standards. Our Western sphere of thought rarely, it seems, ventures out beyond the
edge into what seems to be a ‘circle of profound darkness’, as is the case when we consider a
concept such as ‘emptiness’, which conjures up synchronous images of a nihilistic abyss. This
myopia, in turn, grants agency to a persistent, if mistaken, logic within the discourse surrounding
the sublime, viz. that the definition of the sublime experience can be deconstructed as follows:
the human imagination becomes incapable of processing the appearance of an unexpectedly
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astonishing or terror-instilling sight or experience of phenomenon. However, our reason
immediately arises, takes command, and comes to the rescue; just at the moment when all seems
irretrievably lost, reason grasps and apprehends the seemingly incommensurable and
incomprehensible, thereby putting our mind finally at ease, very satisfied with ourself. Reason
thus renders the (presumed) threatening experience of ‘the vast and immeasurable’ all but
benign, seeing that our physical safety is assured due to our physical remove from the threat.
However, this construction of the sublime experience considers only the circumspect vision of a
one-eyed whale. What happens if we turn to the second eye? In so doing, we are attempting
nothing less than the task of “simultaneously…go[ing] through the demonstrations of two
distinct problems in Euclid” (263). These two distinct prospects, viz., ‘emptiness’ and ‘the
sublime’, will, I trust, come into such a focus that there will remain no profound and
insurmountable or impenetrable darkness in-between, and a complete and clear picture will
emerge as we continue.
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III.
John Dennis and Nāgārjuna:
Complete Openness vis-à-vis the Enthusiastic Passion / Terror of the Sublime

Considering emptiness—that is to say the opposing eye of our whale to that of the
sublime ‘line of sight’—it has been said that “experientially, emptiness is described as…no
reference point: no this, no that, and no this-and-that together…your mind is just open, simply
open, simply being—or non-being” (Trungpa 2014: 130-31). There is a reported boundless
spaciousness in the experience of the sublime as well, which can be shocking, or bewildering, or
even terrifying, as attested by recollections of so-called ‘sublime’ experiences throughout the
ages. In a dialectic of the sublime and emptiness, I propose that this bewilderment arises because
this usually sudden experience of unlimited spaciousness that is revealed when conceptuality
collapses has no-ground as a (non-)reference point. The only reference point as such is open
space, which is no-reference point at all. It is this no-reference point that evokes the “terrifying
prospect that you cannot have ground to struggle with…the carpet is pulled out from under your
feet. You are suspended in nowhere…” (Trungpa 2003b: 332). It is as though you are floating in
outer space without a spacesuit, yet you are still able to breath. However, rather than gaining a
foothold vis-à-vis reason, one begins to understand, as the development of prajñā unfolds, a
quality that can be called emptiness, viz. complete openness and spaciousness, that is cognizant.
That understanding reveals “a quality of brilliance. We realize that this absence [of dualistic
fixation on this or that] is not empty or vacant in the ordinary sense, but there is a tremendous
spark or brightness taking place” (Trungpa 2013: 195). In other words, in the first instant there is
open space, pure being, with no reference point. If we neglect to recognize this as such, if we
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resist relaxing into that openness, panic may well ensue, with reason ‘brought to the rescue’ in
the form of a conceptual remedy. However, if we go along with, or relax into being suspended in
the midst of nowhere, we find brilliance and clear cognizance. This is what I call the emptysublime in its fullest, most luminous sense.
The two, almost simultaneous experiences, which have come to define the sublime—
complete non-conceptual openness, and an accompanying panic or terror—were first introduced
into the literature of the sublime by the English theologian and critic John Dennis (1657-1734) in
his essay, “ The grounds of criticism in poetry” (1704). Mentioned rarely, if at all, in
contemporary conversations about the sublime, Dennis’ theological footprint can be found
throughout all subsequent formulations of the sublime experience. Diverging radically from
Longinus and Boileau, John Dennis perceived a divinely influenced event in the sublime,
wherein an enthusiastic passion/terror marked a sublime moment corresponding to his Christian
worldview. From this historical moment onwards, the sublime is described as an admixture of
awe, or a similar idea of his enthusiastic passion, and fear or terror. For this reason, it is
worthwhile to spend some time on John Dennis’ legacy, as a representative of the other eye of
our whale.
Dennis’ account of the sublime can be divided into four categories: 1) enthusiastic terror;
2) enthusiastic passion; 3) terror-wonderment; and 4) theology. First, explaining his thesis for an
enthusiastic terror, Dennis writes118 that there are “several ideas which are capable of producing
this enthusiastic terror:
gods, dæmons, hell, spirits and souls of men, miracles, prodigies, enchantments,
witchcrafts, thunder, tempests, raging seas, inundations, torrents, earthquakes,
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volcanoes, monsters, serpents, lions, tigers, fire, war, pestilence, famine, &c.
(Dennis/Ashfield & de Bolla: 38)

This reads strangely like the extraordinary taxonomy of animals from Borges’ telling of an entry
in ‘a certain Chinese Encyclopædia’, recalled by Foucault; but in this case, Dennis’ taxonomy is
deeply colored by Christian biblical mythology. Dennis goes on to fill out this picture, writing
that
…of all these ideas none are so terrible as those which show the wrath and
vengeance of an angry god; for nothing is so wonderful in its effects: and
consequently, the images or ideas of those effects must carry a great deal of terror
with them… Now of things which are terrible, those are the most terrible which are
the most wonderful; because that seeing them both threatening and powerful, and
not being able to fathom the greatness and extent of their power, we know not how
far and how soon they may hurt us. (38)
Dennis has created a startling and starkly delineated borderline, which shall not be breached!
Beyond that frontier is “the wrath and vengeance of an angry God”, the Divine, the vast, the
powerful, the realm where both angels and philosophers fear to tread.
The idea of ‘enthusiastic passion’ is rooted in Dennis’ hermeneutic of the ‘great passion’
which, he argues, all great poets and their great poetry evoke. The poet “must every where excite
great passion” (35), he writes. This passion of Dennis’ is manifold and can be divided into
‘vulgar passion’ and ‘enthusiastic passion, or enthusiasm’. The ‘vulgar’ passions refer to “the
objects…or the ideas in the ordinary course of life” (35). The ‘enthusiastic passion, or
enthusiasm’ arises as discursive, imaginative thoughts in contemplation, or in what Dennis
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describes as a “meditation of things that belong not to common life” (35). The ‘enthusiastic
passions’ are six in number:
admiration; terror; horror; joy; sadness; and desire.
Quite often these ‘enthusiastic passions’ call forth an idea which “must move a great deal of
terror in us, and it is this sort of terror that I call enthusiasm” (36). Dennis continues: “Things
then that are powerful, and likely to hurt, are the causes of common terror; and the more they are
powerful and likely to hurt, the more they become the causes of terror: which terror, the greater it
is, the more it is joined with wonder, and the nearer it comes to astonishment” (36).
Dennis next constructs a ‘terror-wonderment sublime’ from a quintessential late
seventeenth-century theological scaffolding. After defining the enthusiastic passion as that which
contains both terror and wonder, as well as astonishment, he proceeds to argue that “the greatest
sublimity is to be derived from religious ideas” (36). “This enthusiastic terror contributes
extremely to the sublime” (37), Dennis continues. The sublime, for Dennis, becomes an
unmistakable expression of the eternal Divine: the wonder and astonishment, and terror, of a
transcendent, vengeful, wrathful Almighty. In other words, in the experience of the sublime, we
meet our Maker(s): God and John Dennis.
In his fantastical hermeneutic, Dennis has strayed a long way from Boileau’s Longinus,
where Boileau writes that the Longinian sublime is “something extraordinary and marvelous that
Strikes us in a Discourse and makes it elevate, ravish and transport us [cet extraordinaire et ce
merveilleux qui fait u’un outrage enlève, ravin, transporte]” (Monk: 31). Boileau asserts that
“therefore by the Sublime in Longinus must be understood that which is extraordinary surprising
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[sic], and as I have translated it, marvelous in Discourse” (Boileau: 7). Perhaps within the
Longinus-Boileau sublime can be found something poetic, ‘Divinely inspired’, or, if you wish,
transcendental, but nowhere do we find a Dennisian terror, or ‘enthusiastic passion/terror’, or any
terrible fright whatsoever. When John Dennis invites “the wrath of infinite power… [and] the
vengeance designed by it” to the table (Dennis/Ashfield & de Bolla: 38), he takes us from the
transcendent experience to a concept of an experience which is suffused thoroughly by his
theology; subsequent commentators and interpreters, chiefly Burke and Kant, have followed suit
in formulating a recipe of the sublime which contains a sudden openness and wonderment with
an equal measure of terror and/or abjection. Thus, they have fallen into the Dennisian trap of
epistemological incoherence and ontological absurdity, as I have explained in Chapter Two.
Theology has always figured largely in the modern discourse on the sublime, from
Boileau’s invocation of the ‘fiat lux’ in the old Hebrew Book of Genesis, to the idea of sublimity
as an expression of the Divine found in Burke’s Enquiry, and even Kant’s third Critique.
However, Robert Doran maintains that “Dennis simply makes this relation more explicit, and in
the process allows us to understand, however contrary to his stated intentions, how the sublime
represents a counterweight to religion, precisely by furnishing its aesthetic equivalent” (Doran:
140). Notwithstanding Doran’s noteworthy scholarship, I do not agree that one may read in

Dennis’ sublime ‘a counterweight to religion’; rather, I think that the sublime moment has been
all too easily repurposed (or subsumed) here to serve as a claim of divine revelation or
intervention, positioning the sublime experience firmly on the side of the theistic/Christian
divide, which negates anything which might seem incommensurate with it, regardless of the
elegance and simplicity that the second, opposing eye of the whale may suggest and disclose; in
this case the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view of emptiness.
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Longinus, when speaking of Ὕψους (hupsos)—commonly translated as ‘height’,
‘grandeur’, ‘loftiness’, or ‘sublimity’—spoke with a “singular commitment to an aesthetics of
transcendence, to an experience resembling, or analogous to, mystical religious experience”
(Doran: 41). I disagree with Doran’s interpretation here, and would argue that Longinus’ ‘singular

commitment to an aesthetics of transcendence’ could not possibly have been analogous to our
contemporary Western view of a mono-theistic, and/or tripartite Christian ‘mystical religious
experience’, as such a thing did not exist for Longinus, or anyone else in Greece or Rome in the
first-century CE. The context is completely incommensurable.
James Porter explains that the aesthetics of transcendent experience can be found “in an
astonishing range of areas, from thought to one’s own nature to political rhetoric, literature,
silence, the emotions, statues and paintings, the gods, natural phenomena, and even natural
inquiry” (Porter 2016b: xviii). He further argues that “the sublime, when it occurs, appears in
flashes and at moments rather than being a consistent feature of works and authors, which makes
it all the harder to detect” (xviii). This assertion is echoed by Doran who, in referencing Boileau’s
“Préface” (12.1), contends that “Boileau…invokes a concept of aesthetic temporality: sublimity
does not show itself over the course of entire works or in long passages, but is something that
happens in singular moments (Longinus’s kairos)…” (Doran: 113). This description is consistent
with accounts of experiences of emptiness (śūnyatā): moments of flashes, which can sometimes
even seem random within our daily routine. “We might realize the nature of shunyata [sic] while
we are preparing a meal or drinking a cup of tea”, Trungpa writes (Trungpa 2014: 145).
The current conundrum surrounding the sublime, or the conundrum which is the sublime,
is summed up well by Porter: “The problem is that the sublime is not a word. It is a concept and
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an experience, or rather a whole range of ideas, meanings and experiences that are embedded in
conceptual and experiential patterns” (Porter 2016b: xx). The sublime, as a word, and as a
concept, merely points to an extra-ordinary experience, and out of this experience an array of
construals and suppositions have emerged over more than two millennia. And in the intervening
years, the recognition of the actual sublime experience has been all but lost, while conceptual
constructs have become ever more obscure and confusing, especially as ‘the sublime’ has entered
the vernacular of the postmodernists.
From the Mahāyāna Buddhist Yogācāra-Madhyamaka point of view, Dennis’ enthusiastic
terror, enthusiastic passion, terror-wonderment, and theology, which I have surveyed above, are
merely conceptual obstacles to a genuine experience of emptiness. Even temporality in the
examination of the sublime is mistaken, because emptiness is not something that comes and
goes. What is ‘sudden’ is the collapse of conceptual mind, like ‘storm clouds parting to reveal
the sun’. Dennis and his terror-wonderment sublime has cast an impenetrable cloud cover over
the ever-shining clarity that is the empty-sublime experience of non-conceptual openness.
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IV.
The Neuroscientific View: Consciousness = Experience
vis-à-vis
The Empty (Madhyamaka) View: Consciousness is a False ‘Reality’

Misapprehensions, and certainly disagreements, of what is considered to be the
veridicality of reason and logic and its objects, on the one hand, and the very nature of
consciousness, which apprehends phenomena on the other, have persisted since ancient times.
The scientific and the Abrahamic-based religious interpreters and commentators representing one
side of our metaphoric whale’s vision, have not understood, I argue, what it is that one
encounters when one steps over the threshold beyond the reasoning, discursive mind, or the
mental factors of consciousness, into unobstructed openness, or emptiness. For the scientist, this
threshold represents a certain je ne sais quoi, or for Kant, das Ding an sich; and for the believer
steeped in the Abrahamic traditions lies the unknown, unknowable, unapproachable, often
unspeakable, and wholly unapproachable Divine. This is vividly illustrated in a short passage by
the Christian ‘mystic’, Meister Eckhart, cited by the neuroscientist Christof Koch in the latter’s
recent (2019) monograph on consciousness,119 as support for his argument for a scientific view
of the nature of consciousness qua experience:
There is the silent ‘middle’, for no creature ever entered there and no image, nor
has the soul there either activity or understanding, therefor [sic] she is not aware
there of any image, whether of herself or of any other creature. (Koch: 7)
In other words, Eckhart is saying that beyond the thinking, reasoning, discursive mind (which, in
the early Buddhist philosophical system, is said to be the sixth, or mental consciousness, and is,
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itself, completely insubstantial),120 there is to be found no self-conscious or self-reflexive
stirrings at all, no awareness of any kind, nor any understanding. Eckhart here points to an utter
negation of every-thing resulting in a complete void.
Koch’s argument is that “it seems that any experience has to be about something. Does it
even make conceptual sense to be conscious without being conscious of something? What would
it feel like? Would such a putative state of pure consciousness have any phenomenological
attribute that distinguished it from deep sleep or death?” (Koch: 114, emphasis added). And if our
experience is not about something, then the alternative for Koch is a vast, ‘silent middle’,
resembling Sartre’s existential, bottomless abyss, or even the massive Heidelberg Tun, located
between the two eyes of the Sperm whale: i.e. fathomless darkness. If we extrapolate Koch’s
argument further, e.g. that ‘any experience has to be about something’, we can see that this view
has formed the basis of Western attempts at explaining the sublime experience from the
beginning. That is to say, Western philosophers have been wholly unwilling, or unable, to think
that the sublime experience could be an experience beyond mere thought; of open emptiness—
not a void, à la Sartre—but an instant of non-conceptual pre-thought which is completely open
and cognizant. And oh, so remarkably memorable!
To add further fuel to his bonfire of vanities, Koch quotes from the ‘Coda’ of Umberto
Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1980), thought probably to be penned by the medieval Benedictine
monk and abbot, Adso of Montier-en-Der (910/920-992 CE), who writes:
I shall soon enter this broad desert, perfectly level and boundless, where the truly
pious heart succumbs in bliss. I shall sink into the divine shadow, in a dumb silence
and an ineffable union, and in this sinking all equality and all inequality shall be
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lost, and in that abyss my spirit will lose itself, and will not know the equal or the
unequal, or anything else, and all differences will be forgotten. (177: fn13)
This, avers Koch, is “Eckhartian language [used] to powerful effect” (ibid.). Koch then goes on
to quote Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE), the early Roman African theologian and
Neoplatonic philosopher, who writes in City of God (426 CE): “But, without any delusive
representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight
in this” (175: fn3).121
Koch states that his research into consciousness and experience has led him to conclude
that consciousness is experience, for and by an experience-er, and nothing more (nor,
presumably, less). Thus, the alternative to the act or function of experience is, for Koch, a
‘boundless, broad desert’, and ‘a dumb silence’, indistinguishable from deep, presumably
dreamless sleep, or death. For Koch, René Descartes had it right when he argued in his
Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) that it all can be distilled into three, now-famous Latin
words: Cogito, ergo sum. In the second meditation of his Meditations, Descartes follows up this
proclamation by asking rhetorically,
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a
thing which [(a)] doubts, [(b)] understands, [(c)] conceives, [(d)] affirms, [(e)]
denies, [(f)] wills, [(g)] refuses, which also [(h)] imagines and [(i)] senses”. (Koch:
175)

This list more soberly recalls Borges’ fantastical taxonomy referred to earlier, although
Descartes’ list omits literally dozens and dozens of additional possibilities of various mental
formations, or factors, identified and enumerated by the early Buddhist Abhidharma project as

165
the fifty-one saṃskāras.122 Yet this underscores Koch’s thesis of consciousness qua experience,
the experience of doubting, understanding, affirming, etc., etc. In other words, Koch is
postulating that the mental formations are consciousness, and beyond this there is and can be
nothing; i.e., a great, featureless void. Consciousness qua experience is all, and beyond
consciousness, nothing. No thing whatsoever.
Koch’s view can be read as remarkably concordant with that of Kant, who argues in his
Critique of Pure Reason that our intuitions, or our ‘sensibility’, ‘constitutes’ or embodies the
phenomena that we experience, all the while intuiting phenomena causally within time and
space. And without our (conceptual) understanding—i.e., “the ‘faculty’ which orders and
organizes our sensations with the help of the imagination so that they become an experience of
something”—these intuitions would be ‘blind’; and absent our inherent sensuality, this
conceptual understanding would be a mere empty void (see: Solomon & Higgins: 208). Thus, Kant
concludes that experience is always already the praxis of our understanding in concert with our
sensual being, the consequence of which is an apparent and seemingly real experience of ‘me’,
separate and distinct from ‘my world’.
Now, moving to our whale’s alternate optic we have Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso, speaking
from the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view, refuting Koch’s (and Kant’s) position in no uncertain
terms. Gyamtso argues that,
[we do] not accept the view that consciousness is truly existent. The Madhyamaka
view [is] that [consciousness] is non-arising and without self-nature…free from
conceptual contrivance. [Furthermore,] the concept of a stream of consciousness
consisting of moments having knowing and known aspects [is] a misunderstanding
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of reality. It is a false or deceptive ‘reality’ or ‘truth’, or ‘saṃvṛti’, which means
‘covered’ or ‘concealed’; the Tibetan translation, ‘kun rdzob’, means ‘dressed up’
or ‘blown up’ to give a false appearance. Ultimately, [this seeming reality] is not
true at all. (Gyamtso 1986: 77)
Khenchen Thrangu adds that the “coarseness or turbulence of our thoughts [i.e., the fifty-one
mental formations, or saṃskāras] arise out of the true nature of mind. The mind appears as a
principal or primordial mind that is surrounded by mental arisings or thoughts” (Thrangu 2016:
76). The mind is empty of any intrinsic notion we might entertain about it, and yet it is cognitive

and endlessly expressive; from this mind of empty cognizance arise the fifty-one mental
formations or creations, e.g., doubts, images, senses, etc. The mind is not separate from these
conscious mental arisings, no more than clouds are separate from the sky, and yet these arising
mental formations obscure the true, unchanging nature of mind, as it is said that clouds obscure
the radiance of the sun in a clear sky. However, these saṃskāras, like all phenomena
everywhere, are empty of self-nature or essence. It is only our misapprehension of them, as
indicators of our belief in an inherent ‘self-ness’, that results in our subsequent reification of, and
belief in them, producing a seemingly real ‘I’ and ‘other’.
In citing Descartes’ description of consciousness, or what the mind does, viz, a manifold
thinking about experiences, Koch ironically doesn’t think to look directly at the nature of this
thinking aware mind that experiences. He unthinkingly labels this thinking mind as his
experience, which he further equates with (his) consciousness, his ‘me-ness’. If he were to look
directly at the experience, he would find that there is no experience, per se, that can be found or
located. Likewise, if he were to look at the experiencer, he would find that there is also no
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experience-er, or looker. Neither the experience nor the experiencer is locatable, quantifiable,
identifiable things, objects, or sources. Consciousness, experiencer, and experience are empty,
yet apparent and vivid phenomena. This is what Koch and his scientific brethren are missing in
their examinations of consciousness qua experience. Koch maintains that “we are Turing
machines made flesh,123 robots unaware of our own programming” (133). Whereas, the
alternative Madhyamaka view and logic presented by Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso highlights that
Koch could not be more radically mistaken.
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V.
Nāgārjuna and Non-Conceptual Mind
vis-à-vis
Kant and the ‘Transcendental Illusion’

Kant and Nāgārjuna might well agree that “…the use of pure reason extended beyond the
empirical sphere attempts to give an accurate account, in absolute terms, of ‘the way things are’,
and [results not in knowledge, but instead] leads to antinomies, that is, contradiction [and
paradox]” (Candrakīrti: 7, emphasis added). The dilemma, Wulstan Fletcher continues, “lies not in
the quality of this or that line of reasoning, but in the very constitution of reason itself” (7).
Reason itself is unable to arrive at a “correct understanding of the nature of phenomena; [that is
to say,] the [nature of] objects and situations that surround us in our daily lives, and the thoughts
and emotions that occupy and agitate our minds” (3, emphasis added). Both Nāgārjuna and Kant
agree that reason and logic are inadequate but indispensable tools, which each applies for
radically different ends. Kant employs reason and logic to understand the purpose of mind;
Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, to know the nature of mind. Thus, we have two distinct, dialectical
eyes looking at mind.
Nāgārjuna demonstrates in the MMK that consequential reasoning and logic can be
employed to great effect. In the case of phenomena, for instance, which Koch asserts we
experience qua consciousness, Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, argues that phenomena appear to us
and yet have no intrinsic existence. Through methodical reasoning, Nāgārjuna demonstrates that
we must conclude that all phenomena are empty of any singular, discrete existence in and of
themselves. We can understand, through this method of logical reasoning, that phenomena are
nothing more than “an elusive, ungraspable tissue of interdependent relations” (Candrakīrti: 12).
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And yet, this is in stark contrast to what we experience to be ‘real’, enduring, or even fleeting in
the quotidian of our lived experience. We grasp and embrace appearances as though they are
actual, independently arising and existing particulars. And we go to great lengths to avoid, or
otherwise push away appearances and experiences we find unwelcome, unpleasant, distasteful,
even maddening and/or frightening. It is habitual conditioning and misapprehension which lead
us to believe that phenomena exist as they appear to us: solid, unitary, and unmistakably real in
themselves.
Nāgārjuna, rather than presenting another philosophic position, simply “points to
phenomena—the things of our experience that appear so vividly and function so effectively—
and shows by force of reasoned argument that they cannot possibly exist in the way that they
appear to exist, and that, in truth, they can be said neither to exist nor not to exist” (13). This is
Nāgārjuna’s brilliant employment of reductio ad absurdum. The existence and non-existence of
phenomena—and our experiences of affirmation and/or negation—are in truth inseparable, as
Madhyamaka refutes any extreme view, be it existence versus non-existence, good versus bad, or
this versus that, and occupies a position within the great middle, in-between all. This great
middle is not nothing, however, as appearances arise unceasingly, vividly, and clearly. It is
utterly non-conceptual. Rangjung Dorje (Tib. rang byung rdo rje), the Third Karmapa (12841339), writes: “All phenomena are the illusory display of mind. / There is no mind; mind is

empty of an essence. / Empty and unceasing, it appears as anything whatsoever […]”.124 Thus,
non-conceptual mind is the antidote to the reasoned (mis)conception, per Koch, of phenomena as
real existents, in and of themselves, which we experience.

170
Turning to the conclusions of Kant’s process of logic and reason, Kant writes that
“Reason is a faculty of principles, and the unconditioned is the ultimate goal at which it aims”
(CJ §76 ¶401, my emphasis), thus setting his sights on the efficacy of reason to surpass the limits

of what has heretofore been perceived to be logically impenetrable. Fletcher, on the other hand,
contends that while “reason is indispensable to Nāgārjuna’s dialectic… its role therein is
precisely to demonstrate its own limits—and to imply that there is, nevertheless, something that
lies beyond its grasp” (Candrakīrti: 14). Kant’s reason leads to the threshold of his ‘ultimate goal’,
which he calls the ‘unconditioned’, but meets with an apparent failure to breach its own dialectic
boundaries. Hence it is that a coherent theory of the sublime, that does not lead to endless
paradoxes and incoherencies, is never forthcoming from Kant.
Understanding this failure, Kant was to conclude that his “purely intellectual achievement
was unable to remove what he called the ‘transcendental illusion’:125 the impression, and
therefore the constant temptation to think that thought is able to lay hold of perfectly
perspectiveless objectivity”126 (Candrakīrti: 24). Caygill states that “the basic source of illusion is
human reason's pursuit of completeness and unity to [as Kant argues,] ‘advance towards
completeness by an ascent to ever higher conditions and so to give our knowledge the greatest
possible unity of reason’ ” (CPR A 309/B365; Caygill: 158). But in the end, Kant’s “attempt to
produce completeness and unity with regard to God, the world, and the soul is exposed as
[merely] dialectical, as resting on illusory premises, and unjustifiable inferences” (Caygill 15859). It does not succeed.

The thesis of a ‘transcendental illusion’ was a portentous, yet undoubtedly troubling
discovery on Kant’s part; however, he apparently never fully understood its possibility and the
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direction in which it pointed, viz. to non-conceptual mind, the nature of which is “the
inseparability of [mind’s] open expanse and awareness (dbyings rig dbyer med) [which] is lucidempty”, quoting Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso (Brunnhölzl 2009: 108). The discovery of the
reasoning mind’s limits, and Kant’s subsequent retreat from the horizon opening before him,
precludes for Kant any possibility of jñāna,127 the “nondual wisdom in which the ultimate is
known directly without the mediation of thought. He failed, in other words, to appreciate the
immense spiritual significance of his discovery and, as [T.R.V.] Murti aptly observes, ended by
putting it to a trivial purpose” (25).128
Wisdom, or highest knowledge, absent the mediation of thought, was seemingly beyond
the realm of the possible for Kant, as it remains for the vast preponderance of Western scientists
and philosophers. Kant’s discovery of the ‘transcendental illusion’ took him to the threshold of
infinite disclosure, but he never stepped over that threshold, beyond which lies a ‘wholly new
dimension [of] the mind itself’, viz. its lucid, open emptiness. Moreover, and perhaps most
importantly, the repercussions of crossing that threshold might well have resulted in “the entire
worldview of common sense [and reason] to be shown to be completely incoherent” (16), as I
have shown to be the case with the modern project of the sublime when subjected to a close and
rigorous examination. Kant, tethered to the theism of the day, turned back from that threshold.
From this, then, several questions arise, namely: What does this ‘new dimension of the
mind’ of non-conceptuality disclose about the true nature of all phenomena, our selves included?
And, how do we develop the wisdom (prajñā) with which to see this true nature, when we are as
fearful captives of the power of “external phenomena, which are [our] own projections” (Trungpa
1990: 6)?
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Nāgārjuna’s brilliant exposition of Madhyamaka refutations, employing the
deconstruction of all logics pertaining to experience, experiencer, and the objects of experience,
presents us with a choice between two avenues we might pursue if we wish to answer these
questions above. First, we could elect to undertake the arduous study of his treatise and his
dialectic reasonings, and, with the utmost perseverance, “reach the limits of rational enquiry,
arriving at the point where ordinary intellection can do no more” (Candrakīrti: 15). At which point
we can do what Kant, et al., did not, or could not do: we can “attempt to step across the frontier
and directly taste through meditation the state of wisdom that Nāgārjuna appears to indicate”
(15). In other words, we can look directly at the nature of our mind.

Or alternatively, we can undertake the study of various primary texts and secondary
glosses of Nāgārjuna’s thought and dialectical approaches to pointing at ‘reality’, contemplate
and reflect on it all, and then proceed to make Nāgārjuna’s project the subject of even further
scholarly investigations, perhaps even developing a career around those investigations. At which
point, we might conclude that we have achieved some insight into an ancient, albeit brilliant,
thinker in the long history of esoteric Oriental philosophic thought.
Either avenue is legitimate, of course, and many have chosen one or the other approach.
However, it is only by electing the former, with its active investigation of the mind in and
through meditation, that we can truly plumb the profundity of Nāgārjuna’s remarkable wisdom,
and discover that there is more to realize lying beyond mere intellection, or within the realm of
cognition (vijñāpti-mātra); that in fact, consciousness is not merely experience of phenomena, as
contemporary neuroscience might have us believe, but is a direct revelation of the boundlessness
inherent in all phenomena.
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VI.
Nihilism, Eternalism,
and the Middle Way Between the Two

In this section, I investigate the dialectical theses of nihilism and eternalism and, further,
two characteristics which then proceed from the premise of eternalism, viz. transcendence and
immanence. Altogether, these four are known within the canon of Madhyamaka as the ‘four
extremes’. I then look at how these four characteristics of the ‘extremes’ might be contextualized
within this discussion of the two eyes of our dialectical whale: the sublime on the one hand; and
emptiness as advanced by the Middle Way on the other; i.e. emptiness which is beyond all
conceptual constructs of this or that, and beyond the philosophic scaffolding of nihilism and
eternalism.
In first considering the nihilistic thesis, I turn to Śāntideva, the great Indian poetphilosopher (ca. 700 CE), who argues that, when nihilism is asserted, the following consequence
obtains:
“There is nothing”—when this is asserted,
No thing is there to be examined.
How can a “nothing”, wholly unsupported,
Rest before the mind as something present? (Mipham 2017: §9, ¶33, p. 108.)
This verse, from the Ninth, or ‘Wisdom’ Chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, or The Way of the
Bodhisattva (early eighth-century CE),129 addresses the root of the problem contained in the
nihilist proposition (as well as, one could say, that of the eternalist project—but we will return to
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that a bit later): i.e., if there is nothing, or no-thing to refer to or identify (with?), and to which
there is no support, then how can this be ‘given’ to us as some thing present, or tangible to
thought? This is as epistemologically absurd as is the normative idea of the sublime, explained
by philosophers and others since Longinus. But this is precisely what Koch argues, as discussed
above. One of Koch’s principle stumbling blocks can be identified in his statement: “Does it
even make conceptual sense to be conscious without being conscious of something?” Koch, it
seems, has never entertained the possibility of looking through the eye of non-conceptuality. Of
course, it doesn’t make ‘conceptual sense’, within a Western conceptual framework, to be fully
conscious without being conscious of something. But if we look through a non-conceptual frame,
everything changes as all conceptuality falls away. A whole new ‘titillating’ horizon opens up
before us that is not ‘nothing’, but emptiness.
The explication of a ‘nothingness’ by Sartre, viz. his notion of nihilism, has been
commonly mistaken to be analogous to the Madhyamaka view of ‘emptiness’, with the latter
then understood as a mere lifeless, empty void. This has been true since Hegel delivered his illconsidered polemics against Buddhist philosophy specifically, and ‘Oriental’ philosophy more
generally. We could say that Nietzsche anticipated Sartre’s notion of this existential abyss of
nothingness by more than fifty years, revealing his remarkable misunderstanding of what he calls
“Oriental Nothingness—called Nirvāṇa” in, for example, the third section of his “Preface” to the
second edition to The Gay Science (1882/87).130 Here, Nietzsche states emphatically that this
‘oriental nothingness or nirvāṇa’ is “mute, rigid, deaf self-surrender, self-forgetting, selfextinction…” (Nietzsche 2001: 7). And in his later On the Genealogy of Morality (1887),
Nietzsche writes that the ‘last will’ of man will occur when a great nausea at man ‘mates’ with

175
great compassion for man, producing “immediately and unavoidably something most uncanny…
his will to nothingness, nihilism” (Nietzsche 1997: §14, p. 89). Thus, we can say that for Nietzsche,
man’s ‘last will’ => nausea + compassion = nothingness = nihilism = mute self-extinction.
Nietzsche here comes surprisingly close to the tripartite Madhyamaka frontier of highest
knowledge (prajñā),131 compassion (karuṇā), and emptiness (śūnyatā), but, much like Kant,
stops at the threshold of further possibility and embraces a will to nothingness. The Madhyamaka
formulation might look like this:
suffering = nausea / (cognizance + compassion)
= realization of emptiness + compassionate activity.
It could, I suppose, be reasonably hypothesized that Nietzsche’s ‘great nausea’ qualitatively
resembles the Buddhist First Noble Truth, which asserts that all existence is duḥkha,132 and is
therefore suffused with suffering and anxiety, or the unceasing experience of an all-pervasive
unsatisfactoriness; and because of this it follows that all happiness as experienced is contingent,
conditioned, and inevitably fleeting. ‘Great compassion’ is also said to be an essential, coexisting element in the (eventual) stabilization of the experience of emptiness, or śūnyatā, and is
born of the development of prajñā. The missing element for Nietzsche, though, is the recognition
of emptiness not as a void, self-extinguishing nothingness, but rather as the very nature of nonconceptual mind which gives rise, unceasingly, to all appearances. This very emptiness, which
Nietzsche so disdained is discovered, or uncovered, through a non-dual manifold: unmistaken
cognizance,133 wisdom (jñāna), and compassion for all beings (mahākaruṇā).
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The belief in a nihilistic non-existence, or nothingness, can be traced to the philosophical
view that if one holds no belief in anything at all, one is, by turn, free from everything; free
certainly from the notion of its apparent opposite, eternalism, with its attendant binaries,
transcendence and immanence. However, in holding to such a view, we wind up theorizing
everything, every experience. And we convince ourselves that if we experience our life as an
expression of nothingness, i.e., holding to the denial of eternalism, then our existential problems
and concerns will dissolve and evaporate into this nothingness.
On the other hand, to hold to the position of, or the belief in the eternal and ever-lasting,
when we hue to the view which holds there is an eternity stretching out before us, we then set
ourselves about the scheme of constantly striving to maintain our ‘self’, so as to thereby extend
our mortal being, on and on into eternity. Paradoxically, despite this professed belief in eternity,
we still, inevitably, harbor a deep fear of our own death. And because of this fear of death, “we
begin to look outward from ourselves to others, out into the world, and grasp at the world as a
way of maintaining ourselves” (Trungpa 2014: 406). Our belief in the eternal becomes more of a
hope born of desperation than any kind of certainty born from experience. And, it becomes the
source of seemingly never-ending problems in the form of duḥkha, suffering and anxiety, as we
continually grasp at ways to maintain our belief and experience of ‘my-self’ and ‘mine’.
Our relationship to, and the relationship of all humankind to the/a divine, has seen many
iterations over the millennia, alternating between immanence and transcendence. Dennis, Burke,
Kant, Crowther, and others understand the sublime in terms of a disclosure of a transcendent
Divine. And this Divine, to which our direct connection is inherently implied as the Divine’s
creation, signifies an always already underlying eternalism at play. In Ancient Greece, the gods,
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as transcendent, were in the clouds up above; in pre-modern Japan, the immanence of the Divine
was incarnate as the Emperor on Earth. Christianity, on the other hand, contains a somewhat
complex and curious mix of the two.
But there follows another very significant problem from this eternalistic construct, in
addition to that spelled out above, as Gregory Bateson explains:
If you put God outside and set him vis-à-vis his creation and if you have the idea
that you are created in his image, you will logically and naturally see yourself as
outside and against the things around you. And as you arrogate all mind to yourself,
you will see the world around you as mindless and therefore not entitled to moral
or ethical consideration. The environment will seem to be yours to exploit. Your
survival unit will be you and your folks or conspecifics against the environment of
other social units, other races and the brutes and vegetables. (Bateson: 468)
Thus, as Bateson articulates so well, holding the view of eternalism entails not just the idea that
‘I’ will go on existing forever, but also that each of us, as a distinct and individuated ‘I’, are
invariably pitted against nature and all the rest of humankind: a great and menacing ‘other’
which appears to continually manifest as the ever-present ‘Dark Side’. This not only explains the
normative thinking around the sublime as some powerful, terror-instilling outside force which
stops us in our tracks, frozen—and which we subsequently hope to conquer by virtue of our
rational mind—but this construct also explains the manifold problems in our world at large,
which are the result of the arrogation of the moral rightness of mind to oneself, and to one’s
conspecifics, to the exclusion of all and everyone else. The problems thus become endless.
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The concepts of nihilism and eternalism are expressions of our subtle anxiety that there
is, in fact, nothing solid about our experience stemming from an imagined individuated and
unitary ‘self’. In this way, nihilism and eternalism are subsumed in the logic of Madhyamaka as
extreme views: views through which we attempt to create a psychological sense of solid ground,
but which have no validity.
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VII.
The Empty-Sublime
and Our Experience of Phenomena

In this chapter, I have been employing a dialectical metaphor, that of the two eyes of the
great leviathan, Moby-Dick. Herman Melville points out that the eyes of the whale are set so far
back in the whale’s head that they are incapable of sharing the same view. My purpose in using
this metaphor is to illustrate the myopia of a philosophic tradition that only looks through a
single eye while examining its worldview. I am arguing that Western philosophy has become so
entrenched in incestuous theories attending to its own particular and historical concepts that it
has ignored a radically different philosophy, developed in another part of the world, which
nonetheless holds vitally relevant information to the Western philosophical project. Our
experience with the incoherencies and contradictions found within the Western explication and
analysis of the sublime over the past three hundred years has begged for an altogether different
perspective, a view through an opposing eye which will provide clarification of what is in plain
sight. In this section, I survey the two eyes comprising, first, Western philosophy’s view of the
experience and understanding of phenomena, and then that of the Madhyamaka view of
Nāgārjuna that I call the ‘empty-sublime’.
Our quotidian experience of the phenomenal world leaves us with the impression that the
objects we perceive with our senses are real and solid. As we have seen, this very premise of
reality has undermined all attempts to develop a coherent theory of the sublime. The question of
phenomena, that is to say the notion of phenomena and our experience of it, seems to lie at the
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very heart of the sublime/emptiness dialectic we are discussing here. Boileau writes that the
Longinian sublime is “something extraordinary and marvelous that Strikes us…”, obviously
referring to a phenomenon which we suddenly and unexpectedly encounter, evoking an
experience of a ‘sublime moment’. For Dennis, there is a transcendent134 phenomenon of “the
wrath and vengeance of an angry god”, which is perceived and experienced as ‘real’ and present,
which brings us up short, and stops our (discursive, ever-thinking) mind.
Kant, in a much more sophisticated narrative on phenomenon, writes that: “…it is at least
possible to regard the material world as a mere phenomenon, and to think something which is not
a phenomenon, namely a thing-in-itself [Ding an sich], as its substrate. In this way a
supersensible real ground, although for us unknowable, would be procured for nature, and for the
nature of which we ourselves form part” (CJ §409, 237).
Kant, in this above referenced section of the CJ, entertains the idea of phenomenon
arising from a ‘supersensible real ground’, that remains separate, and distinct from ourselves, a
substrate of some kind, which underlies everything. This is, indeed, a radical view for an
eighteenth-century Western thinker. However, Kant maintains, here as elsewhere, that the Ding
an sich is unknowable to us. Its unknowableness can be traced to “the constitution of our human
faculty of knowledge [whereby] it becomes necessary to look for the supreme source of this
purposiveness in an original understanding as the cause of the world” (§410, 238). Having
broken through a certain view of the solidity of phenomena, Kant creates ‘Ding an sich’ as a
signifier for the Divine, his resolution for what he believes is unknowable by mere human
beings.
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Looking at phenomena through the opposing eye, that of Nāgārjuna, we find that his
philosophy and that of Kant, although remarkably similar in some respects, diverge profoundly.
Nāgārjuna’s delineation of the interdependent arising of all phenomena without a root cause
completely refutes the argument that there is a ‘supreme source’, or ‘cause of the world’, or even
a ‘Ding an sich’, thus dissociating his argument from the incoherency inherent within the deistic
sublime project. And likewise, Thrangu asserts, as I have noted in Chapter Three, that the ‘Ding
an sich’ is indeed knowable by ‘mere human beings’, not because he says it is, but because it is
knowable experientially.
In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, Nāgārjuna’s dialectical arguments turn “around the
fundamental axiom that dependent coörigination [pratītya-samutpāda] is the equivalent of
emptiness: [viz.] the absence of intrinsic being [svabhāva] in things as they appear. If phenomena
are a tissue of interdependent relations, they cannot be the clear-cut, isolated, really existing
entities that they seem to be” (Nāgārjuna 2016: xix). And nor can our experiences of that tissue,
what we know or perceive as phenomena, have the ‘reality’ that we attribute to them.
Returning to the matter of consciousness and its engagement with, or perception, or
experience of phenomena, Khenchen Thrangu states that “It is due to consciousness that we do
not have ultimate knowledge” (Thrangu 2013: 6). Not, as assumed by Kant, that there is a limit
beyond which the reason of man cannot penetrate, because beyond this limit is the dominion of
the ‘supreme source’, that is unknowable. Thrangu continues,
Consciousness does not create ignorance. [Consciousness] is a state of luminosity
or intelligence of mind. However, what should be seen (i.e. the true nature of
phenomena) is not perceived by consciousness. Rather, false appearances are what
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consciousness vividly perceives. This results in a state of delusion that obscures the
realization of ultimate wisdom. (Thrangu 2013: 6, emphasis added)
This state of delusion to which Thrangu refers includes the very thesis of divinity at the heart of
Kant’s theory of phenomena. Consciousness is always already vividly perceiving appearances.
These appearances, or phenomena, are mis-apprehended by a consciousness habituated to
solidifying appearances as something that they are not. Our lens, through which we impute solid
phenomena, is distorted to the point of delusion, which completely obscures phenomena’s true
nature. The true nature of phenomena is that it vividly appears, and yet is empty of any
individuated or inherent self-ness.
So now the question is: How can phenomena be said to be empty, non-arising, and
without self-nature, and yet appear to us vividly, all the while seeming real and solid? This is
justified by the logic of interdependent coörigination (pratītya-samutpāda) and the ‘Two Truths’
or ‘Realities’, viz. the relative truth, and the absolute truth. According to the view of the ultimate
truth or reality (Skt. paramārthasatya; Tib. don dam bden pa), consciousness does not inherently
exist; it ‘is non-arising and without self-nature…free from conceptual contrivance’, as Khenpo
Tsültrim Gyamtso asserts.
On the relative level, where phenomena is experienced as real (Skt. saṃvṛtisatya; Tib.
kun rdzob bden pa), we constantly experience eight delusory consciousnesses: the five sensory
consciousnesses, which engage sensory objects; the sixth, i.e. the mind or mental consciousness,
which perceives sensory input from the five sensory factors; the seventh consciousness, which is
the immediate or afflicted consciousness, and which has the power to create from the view of
‘me’ and ‘mine’; and the eighth consciousness, which is known as the foundation consciousness,
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and serves as a storehouse of experiential patterns. These eight consciousnesses may be said to
be the instantaneous aggregates of successive momentary experiences by deluded mind. In this
respect, and in contradistinction to Koch, Thrangu explains that deluded mind, i.e. the everyday
mind comprising the eight consciousnesses, is consciousness (vijñāna), while non-deluded mind,
i.e. absent the eight everyday consciousnesses, is wisdom (jñāna). (An in-depth explanation of
the purification of the eight consciousnesses is beyond the scope of this present project, but has
been presented elsewhere by Thrangu, Trungpa, and Brunnhölzl.135)
The quotidian experience of our life constantly begs the question: What is this (version
of) reality upon which we seemingly and endlessly base our interpretations of self and
phenomena? How can we “be sure that we have [truly] understood the basic phenomena of
reality?” (Trungpa 2014: 140). In other words, how do we really know that red is red, and that
blue is blue? By delving into this question, we must simultaneously acknowledge our greater or
lesser bewilderment, our confusion, and our expectations of really knowing which is which and
what is what. This happens no matter what eye of the whale one is looking through; this is the
fundamental origin of all philosophical exploration.
Speaking from the eye of the Madhyamaka dialectic, Trungpa explains that this is the
fertile ground, where “at the point when our expectations are fading out and future possibilities
have not yet turned up, there is a faint little gap in which there is the possibility of some
unknown factor taking place” (141). This echoes Kant’s ‘supersensible real ground’, but it is
taken to a much different resolution. Rather than closing the door by labeling it divine and
unknowable, it is allowed to remain a ‘gap’. It is not a big deal, but it is open. It is a gap which
opens up in the sixth, or mental consciousness, and which is of the nature of a fresh breeze
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blowing in through an open window in your cabaña on the seashore. It rests as it is, an open,
unobstructed space, infused with complete clarity.
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Conclusion

In this chapter, I first introduced Foucault’s idea that when our markers of sensibility and
certitude, by which we have approached and interpreted the world, are challenged by another
seemingly incommensurable idea, especially from a system of thought foreign to our own, our
‘age-old distinctions between the Same and the Other’ are threatened. The YogācāraMadhyamaka project is just such an incommensurate system of thought, advocating an alternate
thesis for the understanding of consciousness or mind, phenomena, experience, and what we call
the ‘sublime moment’.
The great White Whale, as chronicled by Melville, with eyes on opposing sides of its
massive head, is an apposite metaphor for the dialectical method I am employing to investigate
the experience of the sublime vis-à-vis the experience of emptiness, or śūnyatā. While it may
appear to us that the vision of the great leviathan is hopelessly bifurcated, I contend that through
an investigation into the dialectic of the sublime as chronicled in Western philosophy, and
emptiness as explicated in the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view, we obtain a stunning resolution to
what might otherwise appear as a hopelessly two-headed dilemma.
In section IV, I directly posit the theism of the English critic and theologian, John Dennis,
contra the oppositional ‘eye view’ of Nāgārjuna’s thesis of complete openness. Dennis’
‘contribution’ to the evolving hermeneutic of the sublime should not be underestimated; his
isogesis imagines a sublime consisting of both an “enthusiastic terror [which] contributes
extremely to the sublime”; and one that is most highly produced by religious ideas”, which
inevitably includes a terror of a wrathful Divinity (37). Dennis’ theological turn strays a long
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way from Boileau’s Longinus, and has persisted to this day under various guises. Finally,
Dennis’ dramatic reaction to ‘open space’ is in stark contrapunctum to Nāgārjuna’s emptiness,
where the former’s terror, wonderment, and enthusiastic passion are seen as hyperbolic and
obscurant reactions to what is, essentially, a momentary experience of openness when conceptual
mind falls away.
I moved on to examine the concept of consciousness, first as argued by the contemporary
neuroscientist, Christof Koch, and then as posited by the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka project. For
Koch, consciousness is experience, and beyond experience, there is nothing save perhaps a
phenomenological quality commensurable with deep sleep or death. In direct contradistinction
worthy of a truly bifurcated set of eyes, is the view of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, which, on the
ultimate level, denies the existence of consciousness altogether as some ‘thing’.
In section VI, Kantian reason and logic are examined in the light of the consequential
reasoning employed by Nāgārjuna in the MMK. Kant’s pursuit of completeness and unity within
the tripartite manifold of God, the world, and the soul rests in the final analysis on the ‘illusory
premises and unjustifiable inferences’ which result in his ‘transcendental illusion’, a defeat of
reasoning mind. Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, is shown to have crossed that threshold in one
bold leap, unrestrained by such a manifold of conditions, deconstructing the experience, the
experience-er, and the objects of experience to reveal they are nothing more than mere empty
imputations.
In Section VII, Nāgārjuna’s postulation of the Middle Way is shown to be a specific
argument in opposition to the notions of the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism. The belief
in the eternal is embraced by Dennis, Burke, Kant, and others who interpret the sublime as a
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disclosure of a transcendent Divine, where the ‘everlasting’ is to be found. When a belief in the
eternal is viewed through the dialectical eye of the Middle Way, it is shown to be nothing more
than a desperate attempt at maintaining our belief in, and our grasping for a ‘self’ in the face of
our certain death which, ironically, provokes great fear for the eternalist.
The nihilism of both Nietzsche and Sartre, including Nietzsche’s outright contempt for
what he understands as an ‘Oriental nothingness or Nirvāṇa’, is shown to be a philosophical
game of constant negation leading to a vacant, unresponsive nothingness. The Middle Way, as
the opposing eye, strikes a balance, declaring ‘not nothing, not something, not empty, not full’;
parrying the extremes of eternalism and nihilism with an emptiness that is without qualities, and
from which everything dependently arises.
In a survey of the nature of phenomena and our experience of it, we explore what lies at the
very heart of the sublime / emptiness dialectic. Throughout history, the sublime has been
conceived as a phenomenon which causes a sublime experience to arise, or ‘strike’ us. This
phenomenon can be a roiling sea, a grand architectural marvel, or a ‘presentation of the
unpresentable’, as Lyotard would have it. In each case, the suddenness of encountering an
unexpected phenomenon, often of impressive scale or power (but not always), stops our mind;
we experience a sudden, open gap in our otherwise discursive mind. This gap is not a moment of
terror or wonderment; those are conceptual ideas that merely follow. This gap, this stopping of
the mind, is a simple experience of complete spaciousness. There is, however, no grasping or
defining it. Attempting to reify it as ‘some thing’ has occupied thinkers for millennia, serving to
obscure the actual experience of the empty-sublime moment, which lies beyond all theological,
philosophical, psychological, and otherwise obfuscational definitions and narratives.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Empty-Sublime Praxis:
Considering Rauschenberg, Martin, and Laib
Introduction
In this chapter, I create a foundational argument for my thesis of the empty-sublime
through the examination of the praxes of three visual artists, Robert Rauschenberg (1925-2008),
Agnes Martin (1912-2004), and Wolfgang Laib (b. 1950). Choosing these three presents an
interesting, and perhaps curious bricolage of characters through which to examine the emptysublime as it has manifested in twentieth-century visual art. But I am arguing that they are each
exemplars of the empty-sublime in the ‘action’ or process of their art-making. This is where the
empty-sublime is to be found, not in a canvas.
The work of Robert Rauschenberg would never be singled out as illustrative of ‘the
sublime’ by twentieth- or twenty-first century critics, and yet his early work of 1949-1953 shows
incontrovertible evidence of a fearless and unselfconscious, if not youthful outpouring of
creativity, spontaneity, and endless experimentation. Are these marks of the sublime?
Rauschenberg’s comments of late 1959 about life, art, and the gap in-between136 reveal a
recognition of, and a relationship to the instinctual from which flows true creativity, resulting in
a remarkably different artistic expression than one might expect from a praxis of what is
commonly thought of as ‘sublime’.
Agnes Martin’s work, on the other hand, has been said to be “an ambience one enters, as
into the ocean, or the landscape…[which] function[s] as a lens through which [Martin] saw the
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world…clarify[ing] that world…and organiz[ing] it, making it both orderly and luminous”
(Princenthal: 176). Does this qualify Martin’s canvases or her praxis as sublime? Or, could there
be a dichotomy at work here? Perhaps there is more tension than dichotomy, a tension which
Martin seems to have experienced regularly in her everyday life, as well as in the act of her artmaking. And yet, this tension seems to have given way to extraordinarily disciplined, measured,
and above all, elegant work through which, I argue, she practiced the discipline of emptiness
(śūnyatā), or the empty-sublime.
Wolfgang Laib creates work totally distinct from that of either Rauschenberg or Martin.
Laib’s constructions and installations speak of an austerity, if not the remove, of a meditative
life, of an echoing silence, simultaneous with an unmistakable expression of ‘being-here’. Laib’s
work seems to embody meditation cum action. Can we identify this as the rare aesthetic
expression of an authentic empty-sublime praxis?
The following pages will seek to answer the questions I have posed above. And in so
doing, I will argue that the empty-sublime is not to be found in works of art, nor in phenomena—
the grand, awesome, formless, meditative, or otherwise stupendous ‘thing’. Rather, I argue that
the empty-sublime is our momentary experience of ordinary mind; the open, spacious, creative,
cognizant awareness with which we are born. The empty-sublime is not ‘out there’; it is here.
This exploration would not, however, be complete without, first, a brief survey of two
artists and critics who figure prominently in the emerging American avant-garde of the 1940s,
Barnett Newman (1905-1970), and Mark Rothko (1903-1970); both importantly prefigure the three
artists I am dealing with here, and their relationship to the sublime sets the stage for any
discussion of modern and postmodern art. Newman is well known for the resurrection of the idea
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of the aesthetic sublime in contemporary art, and Rothko’s work has often been offered up as a
notable example of this tendency.
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I.
Newman, Rothko, and the Sublime
So strong is the grip of the rhetoric of exaltation as an attitude in the large context of the European culture pattern
that the elements of sublimity in the revolution we know as modern art, exist in its effort and energy to escape the
pattern rather than in the realization of a new experience.
- Barnett Newman137
To us art is an adventure into an unknown world which can be explored only by those willing to take the risks.
- Mark Rothko138

It is commonly accepted that Barnett Newman and Mark Rothko, as well as several
nineteenth century artists,139 have sought to express or portray an aesthetic ‘sublime’ in their
plastic art, but I think a closer examination is warranted. That is what I intend to do in this
chapter. While I am principally considering the work of Rauschenberg, Martin, and Laib, I am
also including this short section on Barnett Newman, who authored the essay “the sublime is
now” [sic], published in late-1948; as well as his colleague, Mark Rothko, who penned another,
earlier essay (in 1943) defending the work of emerging New York avant-garde artists.140 Both
were key figures in the Abstract-Expressionist movement in the US in the 1940s and early 1950s,
and were among the members of that group that adopted ‘the sublime’ as a matrix of their praxis.
Barnett Newman re-introduced the notion of the ‘sublime’ to twentieth-century aesthetic
discourse.141 Nevertheless, he conflated the ‘sublime’ and ‘exaltation’ in his essay of late 1948,
while railing against what he judged to be an almost hopeless confusion in philosophy and in the
history of the plastic arts between exaltation (being interchangeable with ideal sensibility), and
beauty.142 Michelangelo, Newman asserts, “set a standard for sublimity”, approaching the
“plastic problem” as one rooted neither in the ancient Greek nor the Medieval past, but one
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which required the making of “a cathedral out of man” for his own time (Newman/Clewis: 244).
Fast-forwarding four hundred years to the twentieth century, Newman goes on to assert that Piet
Mondrian, “in his attempt to destroy the Renaissance picture by his insistence on pure subject
matter, succeeded only in raising the white plane and the right angle into a realm of sublimity,
where the sublime paradoxically becomes an absolute of perfect sensations. The geometry
(perfection) swallowed up his metaphysics (his exaltation)” (244). In other words, Mondrian’s
work expressed perfection in its geometric representations, but lacked a ‘pure’ feeling of
exaltation, which Newman conflates with the ‘sublime’, as necessary to augur ‘an absolute of
perfect sensations’. However, Mondrian’s geometric planes represent for Newman a failure
common to all European art of the time, i.e., the inability or unwillingness to dare to envision, or
create “a new sublime image” outside the ancient Greek ideal of beauty; Mondrian merely
resorted to “distortion, or by denying it [i.e., the Renaissance imagery of figures and objects]
completely for an empty world of geometric formalism…” (244), which Newman found
distinctly un-metaphysical and failing at the task of invoking a radically new aesthetic sublime.
Here we find Newman breathing new life into the debate against the Pythagorean argument, that
mathematics is the key; this time with Mondrian as the foil.
American artists of the 1940s freed themselves, Newman argues, of the “props and
crutches that evoke associations with outmoded images, both sublime and beautiful…”. Newman
writes emphatically that: “Instead of making cathedrals out of Christ, man, or ‘life’, we are
making it out of ourselves, out of our own feelings. The image we produce is the self-evident one
of revelation, real and concrete, that can be understood by anyone who will look at it without the
nostalgic glasses of history” (244-45, original emphasis).
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Anne d’Harnoncourt writes that Newman was “an artist on a grand scale, believing
profoundly in the significance of his profession and the contribution of art to what he called
‘world thought’” (Temkin: 12). Newman was indisputably a founding figure of an American
vanguard of visual artists seeking to break ties to a long history of European artistic hegemony
and establish a truly unique ‘American’ tendency within the plastic arts, distinct in every way
from their Parisian rivals. However, the tendency adopted by the Abstract Expressionists was not
one of empty-sublime, which, if it were, might have resulted in a significant movement away
from the ideals of European expressionism. Instead, Newman pressed for self-expression on a
grand scale, where the conceptual vagaries of self-revelation are paired with over-sized canvases.
The new ‘American’ tendency merely replaced ‘cathedrals to ideas’ for ‘cathedrals to the self’.
Mark Rothko, Newman’s contemporary, conceived of his canvases not as sublime,
formless color fields, as is often surmised, but rather, as Rothko states, as “dramas; the shapes in
the pictures are the performers. They have been created from the need for a group of actors who
are able to move dramatically without embarrassment and execute gestures without shame”
(Rothko: 572). And rather than with a commitment to an empty-sublime, a vividly manifesting
emptiness, Rothko, echoing a religious fervor, says he works with a “faith in [the] ability to
produce miracles when they are needed. Pictures must be miraculous… a revelation, an
unexpected and unprecedented resolution of an eternally familiar need” (572, emphasis added).
Perhaps Rothko shared the conviction of his friend and colleague Barnett Newman that, as
Newman wrote, “a shape was a living thing, a vehicle for an abstract thought-complex, a carrier
of the awesome feelings [which the artist] felt before the terror of the unknowable” (Newman:
574). Newman’s reference here to ‘awesome feelings’ before the ‘terror of the unknowable’
invokes the familiar trope to explain the sublime: the simultaneity of bewildering awesomeness
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and an accompanying terror. But it does not call forth a horizon of empty-sublime, the nonconceptual clarity untainted by these familiar ideas and their philosophic origins. As much as
Newman and Rothko wanted to break all ties to the Parisian School and their ‘cathedrals to
Christ, man, and life’, the Americans’ cathedrals, which were built by and from themselves and
their ‘own feelings’ did nothing to advance a project of a new sublimity in the plastic arts,
because the philosophy underpinning their work had not significantly changed. Instead, the same
continuum persisted, but under a different guise; and one not particularly diverging from
Newman’s critical isogesis of Mondrian’s work. This new semblance blurred the lines and took
on the form of the oversized, ‘dramatic’ canvas; whatever exaltation there was, was in the
service to ego.
Newman foresaw “a new force in American painting that is the modern counterpart of the
primitive art impulse” (574), referring specifically to the Kwakwaka’wakw artist of North
America (in what is now coastal British Columbia), who employs the abstract shape within an
“entire plastic language… directed by a ritualistic will towards metaphysical understanding”.
However Newman, by asserting that for the Kwakwaka’wakw, “the abstract shape was,
therefore, real rather than a formal ‘abstraction’ of a visual fact, with its overtone of an alreadyknown nature” (574), makes it apparent that he is attempting to ‘colonize’ various strains of
Indigenous art into his project. Newman, a New Yorker all his life, apparently never visited
Vancouver Island nor the opposing mainland shore in British Columbia, Canada, which is the
ancestral home to the Kwakwaka’wakw —as far as this writer is able to ascertain—making it
unlikely that he ever spoke personally to a Kwakwaka’wakw artist. He did, however, harbor a
genuine and abiding interest in Pre-Columbian and contemporary indigenous art and artifacts,143
which led him to curate and write an essay for the exhibition “Pre-Columbian Stone Sculpture”,
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in mid-1944, under the direction of Betty Parsons, for the Wakefield Gallery in Uptown
Manhattan.
Two years later, Newman organized and curated an exhibition with a related indigenous
theme, “Northwest Coast Indian Painting”, for Betty Parsons’ debut show at her new, namesake
gallery.144 Temkins writes that both “Parsons and Newman felt this aesthetic tradition made a
powerful argument for the meaningfulness of [American] modern art, for an art in which
seemingly ‘abstract’ design was far more than decoration” (Temkins: 19). The painted and
inscribed designs and representations on the masks and various ceremonial implements in the
exhibition “referred to the boldly abstracted depictions of supernatural beings, rendered with flat
forms and fluid outlines” (19). Newman presented these Northwest Coast peoples as artists. He
further asserted that their embellished artifacts are of interest not for their form alone, but “are an
expression of the[ir] mythological beliefs … and take place on ceremonial objects only because
these peoples did not practice a formal art of easel painting on canvas” (19). Newman believed
this connection between abstract form and mythological belief was key to understanding and
valuing the contemporary art that had begun to be produced in the United States in the 1940s,
and which imbued this abstract art with what he considered to be a transcendental, symbolic
‘aura’. However, it must not be forgotten that Newman’s other ‘key’ to the Abstract
Expressionist project is the exaltation of ‘self’; a myopic perspective that is in obvious
contradistinction to the myth traditions of Indigenous peoples.
I have briefly surveyed the early history of Newman’s and Rothko’s artistic career,
illustrating the complex, and sometimes contradictory, aspects of their abiding interest in
defining a new American artistic inspiration. Newman identifies this tendency as being rooted in

196
self-expression, while having an affinity for the plastic expressions of América’s indigenous
peoples, both pre- and post-1491 CE. He promoted the idea of presenting the ‘unpresentable
sublime’ as the new American artistic statement, per his grand canvas, Vir Heroicus Sublimis
1950-51 (see Plate 4, below).145 It is unclear to this writer whether Newman conflated sublimity,
himself as an artist, and the notion of the ground of religious and mythological belief as his
career progressed. It is, in fact, questionable whether he was able to transcend any of the
philosophical ideas of the European tradition he sought to eliminate from his praxis. In any
event, what is clear is that, on the evidence, Newman’s praxis was not one of empty-sublime; he
did not approach his artistic praxis from a state of openness and non-reference point. As Trungpa
states, the sense of “no reference point is the ground for perceiving absolute symbolism. That
experience of suspension [of any reference point] is the canvas where you paint your pictures,
your symbolism. It is the empty stage you can perform on” (Trungpa 1978: 9). This, however,
may very well have been the space in which the Kwakwaka’wakw artist invoked the symbolism
that Newman became so taken with. We do not know.
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Plate 4. Barnett Newman, Vir Heroicus Sublimis, 1950-51.

I have argued in previous chapters against the assertion that any encountered exteriority
comprising grand or overwhelming phenomena and the like can be a signifier of the ‘sublime’.
What I am proposing here is that the phenomenological act which embodies art creation is an
expression of the empty-sublime, and that the work that flows from what Kant calls the ‘genius’
of artists is an expression of this phenomenological experience; of a presence so complete that
there is no question of ‘being-here’ or not. In other words, artists who find in the making of their
art a spacious, unobstructed nowness which serves as the ground, as well as the horizon, for the
expression of their polychromatic creativity, are practitioners of the empty-sublime. This
argument is radical; revolutionary in fact. I am asserting that the current tendency and pedagogy
in graduate art programs throughout North America and Europe privileges the notion of
‘conceptual’ to the veritable exclusion of the view and practice which values the spontaneous
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outflow of ‘genius’. In other words, current pedagogy in the plastic arts requires a conceptual
complexity to certify the ‘relevance’ of the piece, rather than encouraging artists to suspend
concepts and reference points in order to experience and express symbolism of whatever kind,
without reference to any sort of conceptual complexity or so-called sophistication.
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II.
The Phenomenology of the Empty-Sublime
and the Work of Art

Phenomenology and Buddhism both take the whys and hows of human experience as their starting and concluding
points. Both focus on similar epistemological issues, such as perception, sensation, cognition, noetic construction,
embodied conditioning, and the overcoming of embodied ways of seeing the world. Both propose, through methodic
investigation of the way we cognize, to resolve the most fundamental human dilemmas and problems.
- Dan Lusthaus146

Is the approach to and process of making art, when talking about the praxes of
Rauschenberg, Laib, and Martin, illustrative of a phenomenology of the empty-sublime? To talk
about phenomenology here, I am referring to the nature of our immanent experience—that is to
say, the data produced by our six consciousnesses which I talked about in the preceding
chapter—and the world which we ceaselessly create and are embedded and embodied in. Perhaps
most importantly, I am referring to the very nature of subjectivity itself—with or without
reference to an extra-mental world.147
Jay Garfield asserts that Buddhism—presumably of all stripes, although he doesn’t
specify—“is about the transformation of the way we experience the world” (Garfield 2015: 179,
my emphasis). This desire to transform inspires an understanding of both our cognitive and

habitually intended scaffolding which informs the construction of our version of the world, and
our embodiment in it. Obtaining from this, we aspire to see through and cut through the suffering
which we endlessly create for ourselves and others. In Yogācāra-Madhyamaka philosophy, there
is no Husserlian bracketing whatsoever. Instead, all phenomena, i.e., all the factors of experience
(dharmās), are open to reflection, introspection, and analysis so as to establish ineluctably that
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they do not, in fact, exist as independently arising ‘things’. This, then, can be understood as a
description of Buddhist phenomenology.
Dan Lusthaus writes: “There is no thought, feeling, idea, memory, or knowledge of any
kind that does not come to us through our senses” and our six consciousnesses (Lusthaus: 1).148
Lusthaus spells out why our responses and interpretations are problematic, and why,
teleologically speaking, Buddhist phenomenology is, at its core, and as Garfield asserts,
ultimately ‘transformational’:
Rather than seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and thinking our relation
to the world in the manner it becomes, we perpetually grasp at our own reflections,
mistaking the images in our self-constructed mirror for what is other than ourself.
Ironically, in order that our projected images and ideas become graspable and
appropriatable, we have to dispossess them, i.e., disown and disavow them as our
own projections. If we recognized them as already ours, pursuing them further
would be redundant. Only by pretending that they are not ours, can we appropriate
them. We use all the means and strategies at our cognitive disposal—such as
language, sensation, reason, belief, willful ignorance, hedonistic tone—to maintain
this pretense” (Lusthaus: 3-4).
This is the central problem with which the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka project wrestles, i.e.
the endless, conflicting emotions which continuously create what we take to be the ground
around us, which becomes the ground of our own suffering, and the pain we inflict upon others.
Thus, the phenomenological enterprise is of central importance to the Buddhist project in
understanding the world as we have created it; the phenomenon that we recognize as ‘me’, the
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phenomena we perceive as ‘other’ (or all externalities), and the emptiness (śūnyatā) which is the
intrinsic nature of ‘my self’ and ‘other’.
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III.
Robert Rauschenberg:
Art, Life, and the ‘Gap’
There is no reason not to consider the world as a gigantic painting.
- Robert Rauschenberg149

In late 1959, while in conversation with Dorothy C. Miller of New York’s Museum of
Modern Art, Robert Rauschenberg made the now-famous statement that “painting relates to both
art and life. Neither can be made. (I try to act in that gap between the two)” (Miller: 58). Much
has been made of this comment (which wouldn’t have been spoken, presumably, with
parentheses), and many interpretations have been proffered as to just what Rauschenberg meant
when he said this. Unfortunately, Miller didn’t probe Rauschenberg further about his statement’s
intent or meaning, but I maintain that Rauschenberg was not suggesting that a ‘gap’ somehow
existed between a compartmentalized art process and that of the quotidian of life. Rather, I think
that his praxis, in which he “tr[ied] to act in that gap”, was one of a ‘gap’ in which the artifice of
effort subsides, so that a raw, unbounded creativity emerges. To be sure, one wouldn’t mistake a
Rauschenberg canvas for a Turner, nor that of a Barnett Newman. Rauschenberg’s canvases and
assemblages, or ‘combines’, are neither particularly spacious nor tranquil, save some of his
earliest work from 1949 through 1953, and into early 1954. And yet, this early work refuses to
submit to a readily definable conceptuality, of the sublime or otherwise, which could be argued
are hallmarks of the works of the likes of Turner, Newman, and other reputed painters of the
‘sublime’. Rauschenberg does not fit neatly into the category of a ‘sublime painter’, nor perhaps
any other category. This is because critics, and even artists themselves, have been looking in all
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the wrong places for the ‘sublime’, when it has been hiding in plain sight all along, i.e., in the
very process of creation. We are unlikely to ever find it in the finished work itself, as the emptysublime is our own phenomenological experience, not the property of a work of art or an object
in nature. Phenomena may act as triggers of the experience of the empty-sublime, but there is no
‘sublime’ which resides within phenomena as such.
By the time Rauschenberg made the statement about the ‘gap’ between art and life in
1959, he had known John Cage for some six or eight years, and had become well acquainted
with the teachings of Zen Buddhism through Cage and from public lectures by the eminent,
octogenarian Japanese scholar and translator, D.T. Suzuki. Suzuki taught at Columbia University
between 1952-1957, and Cage and Merce Cunningham would often be in the audience in the
early years of Suzuki’s residency. Cage was a notable inspiration for Rauschenberg after the two
men met at Betty Parsons Gallery in New York in 1951,150 by which time Cage had come to the
conclusion that “art, in our time, was much less important than daily life, to which so many of us
had become more or less oblivious. The real purpose of art”, Cage asserted, echoing an
awareness of the empty-sublime, “was not the creation of enduring masterpieces for the
delectation of an elite class, but rather a perpetual process of discovery, in which everyone could
participate” (Tomkins 62). All art, including his own discipline, music, is none other than
“purposeless play”, Cage maintained, a play which is nothing short of “an affirmation of life—
not an attempt to bring order out of chaos, nor to suggest improvements in creation, but simply to
wake up to the very life we’re living, which is so excellent once one gets one’s mind and one’s
desires out of its way and lets it act of its own accord”. Calvin Tomkins writes that “Cage
believed in breaking down all barriers between art and life, and not for art’s sake, either” (63).
Cage, nearly fifteen years Rauschenberg’s senior, became a valued mentor and important source
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of inspiration and confidence for his young friend. Rauschenberg would later recall that “Cage
had a fantastic influence on my thinking. He simply gave me permission to go on thinking, and
he was the only one…” (Larson: 230).
Cage was an extraordinarily expansive thinker; a remarkable man in whom the emptysublime echoed deeply. He wrote:
For the field is not a field of music, and the acceptance is not just of the sounds that
had been considered useless, ugly, and wrong, but it is a field of human awareness,
and the acceptance ultimately is of oneself as present mysteriously, impertinently,
on this limitless occasion. (Larson: 419)
In 1953, Cage wrote a poem on the occasion of Rauschenberg’s debut solo show at the
Stable Gallery in New York. Reports differ about the form the presentation of the poem took;
one version recalls that the poem was hung on a wall of the gallery; another that Cage passed out
the poem, in leaflet form, from outside the gallery to visitors as they entered.151 Regardless of
how it may have come to pass, Cage’s poem stands as a beautiful haiku of the empty-sublime,
which he found resonating in Rauschenberg’s work. Written in the negative dialectic style of the
Heart Sūtra, Cage writes:

To Whom
No subject
No image
No taste
No object
No beauty
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No message
No talent
No technique (no why)
No idea
No intention
No art
No feeling
No black
No white (no and). (Larson: 303, original emphasis)
Illustrative of all-too-commonplace misconstruals of the notion of the empty-sublime, the curator
and art historian Kristine Stiles152 completely misses the stylistic reference to the Heart Sūtra,
offering a very different (mis)reading of this poem, of Cage’s relationship to Rauschenberg, and
of Cage’s work altogether. Rather than a dialectical use of negation, Stiles sees a “snide” and
“competitive” rebuke in Cage’s words, writing that “it is hard to overlook Cage’s pervasive
pejorative tone or his disparagement” of Rauschenberg’s work (Stiles: 24). Stiles adds that “as
Cage’s list includes ‘No message’ and ‘No intention’, these terms imply that [Cage obviously
believed] Rauschenberg’s art had none” (24). Stiles’ comments betray a regrettable lack of
scholarship, given that the early Columbia University lectures of D.T. Suzuki, which painted a
vivid, rich, and multi-layered landscape of Zen Buddhist philosophy and practice, carried
profoundly into the lives and praxis of Cage, and later, Rauschenberg. Rauschenberg would later
remark, in a conversation with, and documented by Calvin Tomkins, that “ ‘John [Cage] and I
just had simultaneous thoughts, mutually,’ he said. ‘He would do something, and I would think,
God, that’s brilliant, and then I would do something and it wouldn’t surprise him. We made each
other feel comfortable in the world, and that’s a big one’” (Tomkins: 289).
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Josef Albers, teacher and later rector at Black Mountain College,153 was another early
influence on Rauschenberg, and with whom Rauschenberg had a famously difficult, if short,
relationship (from the fall of 1948 through the spring of 1949).154 Speaking of his time studying
with Albers at Black Mountain, Rauschenberg recalled that Albers had been, ironically, his most
important teacher. “He was a beautiful teacher and an impossible person. He didn’t teach you
how to ‘do art’. The focus was on the development of your own personal sense of looking”
(Tomkins: 29). And during the decade which followed, Rauschenberg developed a very unique
‘sense of looking’, arriving in many instances at a praxis informed by an innate sense of the
empty-sublime.
Rauschenberg was, in his early years, an artist who entered the space of empty sublime
intuitively, facilitating a remarkable creative output through a ‘perpetual process of discovery’,
as John Cage remarked. In conversation with John Gruen in 1977, Rauschenberg recounted how
his process of creation in the studio was largely outside his conscious control, though he would
often resort to ‘tricks’ to reach what he called “that solitary point of creativity”, such as
pretending to have an idea, and then setting to work to discover what might proceed from that
imaginary ‘idea’. Rauschenberg says:
I put my trust in the materials that confront me, because they put me in touch with
the unknown. It is then that I begin to work, when I don’t have the comfort of
sureness and certainty. Sometimes Jack Daniels helps too. Another good trick is
fatigue. I like to start working when it’s almost too late, when nothing else helps,
when my sense of efficiency is exhausted. It’s then that I find myself in another
state, quite outside myself, and when that happens there’s such a joy! It’s an
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incredible high and things just start flowing and you have no idea of the source.
(Gruen: 48)
And then, sounding a bit like Heraclitus, Rauschenberg says
Every minute everything is different everywhere. It is all flowing… The duty or
beauty of a painting is that there is no reason to do it nor any reason not to. It can
be done as a direct act or contact with the moment, and that is the moment you are
awake and moving. It all passes and is never true literally as the present again,
leaving more work to be done. (Hunter: 121)
Rauschenberg’s comments here are remarkable (in the sense of positively ‘worth being remarked
upon’), foreshadowing as they do Trungpa’s description of the experience of emptiness, or
śūnyatā, stemming from the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view. Trungpa elucidates that experience,
saying that:
When you begin to abandon all possibilities of any kind of reference point that
would comfort you—when you lose all those reference points, including your
ambition, the strangest thing takes place. It is quite titillating. It’s as if you were
suspended in outer space without a space suit. You are just floating and circulating
around the planets, forever and ever. (Trungpa 1996: 40)
Trungpa insists that this experience is remarkably unexceptional, and something that is, in fact,
recurrent for everyone. But very few people are willing to relax enough for the brilliance of the
moment to shine through and recognize this open clarity, much as Rauschenberg has described.
Rauschenberg discovered for himself that, as Trungpa says, “from that experience you can
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cultivate your potential artistic talent, your visual appreciation… [However,] beyond that whole
thing, there is a space of nothing actually happening” (41-42). It is in that spirit, and with that
recognition, that Rauschenberg says, ‘it all passes and is never true literally as the present again,
leaving more work to be done’.
Rauschenberg’s early work, from 1949 through early-1954, testifies to this remarkable
and fresh creative outpouring, a unique synthesis of vision and persistent confidence to pursue
his rapidly evolving imagination and effervescent intuition. This confidence was nurtured in no
small way by his friend and mentor, John Cage, during this formative period. Calvin Tomkins
writes that “Cage once remarked, a little ruefully, that Rauschenberg embodied the kind of
spontaneity and freedom that he, Cage, espoused in theory” (Tomkins: 205).
Walter Hopps’ monograph on Rauschenberg’s early years, Robert Rauschenberg, The
Early 1950s (1991), chronicles this often overlooked, yet formatively rich period in
Rauschenberg’s early artistic development. One intriguing upshot of Hopps’ survey is evidence
of a surprising influence by Barnett Newman on some of Rauschenberg’s earliest work. For
example, Rauschenberg’s “This is the First Half of a Print Designed to Exist in Passing Time”,
from ca. 1949, finds resonance in Newman’s “The Beginning” from 1946. Rauschenberg’s work
here is a progressive series of fourteen small woodblock prints on paper, 12 1/8 x 8 7/8 inches;
Newman’s is a single, larger work, on canvas, measuring 40” x 29 3/4”. Newman’s canvas
features three lines, or stripes, running vertically down the canvas—a precursor to his ‘zips’—yet
exhibit the same organic shapes and randomness found in the horizontal stripes of
Rauschenberg’s series. In this series, Rauschenberg first begins with an all-black print, and then
progresses through thirteen more, with the final print in the series containing eleven horizontal
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stripes, all of varying widths and in varying relationships to an absolute plane, and carved
seemingly at random into the woodblock. Finally the work is bound together at one end with
household twine.
In Rauschenberg’s “Mother of God” (Plate 5., below), a work of mixed media on
masonite, 1950, we find a resemblance to Newman’s “Untitled”, from 1946, which is a work o

Plate 5. Robert Rauschenberg, Mother of God, 1950.
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of brush and black ink on paper, measuring just 24” x 18”. Rauschenberg’s work is much larger
than Newman’s in this case: Rauschenberg’s canvas measures 48” x 32 1/8”, and was produced
using oil, enamel, printed paper, newspaper, and copper and metallic paints on masonite. Both
Rauschenberg’s and Newman’s works feature a prominent, large, empty circle in the middle of
the surface plane. Newman offsets this white, round emptiness with black random brushwork
radiating out from it; Rauschenberg has painted his large, off-white circle on top of a collage of
two-color road maps from twenty-two North American cities affixed to the canvas.
This off-white, irregular circle dominates the canvas. The lower twenty percent of
Rauschenberg’s canvas has been painted over, taking the form of a wide stripe, and employing
the same color as the circle above it. In the lower right corner, within this neutral stripe,
Rauschenberg has collaged a cutout of newspaper text which reads: “An invaluable spiritual road
map… As simple and fundamental as life itself” (Hopps 49).
It would be unlikely that Rauschenberg had not seen Newman’s work at Betty Parsons
Gallery on several occasions. But this isn’t to say that Rauschenberg didn’t produce extremely
original work during this period. He simply absorbed all that he was seeing in New York during
these early years, using it as fodder for his own work. He turned to collage long after Picasso and
Braque had abandoned the technique, and included mirrors, string, rocks, newspaper, wood, and
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masonite, 1950, we find a resemblance to Newman’s “Untitled”, from 1946, which is a work of
“Rauschenberg’s idiosyncratic use of disparate media” (14).

Plate 6. Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled (Interior of an Old Carriage), 1949

Rauschenberg’s artistic production speaks of an unrestrained creative spontaneity that
Newman’s oeuvre, for example, never manages. During these first five years in New York,
Rauschenberg worked in several mediums simultaneously. Photography was an early and
ongoing passion, and in 1949 Rauschenberg produced several black and white photographic
studies of note; two of these, Untitled (Interior of an Old Carriage) (Plate 6.), and Untitled (Cy
on Bench), were purchased three years later by Edward Steichen for the Museum of Modern Art
in New York, becoming Rauschenberg’s first works purchased by a museum.
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Also beginning in 1949 and continuing into the next year, Rauschenberg produced a
series of monoprints from exposed blueprint paper in collaboration with his partner, Susan Weil.

Plate 7. Robert Rauschenberg, Trinity, 1959.

These ethereal works ranged in size from the very small, 6 1/4 x 9 3/4 inches, up to the much
larger, and longer, 105 x 36 inches. Turning to oil and pencil on canvas, Rauschenberg produced
Trinity (Plate 7.), which measured 39 x 48 inches. Trinity is a now-lost, abstract work
featuring three circles, perhaps yellow, with irregular vertical stripes extending above and below
each circle, against a haphazardly brushed dark background, and with a wide vertical stripe
running along the left border, also of an indeterminate color.155
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22 The Lily White (1949) (Plate 8.), a painting made improbably in Morris Kantor’s lifedrawing class while Rauschenberg was enrolled at the Art Students League in New York in
1949,156 is a study in off-white and what appears to be sienna oil medium with a pencil-scribed
nonsensical surface, almost resembling an abstracted hop-scotch game, or an odd vertebrae, but
with numbers incised, seemingly randomly, within the variously connected rectangles of this
improbable game.

Plate 8. Robert Rauschenberg, 22 The Lily White, 1949
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From these abstract works, Rauschenberg moved into the stark simplicity of his
multiple White Paintings, a series of six works created in 1951, boldly emphasizing the single or
repetitive geometry of the rectangular or square canvas stretcher(s) as the only other identifiable
feature in addition to their all-white coloration; for example in White Painting, 1951, five
rectangular panels hang side-by-side, each 72” high, but with widths varying between 19 1/2”
and 31 5/8”. The overall width of this White Painting, 1951, is 126”. Other iterations in this
series include a one-panel square work, 48” x 48”; another, two rectangular panels, each
measuring 72” x 48”; another, three rectangular panels, each measuring 72” x 36”; and finally,
four square panels, each measuring 36” x 36”, creating a work that, overall, measures 72” x 72”.
From all-over white, Rauschenberg then moved into all-over black this same year (1951),
and created a series of matte black paintings, including Untitled [matte black triptych], 1951, a
work in three panels, each measuring 72” x 36”, with an overall dimension of 72” x 108”. These
black paintings assumed many different sizes and combinations of stretchers, alternating between
matte and gloss finishes.
Rauschenberg also began experimenting with collage and a mélange of multi-media and
bricolage in 1951. Examples of this trajectory include the canvas-construction Stone, Stone,
Stone, 30” x 38”, a miscellany of oil, pencil, printed paper, hair, glass, and mirror on canvas,
which Hopps describes as illustrating “five [irregular] rectangular forms [arranged vertically
along the left border of the canvas], each covered by glass, [and which] contain locks of hair,
postage stamp, printed form, printed reproduction of a crested bird, and a drawn, maze-like grid”
(Hopps 52). Another work from the same period, presenting a sophisticated composition and
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Plate 9. Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled [with collage and mirror], ca. 1951

coloration, Untitled [with collage and mirror] ca. 1951 (Plate 9.), created with water-based paint,
enamel, pencil, newspaper, tissu paper, and mirror on canvas. Five irregular, almost-square
forms are placed in an uneven horizontal plane across the top of the canvas, with each form a
slightly different size than the next. Of these five almost-square forms, the fourth from the left is
made with collaged newspaper, in which can be read: “The World…Still the Crisis,” “The Three
and the One,” “The Nation,” and “Muddled Picture”.
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Plate 10. Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled (Night Blooming Series), 1951.

And finally, from this same period of unselfconscious and spontaneous creativity in early 1951,
there is the collaged work, now lost, Should Love Come First?, 24” x 30”, produced with
oil, printed paper, and pencil on canvas. This latter work includes a fragment of printed paper
which reads “my problem…should love come first?”; a printed dance diagram for ‘progressive
waltz steps’; the inked imprint of a naked foot; and a drawn, grid-like maze with the number ‘8’
repeated eight times.157
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The summer of 1951 was a significant marker in Rauschenberg’s early career, which
evidenced another notable turn in the development of his art-making. During this summer, which
he spent in residence at Black Mountain College, Rauschenberg would not only paint his first six
White Paintings, which I spoke about above, but also at least eighteen Night Blooming paintings,
some of which are thought to have been as large as 8 x 6 feet.158 An example of this series, all of
which have been lost but three, is Untitled (Night Blooming Series), ca. 1951 (Plate 10.). The
canvases in this series were produced using wholly different mediums than what Rauschenberg
had turned to before: oil, asphaltum, and gravel.
From this series Rauschenberg then turned, in a radical departure from his tendency up to
this point, to the series of black paintings referenced above, all in various iterations consisting of
several canvas panels covered with black matte oil paint, or, alternatively, single- or multiplecanvas panels covered with a gloss oil paint over an uneven newspaper subsurface.
Early 1952 saw more movement and change. Rauschenberg steered away from his
monochrome expressions of all-black or all-white towards a more varied palette of earth-tones,
incorporating collaged newspaper scraps, which are, for the most part, barely legible. His
Untitled [matte black painting with Asheville Citizen], ca. 1952, is one of Rauschenberg’s early
collage works, and is exemplary of this darker palette. Here he joins two canvases, one above the
other, with a painted, near-square black field above, then several sections of a barely legible
newspaper collaged below that, forming another slightly elongated rectangle, and which has been
lightly painted over with a burnt sienna oil medium. A wide, black stripe runs along the bottom
of the canvas, forming the foundation or base of the composition. In this series, Rauschenberg’s
sophisticated compositions and palette are again in evidence throughout.
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Rauschenberg’s trip to Rome and North Africa in the autumn of that year, in the company
of Cy Twombly, resulted in a flurry of collage works on paper board (actually cardboard shirtstiffeners from a laundry), and also sculptural ‘assemblages’, both series relying on the bricolage
of found objects and printed matter readily available to the young, broke artists on the streets of
Rome. The hanging, Dada-like assemblages, or kinetic sculptures which Rauschenberg created
were named “Feticci Personali”, or ‘personal fetishes’, and were exhibited in the Pincio Garden,
Rome, in the spring of 1953. Rauschenberg’s collections of found-objects, arranged and
displayed in a miscellany of used jewelry or compartmentalized wooden boxes, were named
“Scatole Personali”, or ‘personal boxes’, and were exhibited in Rome and Florence in late 1952
and early 1953, only to be thrown into the Fiume Arno by Rauschenberg after a scathing review
in a local paper suggested that the bottom of the Arno was the only appropriate place for the
collection of this dubious young ‘artist’. This series of “Personali” resonates with earlier Dada

Plate 12. Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled (Elemental Sculpture), ca. 1953
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works, prefiguring works by the Fluxus movement still to come some ten years in the future.

The employment of geometric shapes and forms is a common element in works of
Rauschenberg from these early years, and is evident in the photographic series Cy and Roman
Steps I, II, III, IV, V. 1952 (Plate 11.); each image 15” x 15”, with its repetitive horizontal lines
formed by the repeating Roman Steps of Santa Maria Aracoeli, in Rome, and interrupted only by
the visible form of the lower half of a clothed male torso (Twombly), which grows ever closer
and larger with each progressive photograph.

Plate 11. Robert Rauschenberg, Cy and Roman Steps I, II, III, IV, V. 1952.

After returning to New York from Italy in the spring of 1953, Rauschenberg would begin
working on spare sculptural constructions, again of found bricolage, which had their beginnings
in his Roman Feticci Personali collection. These works would be made from pieces of salvaged
wooden beams, stones, spikes, a rusted and unserviceable bicycle wheel on one occasion, rope or
twine, and discarded wooden boxes. This series is exemplified by Untitled (Elemental Sculpture)
[spike and block], ca. 1953 (Plate 12.).
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Plate 13. Robert Rauschenberg, Automobile Tire Print, 1951 or 1953.

Perhaps two of Rauschenberg’s most controversial, yet thoroughly playful, iconic works
from this period are his Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953, and Automobile Tire Print, from
either 1953 or as early as 1951.159 Erased de Kooning Drawing, 25 1/4” x 21 3/4”, is a goldframed, essentially blank piece of drawing paper which originally contained a drawing by
Willem de Kooning, but which Rauschenberg completely erased, with de Kooning’s—however
reluctant—blessings. Automobile Tire Print (Plate 13.), 16 1/2” x 264 1/2”, was created by
having John Cage slowly drive his Model A Ford sedan over a series of 20 pieces of blank paper,
pasted one to the other and placed in a long row on Fulton Street in downtown New York,
outside Rauschenberg’s studio/loft, while Rauschenberg walked behind, inking the tire. These
two works are vivid examples of Rauschenberg’s at once playful, exuberant, experimental, and
thoughtful unfolding art praxis. The empty-sublime may not be immediately recognizable in
these works themselves, but the space in which they were created has the taste of indisputable
openness and ‘first thought’.
In the fall or winter of 1953, Rauschenberg made another dramatic turn, and began a
series of paintings that would be known simply as Red Paintings, and which would foreshadow
the ‘Combines’, which would first appear in the middle of the following year.160 The Red
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Paintings were abstracts of variable sizes, often consisting of overlapping rectangles of fabric,
wood and newspaper affixed as a subsurface to the canvas before overpainting, creating grid-like
shapes, with textures and images visible beneath an often-ample layer of paint of varying hues of
both intense and subtle reds and red-oranges, with the occasional addition of yellow, turquoise,
and sometimes crayon of different colors. The sizes of his Red Paintings series ranged from a
very small 14 3/4” x 11 3/4”, up to 76” x 51”. (see Plate 14.) (Hopps: 215). Rauschenberg later

Plate 14. Robert Rauschenberg, Untitled (Red Painting), ca. 1953.
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recounted that he turned to the color red, which had always been “the hardest color I found to
work with”, after feeling particularly distressed “at the many misconstrued assumptions that had
been derived variously from [my] use of the colors white or black: [misconstruals such as]
‘Negativism, … , nothingness, or burned and tarred’ ” (Hopps: 164). Hopps remarks that
Rauschenberg, in the Red Paintings, evidences an “almost architectural construction of the
painting’s composition” (Hopps: 165), a geometric structure not unlike that found in the works
of Laib and Martin.
Yoicks, 1954, would mark the transition between Rauschenberg’s early years and his
unofficial debut as a force in the New York art scene with his ‘Combines’. Yoicks, 1954, (Plate
15.), measuring 96” x 72” overall, employs two joined canvases (not an uncommon device
resorted to by Rauschenberg, as we have seen previously), one above the other. Hopps suggests
that Rauschenberg may have used an existing two-panel White Painting for the execution of this
work, as the dimensions match one work from that series.161 Yoicks is unique from all earlier
Rauschenberg works, an artistic unfurling of expressionistic, even arbitrary stripes, wide and
irregular, in pulsating hues of alternating reds and yellows. Rauschenberg worked quickly here:
yellow paint drips from the yellow stripes; red paint drips freely from the lower red stripes.
Collaged polka-dotted fabric bleeds through in places, revealing a patterned ground beneath the
yellow stripes; in most red stripes, the green polka-dots are barely visible. The collaged
subsurface includes fragments from the comic strips Terry and the Pirates and Gasoline Alley,
without any context.
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Plate 15. Robert Rauschenberg, Yoicks, 1954.
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In summary, I catalogue these five early, formative years of Rauschenberg’s career to
illustrate one example of what an empty-sublime art praxis looks like. To look for the ‘sublime’
in a Romantic landscape or seascape is to misunderstand what the empty-sublime is, which is
why no one has been able to pin down ‘the sublime’ for more than 2,000 years, or for more than
two seconds, for that matter. Rauschenberg maintained a remarkable discipline of openness,
fearlessness, and of surrendering to ‘first thought’ when approaching his art, with a liberal dose
of humor (or not taking himself too seriously), which was never far from his ever-present, dayto-day life. Rauschenberg’s art does not seek to portray the other-worldly seascapes which
Turner depicted, nor the sense of vastness of Friedrich. Nor is his aim to stimulate an experience
of the ‘sublime’ in the viewer of his art. He didn’t have to, having found the empty-sublime in the
very making of his art.
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IV.
The Empty-Sublime Pollen of Wolfgang Laib
I think the idea of the individual in our culture is a misunderstanding that leads to the tragedy which
every individual is in. Other cultures have seen the individual as part of everything and they did not
have this tragedy. … If you believe only in the individual, in what [you imagine] you are, then life is
a tragedy that ends in death. But if you feel part of a whole, that what you are doing is not just you,
the individual, but something bigger, then all these problems are not there any more. Everything is
totally different. There is no beginning and no ending.

-Wolfgang Laib162

In the hands of Wolfgang Laib (b. 1950, Metzingen, Germany), a simple white marble slab
takes on an ethereal beauty. Laib’s stunning sculptural works, all meticulously crafted threedimensional geometric shapes, are made from extra-ordinary materials: plant and tree pollen,
natural beeswax, and marble. To this organic assortment, Laib will often add two elemental
foodstuffs, milk, and rice; and, playing a supporting role, small brass cones and simple brass
offering platters, sourced in India, will be employed.
Describing the work of Wolfgang Laib, the art historian and curator, Margit Rowell,
writes that
A search for historical or social content, technical invention, or moral significance
is irrelevant here: this art must be physically confronted to be understood. It invokes
the power of revelation through direct perception, the victory of the senses and
emotion over the intellect, the revenge of the image over the word. … Laib has
reintroduced the notion of ‘aura’ to the work of art. (Ottmann 30)
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By invoking the phenomenon of ‘aura’ in his work, Laib has stood Duchamp’s call for an
end to ‘retinal’ art on its head. If we heed Duchamp’s encomium for an elimination of the
‘beautiful’ in the work of art—that is to say, all that is given to us by means of the retina (and, of
course, by means of our judgement of taste as well)—this leaves us as mere blind, barren
intellects. In other words, according to Duchamp, we have to ‘think’ art rather than savour it.
Can art, absent the expression of beauty, be art at all? Without beauty, we are left floundering in
discursivus, which literally means ‘gone hastily to and fro’. And one might conclude (rightly, I
believe) that this is the unmoored and haphazard state of much of art-making today, i.e., going
hastily to and fro, and never arriving anywhere at all.
Laib’s earliest foray into sculpture resulted in a large black rock, retrieved from the
countryside surrounding his home in southern Germany, carved into a perfect ovoid, or egg
shape, measuring about one meter long and not quite as high. This was in 1972, two years before
finishing his studies in medicine, and set into motion Laib’s artistic trajectory, a praxis which
would always be inextricably bound to a love affair with, and deep respect for, natural
phenomena in all its manifestations.163 Three years later, Laib sculpted the first in his ongoing
series of ‘Milkstones’, precisely-cut square or rectangular thin slabs of polished Macedonian
pale-yellow marble with ever-so-slight depressions sanded into the top surface, into which Laib
pours fresh whole milk (to be changed daily). These ‘Milkstones’ have assumed various sizes
during their different iterations over time: one as small as 56 cm x 45 cm x 5.7 cm; another more
than twice the size, e.g., 1.04 m x 1.09 m, but only 2 cm in thickness.
Laib says:
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Why [do I find the milk coming to rest on the marble so beautiful]? I cannot explain.
It is something so unbelievable this reality. It’s so far beyond the imagination. It is
absolutely still, the milk, this liquid, that would normally flow away. … Stone is a
living being—like milk, pollen, animals, human beings, or mountains. Other
cultures have seen stone in this way and you find these ideas all over the world, and
also thousands of years ago. Only for us did it become something we would not
believe, because we separated ourselves from all of that. (Farrow: 19)

Plate 16. Wolfgang Laib, Milkstone. 1975-ongoing.
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Laib’s next project would be simple presentations of raw, vividly colored pollen,
painstakingly collected from the wild: pollen from dandelions, buttercup, sorrel, moss, hazelnut,
and pine trees. To create these ‘Pollen Fields’ (1977-ongoing), Laib slowly, patiently,
meditatively, sifts the harvested pollen through muslin onto the floor of the exhibition space,
creating both large or small rectangles of the vibrant, luminous substances, measuring anywhere
between 60 cm x 80 cm, up to 5.5 m x 6.4 m.164 Alternately, he will sift the pollen (in this case
buttercup or hazelnut) through a sieve into cone-shaped heaps, creating a row of five small
pyramidal mounds, which he has named The Five Mountains Not To Climb On (1984-ongoing).
These ‘mountains’ each stand only about 7 cm high.

Plate 17. Wolfgang Laib, Pollen Field installation. 1977-ongoing.
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In his various presentations of pollen, Laib employs the harvest of one flower, shrub, tree,
or moss for each of what I interpret as his ‘fields of contemplation’. To emphasize the delicacy
of Laib’s project, each variety of pollen is used according to its own quality, texture, size, and
color. For instance, the pollen collected from sorrel and buttercup is sparse; Laib exhibits the
diurnal sorrel pollen in several round glass storage jars placed on a wooden shelf, or simply on
the floor. In the case of buttercup pollen, it is slowly sifted into the five, small ‘mountains’
mentioned above. Dandelion, hazelnut, and pine pollen are much more abundant, and comprise
the mediums from which both the large and small ‘pollen fields’ are created.
Klaus Ottmann writes that “Laib’s pollen and milk have a physical impact that extends
into an intermediate domain pertaining to neither their materiality nor their form. Instead it is
located in what the philosopher F.W.J. von Schelling called ‘spiritual corporeality’: it produces a
calm composure…” (Ottmann 16). Laib brings to his work a complete absence of aggression,
which ordinarily arises (i.e. aggression) accompanied by an equal dose of neurotic ‘heat’; this
absence of aggression, conveyed through his careful placement of extremely delicate materials,
gives silent voice to nature’s ‘spiritual corporeality’ about which Schelling speaks.165 As
Trungpa writes, “our message [as artists] is simply appreciating the nature of things as they are
and expressing it without any struggle of thoughts and fears.” (Trungpa 1979: ii).
Laib’s artistic practice, and his life, is imbued with his deep appreciation for the spiritual
nature of phenomena.166 He relinquishes center stage to pollen, beeswax, marble, milk, rice, and
brass, his chosen mediums, and expresses the simplicity and profundity of these materials
without pretence or prejudice. When we work directly and unselfconsciously, “we give up
aggression, both toward ourselves, that we have to make a special effort to impress people, and
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toward others, that we can put something over on them” (1-2), Trungpa says. Laib’s work,
almost naïve in its simplicity, is a reflection of a complete absence of any aggression.
When asked about what it is about the pollen that is most important for him, Laib
explains:
The important thing is what the pollen is. It is…many… things, things that maybe
I don’t know and you don’t know. … The pollen is what pollen is, and I am
somehow participating in that, and trying to get close to these things. I could not
create something like this. Which is why I make the milkstones, and collect and sift
the pollen, because I know that there is much, much more than myself… I am very
disappointed if people see [these works] only as a visual aesthetic experience. The
pollen does have an incredible colour, but it is not a painting and it is far away from
[Yves] Klein, or Rothko. (Farrow: 14, 29)

The installations which Wolfgang Laib has created over the past forty-five years have
followed a few very subtle themes employed in a repetitious manner. These themes, while never
completely distinct and often overlapping, include the consistent use of geometric shapes made
with natural elements; one or two objects arranged in juxtaposition to each other and their
environment; rice and milk contrasting with stone, earth, or metal; traditional offering platters;
and shapes that are obviously products of the human hand such as houses, ziggurats, and a
chamber that can be entered. Given the duration of his career, and the repetitive nature of his
oeuvre, the addition of each new element, though subtle, is resounding. It is difficult to assume
there is a goal or direction to his process, but the installations maintain a strong sense of
connectivity within themselves and with all things natural.
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Geometric shapes: rectangles, squares, circles, cones, and triangles are found in Laib’s
sculptural installations. The pollen in his Pollen Fields, for which he is perhaps best known, is
carefully laid out as ample rectangles, and his Milkstones are precisely cut rectilinear forms.
Laib’s Rice Houses are three dimensional, solid, rectangular, and ‘roofed’. The use of milk and
rice create a soft dissonance in contrast with this stark geometry adding a mysterious dialectic
between food and shelter, contrasting whites, rock and seed and liquid. It is as if the existence
and nourishment of the human has become part of what was a more abstracted display that in
previous works relegated human participation to the observer. As if taking a slow-motion leap, in
Rice Meals Laib places mounds of white or saffron rice in a series of Indian brass offering
platters, bringing his subtle combinations into an undeniable relationship of spiritual expression:
the universal act of offering from the human hand, to what? Perhaps to that universal and
undeniable state of interconnectedness so important to Laib.
Later works by Laib, first installed in the 1980s and 1990s and then repeated thereafter,
often take the form of a geometric enclosure, displaying the unmistakable mark of a human hand.
Laib’s white marble ‘Rice House(s)’ (1983-ongoing), are small long rectangles, roughly-carved
from a single block of white marble, with a peaked roof. Around this marble form Laib places
piles of white rice, which bank up against the sides of the structure. The dimensions of the ‘Rice
Houses’ are variable as with all of Laib’s sculptural installations, but the basic geometric form

232

Plate 18. Wolfgang Laib, Rice House, 1983-ongoing.

persists. The iteration he created for his 1999 exhibition at the Kunsthaus Bregenz (Austria)
measures 44 cm x 42 cm x 125 cm long. Laib has explained that these ‘rice houses’ have been
inspired by Muslim tombs and medieval reliquaries encountered in his travels.167 His only other
sculptural works to which his ascribes architectonic inspiration from travels abroad are his very
large, and somewhat uncharacteristic, Ziggurats,168 fashioned from beeswax supported by a
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wooden framework. These stepped pyramidal structures, which can stand as high as 386 cm, and
75 cm wide, have been inspired by ancient Sumerian/Babylonian/Assyrian temple-structures of
the same name.
Laib develops his exploration of human structures with a small, single, free-standing
enclosed room whose interior is completely lined with beeswax (1987-ongoing). This
installation, “Somewhere else — la chamber des certitudes”, is framed in wood, with a single
door-less doorway serving as both entrance and exit. The interior is just large enough for a single
person, with dimensions of 3.27 m x 76 cm-1.25 m x 4.85 m long, illuminated by a single
incandescent light bulb hanging from the ceiling. To enter the chamber is truly to enter
‘somewhere else’, whose ‘certitude’ is, well, uncertain. The light is warm, and the confined
space is permeated with the dense sweet smell of beeswax. The ‘chamber’ presents an
experience of something akin to the complete opposite to that of Laib’s pollen fields; there is no
spaciousness here. The dialectic exists between oneself and the atmospheric sweet smell and
warm color of the beeswax. One experiences a complete and total immersion in beeswax, which
is quite extraordinary, as we rarely experience a complete immersion in anything. Laib says that
“the individual is somehow participating in what is there” (see: Tanguy: 31). What is there, Laib
says, is “… a material that I did not make. It’s the building material of the bees. …it’s another
world. It’s like there are worlds in between” (Farrow: 22). Laib’s role here is one of mediator, or
even facilitator; yet the unmistakable signature of human intervention in this case evokes a very
different theme from earlier installations.
Klaus Ottmann writes that, in the wax ‘chambers of certitude’, “Laib’s relationship to the
phenomenological epoche is most evident in this temporary suspension of the outside world, this
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experience of an inner ‘lived perspective’. One enters a void space in which the gap between the
Symbolic and the Real is closed—that is, in which desires are directly materialized” (Ottmann
16). I wouldn’t agree with Ottmann here, however, as I believe Laib knows that there is no truth
in believing in a differentiation between ‘outside world’ and ‘inside world’. Rather, I believe
Laib is pointing to, with all his sculptural installations, the gap in which there is neither outside
nor inside. There is simply presence. And that presence which we are, as well as experience,
standing before or behind or within one of Laib’s installations is a presence without boundaries.
It is a presence in this world where there is no separation between ‘nature’ and ‘Being’. Rather
than ‘Being there’, or Dasein, Laib demonstrates that there is an interdependent coörigination
which binds us all together. We are the pollen, the marble, the rice, the milk. Of course, the
particularities are distinct, but the distinctions do not signify difference of nature. Laib’s
sculptural presentations are extraordinarily straightforward; unselfconscious and uncomplicated
demonstrations/mediations of the pure nature and interconnectedness of things, of natural
phenomena. Indeed, they are evidence of the true boundary-lessness which exists in this
marvelous world of ours. One can almost taste the empty-sublime imbued in and evoked by
Laib’s work as you stand gazing at a ‘pollen field’ or a ‘milkstone’. The space changes, and
perception changes. And nothing happens.

.
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Plate 19. Wolfgang Laib, The Rice Meals for Nine Planets, 1983-ongoing
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V.
Agnes Martin:
The Empty-Sublime of a Line
The underside of the leaf / Cool in shadow /
Sublimely unemphatic / Smiling of innocence /
The frailest stems / Quivering in light /
Bend and break / In silence.
This poem, like the paintings, is not really about nature. It is not what is seen.
It is what is known forever in the mind.
-Agnes Martin169

Agnes Martin’s life story is a complex narrative; a puzzling, psychologically-driven
mélange of art and the everyday, overshadowed at times by periodic “descents into what Coentis
Slip neighbor Jack Youngerman called ‘an extremity of distress’, a dark night of the soul mired
in her severe Calvinist roots” (Tobin: 78). She was, as Nancy Princenthal writes understatedly,
an artist “riven with contradictions and exceptions” (Princenthal: 151). Martin dealt with her
schizophrenia and intermittent episodes of catatonia170 through a one-pointed artistic discipline
which provided a needed and welcome refuge from the voices in her head. Self-schooled in
Mahāyāna Buddhist and Daoist thought through the limited number of English translations and
commentaries of Chinese, Tibetan, and Japanese texts available to the U.S. market in the 1960s
and 1970s, as well as through conversations with friends in New York during her tenure there
from the late 1950s through the late 1960s—friends such as Ad Reinhardt, John Cage, and
Ellsworth Kelly, who had attended several of D.T. Suzuki’s lectures at Columbia University in
the early and mid-1950s, and had abiding interests in Zen Buddhism—Martin blazed a
remarkable path to an empty-sublime through her meticulously-crafted abstract geometric
compositions. The degree to which her works communicate, or evoke, an empty-sublime in the
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viewer is indicative of the discipline to which she gave herself in her work. I am arguing here
that Martin’s canvases, especially from her New York period (1957-1967), and her threedimensional constructions from the late 1950s and early 1960s, are particularly illustrative of a
praxis of empty-sublime; the process of working in, with, and from the space of empty-sublime,
rather than as a body of work which seeks to illustrate ‘the sublime’, as Turner’s and Friedrich’s
work are so often described.
Martin relocated to New York from New Mexico in 1957 at the urging of the New York
gallerist Betty Parsons. With time, Martin’s paintings underwent dramatic changes, leaving

Plate 20. Agnes Martin, Mid-Winter, 1954.
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behind the tendency towards organic shapes and the colors inspired by the New Mexico desert,
(see Plate 20, Mid-Winter, 1954), to plumb the breadth and depth of geometric shapes and
repetitive lines; circles, triangles, and rectangles early on, followed by elegantly and precisely
executed grids or simply horizontal graphite lines. The grids, first begun in the early 1960s,
evolved into broad horizontal stripes beginning in the mid-1970s. Martin worked mostly in oils,
acrylics and graphite on canvas or linen, although infrequently she would create works of
watercolor and/or gouache and ink or pencil, on paper. Martin’s later work, featuring horizontal
pale pastel stripes, came to mark her mature oeuvre for which she is best known today.
An artist’s journey is full of twists and turns, expressing all that art and life might serve
up to us. Martin’s journey was no different. Once in New York, Martin took up residence in an
unheated loft at 27 Coentis Slip in Lower Manhattan; Ellsworth Kelly, Robert Indiana, Lenore
Tawney, and Jack Youngerman also lived and worked in lofts there, a place which Youngerman
recalled as possessing “a local spirit that was both warmly congenial and decidedly less
collective than the one prevailing a little further north” (Princenthal: 66), alluding to the ‘scene’
of first-generation Abstract Expressionists, often referred to as the ‘Tenth Street crowd’, which
centered around Union Square and Greenwich Village. Kelly, Indiana, Tawny, and Martin
became friends; “a group of artists” Princenthal writes, who had each seemingly “washed ashore
and were glad to find others similarly bivouacked, but who shared most of all a profound respect
for privacy” (67). Yet, despite their very separate lives, the Slip provided an environment of
cross-fertilization the likes of which Martin had never before experienced in her career as an
artist. And the interchange of ideas, mediums and methods extended well beyond Coentis Slip,
as Martin came to swim in the same waters as Rothko, Newman, Reinhardt, Rauschenberg,
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Johns, Cage, the young Greek artist Chryssa, and the Abstract Expressionists with whom she
most closely identified.
Martin’s first solo show in New York took place in December 1958 at Betty Parsons

Plate 21. Agnes Martin, Harbour Number 1, 1957.

Gallery, featuring biomorphic, or simple, organically-shaped abstractions in various shades of
greys, black, greens, and browns, reflecting the light of the harbor she lived beside, all on an
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identifiable theme that she had been working on in New Mexico before her relocation to
downtown New York (see Plate 21, Harbour Number 1, 1957, above). A year later, with her
work continuing to evolve, Martin had another solo show at Betty Parsons’, which featured
evolving works of geometric elements including triangles, squares, and circles, often in rich deep
hues.
Much as when Rauschenberg had traveled to Italy with Cy Twombly in 1952-3, Martin
was “prolific and adventurous” in these early years in New York (Morris: 58), and often departed
from her accustomed medium of oil and canvas to venture into the world of three-dimensional
geometric constructions made from salvaged objects found in and around the area of the Coentis
seaport. As Frances Morris describes, this period in New York was, for Martin, one marked by a
“collective experimentalism in which many of the painters took to constructing works with
‘discovered’ materials…encouraged by poverty and each other” (58), and Martin joined in. Her
works of this period exhibit her developing affinity for geometric repetition. For example, The
Laws 1958 (Plate 22, below), is a long rectangular, almost totemic, painted plank of wood with
five columns of boat spikes driven into the upper section of the plank, ten spikes long in even
spacings, and painted in a dark hue contrasting to the lighter tone found in the lower grey
section. Slightly above the abrupt boundary separating the dark and lighter fields, five small
squares of unpainted wood form a juxtaposing horizontal alignment, and project slightly beyond
the surface of the wooden plank. The dimensionality of the boat spikes and wooden squares are
at variance with the flat, even grey plane below.
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Plate 22. Agnes Martin, The Laws, 1958.

The Laws 1958 prefigures a work of oil on paper mounted on canvas produced the following
year, The Book 1959, which contains repetitions of elements found in The Laws, but with a
different scale to the objects and their placements within the field of the work. The palette, and
the surface placement of small rectangular black marks in six uniform columns in the upper area
of the paper, however, is very similar to The Laws. The nails and black marks, on this and other
works of the same period, foreshadow Martin’s grids on canvas, which would dominate her work
for the next decade.
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As the 1960s dawned, Martin’s work began to reflect a fascination with the grid. It has
been suggested by Frances Morris and others that this tendency or inspiration can be traced to
Martin’s friendship with the fiber artist Lenore Tawney, a neighbor at Coentis Slip during
Martin’s first year in New York, and a constant friend thereafter. As Morris writes, Tawney’s
tall, hanging, fabric sculptures of 1961, which Tawney described as ‘woven forms’, “were
delicate works in which light flowed through the weave, allowing the pattern of individual
threads to appear like lace” (61). Martin’s work of this period seems to mirror, albeit in an
altogether different medium and scale, this play of space and light between the warp and the weft
of a weaving, especially the loosely woven forms which Tawney was experimenting with.
Martin later talked about her ‘discovery’ of the geometric grid abstractions with John
Gruen:
One time, I was coming out of the mountains, and having painted the mountains, I
came out on this plain, and I thought, Ah! What a relief! (This was just outside of
Tulsa.) I thought, This is for me! The expansiveness of it. I sort of surrendered. This
plain . . . it was just like a straight line. It was a horizontal line. And I thought there
wasn’t a line that affected me like a horizontal line. Then, I found that the more I
drew that line, the happier I got. First I thought it was like the sea . . . then, I thought
it was like singing! Well, I just went to town on that horizontal line.
But I didn’t like it without any verticals. And I thought to myself, there aren’t
too many verticals I like. But I did put a few in there. Finally, I was putting in almost
as many verticals as horizontals. But, I assure you, that after looking at the work of
students, they think that artists such as myself are involved with structure. Well,
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I’ve been doing those grids for years, but I never thought ‘Structure.’ Structure is
not the process of composition. Why, even musical compositions, which are very
formally structured, are not about structure. Because the musical composer listens.
He doesn’t think about structure. So you must say that my work is not about
structure. (Gruen 1976: 91)
To an oftentimes stormy, cloudy mind, a horizontal line might seem like an oasis. And
for Martin, this plain evoking a vast horizontal line, undoubtedly recalled her early childhood on
the vast flatlands of Saskatchewan, Canada. To embark on a discipline that calls for the
repetition of hundreds of near-perfect, hand-drawn lines in graphite pencil, both horizontal and
vertical, is a remarkable practice in taming the discursive mind, a practice known in Buddhist
parlance as śāmata, or ‘calm abiding’. Within the geometrical can be found this spacious
abiding. This is what Rauschenberg, Martin, and Laib knew, consciously or not, while producing
very different forms of art creation, but each often drawing upon repetitive geometric shapes and
constructs.
To be sure, Rauschenberg’s work never exhibits the disciplined precision of Martin’s;
that was not his style. Yet, there is an obvious spontaneity born from openness which is evident
in his work. And for Martin, there is an openness which is born from discipline and onepointedness. Rauschenberg stepped into the gap seemingly easily, as does Laib in the midst of
his solitary pollen collecting; Martin, on the other hand, required stillness, solitude, and a
discipline which bordered on the austere to enter into that open space. In the making of grids,
precisely executed (and later, stripes), Martin was able to step over the threshold into open space.
She recognized the markers of stillness and discipline in the writings of St. Teresa of Avila,
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Thomas Merton, Laozi, Chuangzi, Huineng, and others, of which she was particularly fond. “My
greatest

Plate 23. Agnes Martin, Mountain, 1960.

spiritual inspiration came from the Chinese spiritual teachers, especially Lao Tzu”, Martin wrote.
“My next strongest influence is the Sixth Patriarch Hui Neng… I have also read and been
inspired by the sutras of the other…Buddhist masters” (Princenthal 105-6). On another occasion,
she remarked that “one thing I like about Zen, it doesn’t believe in achievement” (106). These
visionaries would inspire her own earthy musings on life and the mind. An example of this can
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be gleaned from an address she gave to a group of art students at the Skowhegan, Maine,
summer residency program in 1987, where she remarked:
When you’re in life drawing, you’re really thinking of all the women you’ve ever
seen, and all the gestures they’ve ever made. That’s what brings life into the
drawing. It’s your experience of life. It’s not spiritual, it’s really in this life. You
sort of underestimate the human being when you say that every least thing that is
an abstract experience is spiritual. It isn’t. It’s just your real self. You can be capable
of fantastic abstract experiences, right in this life. (Princenthal 105.)
Exemplifying the one-pointed discipline, cynosure, and requisite patience required to execute a
work such as Martin’s Falling Blue 1963 (Plate 25, below), with its hundreds of barely-visible,
delicate and precise lines, is indicative of a practice of extraordinary ‘meditation-in-action’
which serves to calm the distracted and discursive mind, producing over time, the clarity of
empty space. Martin, in her praxis, demonstrated the “capab[ility] of fantastic abstract
experiences, right in this life”, and became empty-sublime while meeting canvas.
Color fields separated by graphite lines scribed horizontally and vertically into the
surface of the painted canvas are products of Agnes Martin’s disciplined, capacious vision. To
stand before a Martin canvas containing the forms of grids or stripes from her later years is to
experience no-form. Of course, it would be easy to say that Martin painted nothing more than
lines and horizontal fields of color. But there is more to see. Martin remarked that:
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my paintings have neither object nor space nor line nor anything—no forms. They
are light, lightness, about merging, about formlessness, breaking down form. You
wouldn’t think of form by the ocean… A world without objects, without
interruption, making a work without interruption or obstacle. It is to accept the
necessity of the simple direct going into a field of vision as you would cross an
empty beach to look at the ocean. (Martin 1998: 7)
Or, to continue the metaphor, approaching one of Martin’s 6’ x 6’ canvases, which she also
thought was “a good size”, one could simply enter into it, fully and completely. (This is in
radical contradistinction to Barnett Newman, who envisioned his large canvases as provoking a
self-conscious astonishment in the viewer.) Comments such as the quote above have earned
Martin the appellation ‘the artist of tranquility and peace’. She of course is also known as ‘the
artist of grids and stripes’. Of big, horizontal stripes of color, on large canvases. But as I have
explained, she is much, much more than merely this. She is an artist of the empty-sublime.
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Plate 24. Agnes Martin, The Islands, 1961
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Plate 25. Agnes Martin, Falling Blue, 1963.
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Plate 26. Agnes Martin, Untitled, 2004.
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Conclusion

In this chapter, I have talked about three visual artists whom I argue create art in and
from the space of the empty-sublime. These three artists, Robert Rauschenberg, Wolfgang Laib,
and Agnes Martin, do not seek to create, or re-create, depictions of the what is referred to as the
aesthetic sublime, often conjured up by thoughts of the work of Turner or Friedrich, painters
from the Romantic period of the mid-nineteenth century. Rather, I am arguing here that it is not
in the work of art that ‘the sublime’ may be found, although Laib’s and Martin’s work certainly
point to that and can inspire that moment in the viewer; but instead, that the ‘empty-sublime’ is
indicative of the space in which, and from which, these three artists work and create.
It could be said, perhaps without too much argument, that Barnett Newman singlehandedly revived an interest in the notion of, or even the possibility of ‘the sublime’ within
twentieth-century artistic/aesthetic discourse. Prior to the publication of his essay, “the sublime is
now”, in late 1948, there had been but one, albeit very noteworthy, contemporary work
examining the ‘sublime’ since the turn of the twentieth century: Samuel Holt Monk’s The
Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England (1935), and which may have
influenced Newman’s own turn to the sublime. Earlier writings by his friend and colleague,
Mark Rothko,171 for instance, make no reference at all to ‘the sublime’. Notwithstanding
Newman’s contribution to the current rediscovery of ‘the sublime’, which has resonated with,
and unsettled critics and thinkers in the intervening seventy years since his essay first appeared, I
argue that Newman has woefully conflated ‘the sublime’ with a notion of ‘exaltation’ of a
transcendent, in the Kantian sense. Newman was clearly searching for some fundamental ground
of being which he believed the Kwakwaka’wakw peoples had connected with or were expressing
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in or through the making of their ritual masks, implements, and totemic representations.
Newman’s search is indicative of not simply orientalizing an unknown, unfamiliar ‘other’ (in this
case, the Kwakiutl peoples and their ‘art’), but also one of a spiritual materialistic approach to
what one considers ‘spirituality’, where the open possibility of the present moment is ignored for
something imagined to be ‘more magical’ or ‘mystical’, and which is waiting ‘out there’
somewhere to be revealed.
Rauschenberg’s early artistic trajectory in New York comprises the five years, 1949
through 1953. While you might never think that Rauschenberg is an exemplar of the emptysublime to look at one of his well-known ‘combines’, or earlier or later works, I argue that
Rauschenberg’s praxis evidences the openness, spontaneity, unselfconsciousness, and confidence
of going into ‘first thought’ in his art-making which speaks so profoundly of the empty-sublimein-action. In the early 1950s, after Rauschenberg’s first solo show at the Stable Gallery in New
York, he was labelled the ‘enfant terrible’ of the New York art scene; his work was found
shocking, controversial, embarrassing, even annoying; some critics felt his art was no more than
a joke which should not be taken seriously.
To understand Rauschenberg, it is important to understand the foundational training he
received at Black Mountain College from Josef Albers. Albers came to Black Mountain in 1933,
following the closure of the Staatliches Bauhaus by the German National Socialists. Albers had
served at the Bauhaus under the master Hungarian painter and photographer, László MoholyNagy (1895-1946), who taught at the Bauhaus between 1923-1928. Moholy-Nagy had “virtually
invented the multimedia approach of design instruction”, writes Walter Hopps, which included a
potpourri of “painting, sculpture, film, photography, architectural design, crafts, and the applied
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arts, all of which Moholy-Nagy was equally proficient in” (Hopps 22). A union of art and design
was the founding vision at the Bauhaus, and distinctions between the fine and applied arts were
essentially ignored in favour of a resulting synthesis of creative expression in multi-media.
Albers, while opposed to any manner of content-based narration or symbolism in art, taught that
all material was intrinsically and equally useful in the articulation of one’s artistic project. “He
taught the nature of paper, wood, and metal. Paint, according to Albers, had no inherently special
worth beyond its usefulness” (22). Nor did the customary foundational training in drawing, in
either traditional or more modern terms. Albers did not believe that visual art springs first and
foremost from drawing, and so he “did not emphasize line and drawing—even modernist
drawing—and this predilection, along with the Bauhaus open orientation to art-making, was to
inform Rauschenberg’s art for the rest of his career” (22).
This concentration on multi-media training, absent the foundation of traditional mastery
of both line and life drawing, was considered extraordinarily radical at the time (and as a
traditionally-trained artist, I consider this approach radical and controversial today); yet, this
training resonated deeply and lastingly with Rauschenberg, despite the tension in his uneasy but
short-lived student-teacher relationship with Albers at Black Mountain. From this first summer at
Black Mountain, Rauschenberg’s artistic process would reflect the spontaneous use of paper,
wood, and metal which Albers had taught were as worthy central elements in a work of art as is
paint. Rauschenberg’s collages and ‘combines’ are strikingly illustrative of Albers’ multi-media
influence. Rauschenberg’s simple sculptures comprised of Seaport bricolage, from late 1953,
would echo this tendency to an ‘open, [spontaneous, and unselfconscious] orientation to artmaking’.
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The contemporary German installation artist, Wolfgang Laib began his art career shortly
after finishing medical school, in 1974, and set to work creating his first Milkstone. This would
be a precisely cut and polished thin marble slab with a very slight, almost imperceptible
depression sanded on the top surface, into which he would pour fresh, whole milk. These
sculptural meditations illustrate the expression of a profound dialectic which exists of rock and
liquid, white on white, one upon the other. These Milkstones, as Laib calls them, are altogether
different from, for instance, the patchwork of steel ‘tiles’ laid on the floor, which Carl Andre (b.
1935) first created in 1969 and 1974.172 There is no sense of stillness or open space in the works
of Andre, nor any hint of dialectic. Laib, however, is a master of the empty-sublime, and imbues
his finished work, as well as his entire process of art-making, with a capacious non-conceptuality
of indescribable lightness.
Laib does not work with the spontaneity which is readily apparent in the work of
Rauschenberg; Laib’s work is carefully, even painstakingly created and installed. Perhaps most
characteristic, and extraordinary, of this meditative work which has become Laib’s artistic praxis
are his Pollen Fields, squares or rectangles of varying sizes, luxuriantly made wholly from the
intense yellow pollens of dandelion, hazelnut, pine, and other varieties of flora, collected
laboriously by his own hand, and then slowly sifted onto the floor of the exhibition space. Laib’s
Pollen Fields can, at their grandest, cover an area in excess of 5 meters by 6 meters. Agnes
Martin’s canvases, which she said are a ‘good size’ when you feel you can walk right into them,
have the power to negate any apparent separation between the viewer and the viewed. Laib’s
Pollen Fields elicit the same response: one wants to be completely engolloped by the
extraordinary expanse of richly lustrous pollen, perhaps leaving one as if floating freely in space
without a space suit.
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I conclude this chapter with a look at Agnes Martin, ‘the artist of grids and lines’. Martin,
of course, was not merely an artist of grids and lines. Rather, it would be more accurate to say
that Martin’s works originated from the space of empty-sublime, found between the lines and
inside the grids. Unlike either Rauschenberg or Laib (or Newman or Rothko, for that matter),
Martin had an abiding and lasting interest in ‘spiritualism’—Daoism and Mahāyāna Buddhism in
particular—to which she frequently referred as a source of daily inspiration, and to which she
would often turn to make a point while in conversation or in her writings.173 “Those who depend
of [sic] the intellect are the many” Martin writes. “Those who depend upon perception alone are
the few” (Glimcher 2012). Martin counted herself amongst the few who turned to perception
over intellection.
Nancy Princenthal writes that it would be a mistake to think of Martin in terms of being a
‘mystic’; and she continues, saying that “it would be a gross error to see in her work symptoms
of illness. Even less was it a cure” (Princenthal 10). Princenthal, Martin’s most recent
biographer,174 gets this wrong. Depending on how you define ‘mystic’, I think it is wholly
possible to see Martin in those terms. If we take ‘mystic’ to refer to someone “who believes in
the spiritual apprehension of truths that are beyond the intellect”,175 then Martin could be said to
align with that definition. More often, however, the term or label ‘mystic’ is used to describe
someone who professes ‘other-worldly contact’ with some ‘higher order’, which is something
altogether different. I don’t think Martin’s art functioned in any way as a cure, as such. Neither
Buddhism nor Daoism, of any stripe, are designed to function as a ‘cure’ for mental illness. But I
have argued previously that Martin’s artistic praxis took the form of a very disciplined, onepointed meditative concentration or tranquility practice, which tamed the voices in her head,
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however temporarily, and allowed her to work. By focusing her attention on the extraordinary
preciseness, delicacy, and repetition demanded by her grids and lines, a spaciousness of mind
develops which would have been liberating.
Martin’s artistic discipline, requiring one-pointed concentration, is not unlike many Zeninspired secular, or lay practices found in Japan, with a heritage dating to the late twelfth
century; e.g., Kyūdō (archery), Kenjutsū (swordsmanship), Ikebana (flower-arranging), Nō
performances and music, Haiku poetry (evolving into its present form from around the
seventeenth century), Shodō (calligraphy), and Chadō (the Way of Tea, which gave rise to a new
type of ‘integrated’ Zen expression in everyday life).176 Hisamatsu writes that in the successive
periods of Japanese history, “beginning with the Kamakura [1192-1333 CE], [and then continuing
through the later] Muromachi [1338-1573], and Momoyama-Edo [periods, 1573-1603; 1603-1868]
… Zen…deeply permeated the everyday life of the people. Indeed, it came to have so strong an
influence that it affected the entire age” (Hisamatsu 25). This same secular Zen sensibility,
coupled with an attendant rigorous discipline, was the touchstone in the everyday life and art
practice of Agnes Martin.
Notably, Martin never adopted the slightest veneer of an ‘Orientalist’ approach to her life
view and practice which came to be so profoundly influenced by these ancient Chinese and
Japanese teachings. Summarizing how she thought of herself vis-à-vis her art, Arne Glimcher,
her later gallerist, recalled that Martin once remarked, in a manner which recalls her early
childhood spent on the plains of Saskatchewan, “A potato farmer stands in front of his harvest of
potatoes and says, ‘These are my potatoes’. Well, they are no more his potatoes than these are
my paintings. We are merely the locus where it happened” (Glimcher 2012).
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The empty-sublime is always pregnant with possibilities, but always empty of itself. And
from within this fecund emptiness, the art of Rauschenberg, Laib, and Martin has emerged. Jason
Wirth, writing about the great contemporary Zen master and calligrapher, Fukushima Keidō
Rōshi, explains that “Fukushima’s calligraphy is a quiet storm, a serene volcano, a
compassionate and gentle eruption of the vast energy or ki of the Zen mind” (Wirth 2). These
are apt metaphors for the empty-sublime praxis of Rauschenberg, Laib, and Martin.
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Conclusion
From ‘Je ne sais quoi’ to Śūnyatā.

I.

I have argued throughout this dissertation that the sublime, as it has been presented and
interpreted in its long history within western discourse, is a failed project that has resulted only
in contradictions, incoherencies, and cul-de-sacs. In response, and to make sense of all the
confusion, I have argued that through applying a method of dialectic inclusivity, which takes up
the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka Buddhist proposition of emptiness, or śūnyatā, an understanding of
the sublime, as both a theory and an experience, can be reached. The value of employing this
method of investigation is manifold:
1) A dialectic of inclusivity opens what has been a troubled and convoluted discourse to
new ideas and new paths of discovery. The Western discourse surrounding the sublime embodies
problematic elements of contemporary culture, with its emphasis on terror, drama, enthusiastic
passion, and the spectacle—all heightened states of emotion. Broadening the discourse to include
sources outside the traditional western canon will greatly enhance possibilities of different
paradigms of thinking. Furthermore, the timing of an opening up of the western canon to
embrace the inclusivity of all the world’s traditions of critical thought is prescient.
2) The ideas and theses found within the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka project expand the
possibilities for understanding the thesis of the sublime and the sublime experience (as well as a
host of other western philosophical conundrums related to the phenomenology of mind). The
Prajñāpāramitāsūtras literature elucidates the assertion that the sublime experience is not only
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available in dramatic, overwhelming, or terror-filled events, but also in the simplest of daily
activities.
3) The concept of the emptiness of the nature of mind and of all phenomena is not a
particularly radical idea in and of itself. Within the western canon, however, where the focus is
‘out there’ rather than ‘in here’, it may seem to be so. But with an integration of the
understanding of emptiness, a shift is possible in the millennia-long western myopia of viewing
the world solely through a lens colored and distorted by the overriding concept of an Almighty
God, and the subsequent “man made in his image”.177 Such a shift could herald a coherent,
inclusive philosophical project, acknowledging the interdependent and coöriginated world we all
inhabit and share, and to which so many can contribute their multi-faceted, brilliant voices.
In what follows, I will briefly review the salient points of the preceding five chapters,
beginning with a review of three visual artists who, I have argued, create their art from an
experience, or space, of empty-sublime. I then review the early pronouncements on, and
interpretations of the sublime by Longinus, and then Boileau. The next section reviews the
remarkable influence John Dennis exerted on the unfolding hermeneutics of the sublime. From
Dennis’ enthusiastic terror we move to Kant’s dynamic and mathematical sublime. However,
Guy Sircello argues, in the next section, that the entire proposition of the sublime is
problematical, riven with incoherencies and contradictions. The following section answers the
question: How, then, are we to understand the sublime experience? through an exposition of the
Yogācāra-Madhyamaka thesis of emptiness, or śūnyatā. The chapter ends with a brief
recapitulation of two foundational Buddhist Mahāyāna texts which elucidate the idea and
ramifications of emptiness: first, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna; and second, from
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the corpus of the Prajñāparamitāsūtras literature, the short and pithy Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya, or
Heart Sūtra, of uncertain, although early, provenance as well.
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II.
The Empty-Sublime Artistic Praxis: Rauschenberg, Laib, and Martin

As I argued in the previous chapter, the artists Rauschenberg, Martin, and Laib have
created work from within a space of empty-sublime. The work of each one of these artists is
uniquely distinct. In this concluding section, I will turn to the artists’ own words (or, in the case
of Rauschenberg, to his friend and early mentor, John Cage) to paint a picture of their praxis.
Perhaps one can sense the emptiness and peace evoked in Laib’s meticulous pollen
installations, or in Martin’s extraordinarily disciplined and precisely executed grids and wide
horizontal stripes. But Rauschenberg’s work is more difficult to discern in terms of the emptiness
paradigm. This is because Rauschenberg worked from a space of complete openness, of nativus,
and with an apparent willingness to experiment, create, and fail, and keep going.
John Cage, in his 1961 essay, “ON ROBERT RAUSCHENBERG, ARTIST, AND HIS WORK”,
writes that “Over and over again I’ve found it impossible to memorize Rauschenberg’s paintings.
I keep asking, ‘Have you changed it?’ And then, noticing while I’m looking, it changes” (Cage:
102). And again, John Cage:
Beauty is now underfoot wherever we take the trouble to look. (This is an
American discovery.) Is when Rauschenberg looks an idea? Rather it is an
entertainment in which to celebrate infinity. Why did he make black paintings, then
white ones (coming up out of the South), red, gold ones (the gold ones were
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Christmas presents), ones of many colors, ones with objects attached? Why did he
make sculptures with rocks suspended? Talented?…
…
I know he put the paint on the tires. And he unrolled the paper on the city
street. But which one of us drove the car?…
…
These are the feelings Rauschenberg gives us: love, wonder, laughter,
heroism (I accept), fear, sorrow, anger, disgust, tranquility. …
…
Having made the empty canvases (A canvas is never empty.), Rauschenberg
became the giver of gifts. Gifts, unexpected and unnecessary, are ways of saying
Yes to how it is, a holiday. …
…
I am trying to check my habits of seeing, to counter them for the sake of
greater freshness. I am trying to be unfamiliar with what I’m doing. (98, 101, 103,
106, original emphasis)
Rauschenberg once commented about [Josef] Albers that “Albers’ rule was to make
order, but I only consider myself successful when I do something that resembles the lack of order
I sense” (Tomkins: 47).
In 2005, Rauschenberg remarked: “My career is unknown to me. Other people seem to
understand it, but I’m not that interested. I think it’s sort of indecent to have things so worked out
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that they end up like you thought they should. You think I want to be what I am? [Much laughter
at this.] You just have to expose yourself to more, and see what the consequences are” (289).
Asked to define the strongest element in his work, Rauschenberg responded:
“Perseverance, curiosity. That I don’t know where I’m going but I’ll get there on time” (289).

Turning now to Wolfgang Laib, Laib recounts:
When I started out with my first works, the milkstones and the pollen, I was living
in a very small village, totally isolated with my family and doing these works. … I
was so struck by these things because, for me, they were the most important things
in the world, and I wanted to show them from the beginning to as many people as
possible. It would have been sad for me to have them only for myself. It was like a
message. I found the pollen and the milk to be so world moving, to be culturally
important. It’s something very beautiful to have this experience collecting pollen
for myself, but then on the other side, I wanted many other people to participate in
this. (Tanguy: 4)
…
This work is concerned with something totally different in terms of your whole
meaning, what you think you have to do with your life, what you gain and what you
don’t gain, what is big and what is small, what is much and what is little—all these
things become the opposite of what we are used to, and it becomes a question of
everything and all. There is something other than what we see and think we achieve.
(Farrow: 12)
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…
[When I am collecting the pollen,] most probably it is what other people would call
meditation. If you concentrate on something enough, you reach the point where you
are no longer conscious of your own concentration. I think this is the state I am
longing for. (Farrow: 11)
…
…I’m not a painter who’s using pigments to create a painting. I use the milk and I
use the pollen or the beeswax, which I did not create. I could never create this beauty
of the pollen. So, the tragedy for me would be if I tried to make a painting out of
pollen. (Tanguy: 4)
Laib is an artist whose medium is the natural beauty of this world: milk, marble, pollen,
beeswax; each presented in the form of simple offerings, and thus revealing their natural wonder
and purity.

And next we turn to Agnes Martin, in her own words. In a mild rebuke to Barnett
Newman, Martin writes:
When we go to museums we do not just look, we make a definite response to the
work. As we look at it we are happier or more sad, more at peace or more depressed.
A work may stimulate yearning, helplessness, belligerence or remorse.
The cause of the response is not traceable in the work. An artist cannot and does
not prepare for a certain response. He does not consider the response but simply
follows his inspiration.
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Works of art are not purposely conceived. The response depends upon the
condition of the observer. (Martin: 18)
In Martin’s prose poem “Reflections”, Martin speaks about the flickering discursive mind, and
moments of ‘perfection’, as she calls them, which arise unexpectedly and fleetingly. These
moments of ‘perfection’ which Martin describes, are the experiences of emptiness, or śūnyatā.
[…] In our minds, there is awareness of perfection;
when we look with our eyes we see it,
and how it functions is mysterious to us and unavailable.
When we live our lives it’s something like a race—our minds
become concerned and covered over and we get depressed and
have to get away for a holiday.
And then sometimes there are moments of perfection
and in these moments we wonder why we ever thought life was difficult.
We think that at last our feet are on the right path and that we will not falter or fail.
We’re absolutely convinced we have the solution and then the moment is over.
Moments of awareness are not complete awareness,
just as moments of blindness are not completely blind.
[…] These experience of the mind are too quickly passed over and forgotten,
although startling moments of awareness are never forgotten.
[…] Moments of awareness of perfection and of inspiration are alike
except that inspirations are often directives to action.
[…] A work of art is successful when there is a hint of perfection present—
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at the slightest hint…the work is alive. (Martin: 31-2)
In one of Martin’s short ‘Notes’, she writes:
The silence on the floor of my house
Is all the questions and all the answers that have been known in the world
The sentimental furniture threatens the peace
The reflection of a sunset speaks loudly of days
(Martin: 16)

And finally, in the conclusion to her essay “On the Perfection Underlying Life”, Martin writes:
For those who are visual minded I will say: there seems to be a fine ship at anchor.
Fear is the anchor, convention is the chain, ghosts stalk the decks, the sails are filled
with Pride and the ship does not move.
But there are moments for all of us in which the anchor is weighed. Moments in
which we learn what it feels like to move freely, not held back by pride and fear.
Moments that can be recalled with all their fine flavor.
The recall of these moments can be stimulated by freeing experiences including the
viewing of works of art.
Artists try to maintain an atmosphere of freedom in order to represent the perfection
of those moments. And others searching for the meaning of art respond by recalling
their own free moments. (Martin: 74)
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III.
The Sublime: The Beginnings of an Enduring Conundrum

Paul Crowther argues that in the more recent, ‘fashionable re-appropriations’ of the
sublime by writers including Paul Guyer,178 Jacques Derrida,179 Paul de Man,180 and JeanFrançois Lyotard,181
Kant’s theory is put to use on the basis of, or in the service of, some much broader
set of theoretical interests [of the individual writer in question]. There is little or no
attempt to consider it in the context of possible tensions and distortions forced upon
it by the broader philosophical position embodied in Kant’s ethics and aesthetics.
Until this issue is clarified, I would suggest that our understanding of both Kant and
the status of sublimity as an aesthetic concept remain substantially incomplete.
(Crowther 2002: 3)
While Crowther gets it right as far as he goes, it is not simply in the distortions and
tensions found within Kant’s ethics and aesthetics more generally that we find deep problems
with the status and theory, and sheer possibility, of the experience of ‘the sublime’. A close and
thorough interrogation of ‘the sublime’, be it Longinus’ sublime or Lyotard’s, Boileau’s or
Dennis’ or Burke’s, reveals ontological incoherencies and epistemological contradictions which
cannot be easily resolved without resorting to a kind of sleight of hand to which carnival
magicians are sometimes (but not always) proficient. And it is to this sleight of hand that critics
such as Dennis, and philosophers such as Burke, Kant, et al., have resorted in explaining the
sublime moment; while variations on a theme have endured for many, many centuries. I call this
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a ‘sleight of hand’ because the logics simply do not hold up under even the most rudimentary
scrutiny. And it is altogether quite puzzling that it wasn’t until Professor Sircello shone a light on
the incoherencies and contradictions inherent in each and every chain of reasoning when positing
‘the sublime’, that the weak links were laid bare for all with eyes to see.
The concept of the ‘sublime’, i.e., that momentary, fleeting, and yet remarkable and
memorable experience of lightness, openness, and clarity which cannot be put into words, is
traditionally ascribed to the Roman or Greek thinker known to us as ‘Longinus’, writing in the
first-, or perhaps as late as the third-century CE. Writing in his only essay to have survived the
ravages of time, bookworms, and Christians—those bent on rooting out and destroying all
manner and evidence of so-called paganism—an essay which had no formal title, but which we
know as Περὶ Ὕψους, Peri hupsous (On Height, or On the Sublime), Longinus asserts that the
‘sublime’ can be found throughout the writings of the ancients, e.g., Homer, Sappho, Plato,
Demosthenes, and others working in a variety of genres. Indeed, James Porter writes that
“Contrary to contemporary views…the sublime does not suddenly appear out of the blue in the
first century BCE [with Caecilius’ now-lost essay] as a usable concept. The sublime pervades
much of antiquity;” Porter argues, “it has simply been hiding in the light. Longinus is a key to
understanding this inheritance—though hardly the solution to the problem” (Porter 2016b: xviii).
And as Porter insists, these earlier writers “are intentionally seeking to be sublime writers in
addition to being naturally sublime minds or spirits. In other words, they are sublime both by art
and by nature…” (xvii - xviii, original emphasis). Here Porter picks up Boileau’s cue: the
‘sublime’ is not a mere rhetorical or literary tool, but signals a deeper, philosophical nod to a
state of mind beyond normative reason, beyond thought, beyond imagination. As Longinus
writes, “For by some innate power the true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud
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exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy…” (Longinus §7, 120). This is territory which the ancients
had a hard time mapping. And that difficulty persists. The question begging a solution is: What,
exactly, is the sublime?
The early modern period responded to this apparent dilemma with the apposite rejoinder,
je ne sais quoi, ‘I know not what’, or, ‘I haven’t got a clue’. And while they were not kidding,
they were, at least, forthcoming with their confusion over the nature of the experience of the
sublime. Boileau sought to explain it this way in his consequential Préface (1674, revised in
1683 and, again in 1701) to his French translation of Longinus’ treatise:
It should be understood, then, that by the sublime, Longinus does not mean what
orators call sublime style, but the extraordinary and the marvelous which strikes us
in terms of language, and causes a work to carry away, ravish, transport us. The
sublime style always calls for grand words, but the sublime may be found in a single
thought, in a single image, in a single turn of phrase. A thing may be in the sublime
style and yet not be sublime… (Boileau 59-60, original emphasis)
Boileau understood that the sublime was more than a mere literary or rhetorical device.
Something more was happening in the realm of the mind which had not been adequately mapped
heretofore. But what, exactly, was happening was certainly not clear to Boileau. But he knew
that, whatever it was, it merited his attention, and ours.
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IV.
John Dennis and the ‘Enthusiastic Passion-Terror’ Turn

John Dennis (1657-1734), an Augustan dramatist and critic writing shortly after the
appearance of Boileau’s translation and Préface, criticized Longinus for not spelling out for us
what the sublime is, and instead focusing on the effects which the sublime experience produces.
Dennis sought to correct this ‘omission’ by penning his own definition of the sublime in his The
Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry (1701):
[Sublimity] is never without enthusiastic passion: for the sublime is nothing else
but a great thought, or great thoughts moving the soul from its ordinary situation by
the enthusiasm which naturally attends them. … Now I have endeavoured to show
what it is in Poetry that works these effects. So that take the Cause and the Effects
together, and you have the Sublime. (Dennis/Ashfield & de Bolla 33-4, 37)
Dennis explains that the effects the sublime produces or causes in “the minds of men”, those
effects which he alludes to above, which include: “admiration and surprise; a noble pride, and a
noble vigour, an invincible force, transporting the soul from its ordinary situation, and a
transport, and a fullness of joy mingled with astonishment” (34). These effects and experiences
do coincide with those described by Longinus. However, Dennis diverges dramatically and
significantly from Longinus and Boileau when he attributes these effects/experiences to the
cause he describes as enthusiastic passion, which, for Dennis, is interchangeable with what he
also calls enthusiastic terror. In Dennis’ The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (1704), Dennis
argues (unconvincingly) that this enthusiastic passion/terror is established by Longinus as the
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“second source of sublimity” (37), produced most strongly by “religious ideas”. Longinus has
been saying all along, Dennis asserts, that “sublimity is never without passion…”, and then
further states that “ideas producing terror, contribute extremely to the sublime” (37). Here
Dennis lays the groundwork for the sublime experience consisting of a bifurcation of terror and
passion, predicated upon the notion that the terror invoked by/as sublimity is attributable to an
all-powerful, terrible, wrathful Divine. Passion, for Dennis, is never far from terror—Divine
terror.
With this move, Dennis strays a long way from the Longinian/Boileau sublime, and
injects wholly new (and I would contend, completely foreign) elements not found in Longinus’
treatise nor in Boileau’s Préface, viz. a sublime defined as an experience of, if not the evocation
of a passion-terror in union with extreme fear in the face of an encounter with what Dennis
paints as a Sartrean type of bottomless abyss, the realm of a wrathful, vengeful Divine. This is
obviously not the joy and exaltation that Longinus writes of, nor the ‘fullness of joy mingled
with astonishment’ which Dennis had written about several years earlier, nor that experience
which Rauschenberg recounts from his process of artistic creation. And yet, despite its
completely questionable roots, this notion of the sublime as a manifold of passion-terror, or painpleasure, has persisted for more than three hundred years in various and sundry descriptions of
the sublime and the sublime experience. And for this reason, Dennis stands as a key player in the
genealogy of the hermeneutics of, and the evolving developments attached to the
(mis)understandings, or (mis)perceptions, of ‘the sublime’.
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V.
All (Sublime) Roads Lead to Kant

Longinus, Boileau, and Burke (et al.) notwithstanding, all roads inevitably lead to Kant
when discussing the sublime. After the appearance of Kant’s third Critique and the “Analytic of
the Sublime”, discourse around the sublime was in support of, opposed to, or a variation on
Kant’s arguments, in one form or another. And this is in spite of Crowther’s criticism that ‘our
understanding of both Kant and the status of sublimity as an aesthetic concept remain
substantially incomplete’. This may well be so, but then, Kant is hardly the last word on the
sublime.
While Kant argues that “…we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we term any
object of nature sublime, although we may with perfect propriety call many such objects
beautiful. [. . .] All that we can say is that the object lends itself to the presentation of a sublimity
discoverable in the mind” (CJ, §23, ¶245, p. 76, original emphasis),182 he equivocates later in the
Analytic of the Sublime, writing that various great forces in nature, as well as awe-inspiring
architecture of the likes of St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome (with which he was completely
unfamiliar, venturing but once from his perch in Königsberg during his entire lifetime),183 can
trigger, or ‘excite’, as Kant says, our ‘feeling’ of the sublime moment.184 Kant attempts an
elucidation of these comments made in §23, writing in §28 that:
Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our
own mind, in so far as we may become conscious of our superiority over nature
within, and thus also over nature without us (as exerting influence upon us).
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Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which
challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and it is only
under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable
of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that being which inspires deep respect in
us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is
harboured in us of judging that might without fear, and of regarding our vocation
as sublimely exalted above it. (CJ, §28, ¶264, p. 94, original emphasis.)
Here Kant embraces Dennis’ notion of the sublime as being inspired by, and inextricably
linked with the Divine; our facility of overcoming our fear of the might of nature coming through
the transcendental grace of the Divine; and our deep respect for the Divine inspired by our
capability of attaining the sublime experience, which is synonymous with (a union with) the
Divine. (Technically for Kant, the Divine is the noumenal ‘freedom’ at the ground of our
subjectivity, but we project it onto nature in aesthetic judgment. In the latter, i.e., our aesthetic
judgment, we sense the God within as the God without, so to speak.) The scaffolding here is very
similar to Dennis’, with the difference being Kant’s formulation of our confidence to overcome
our fear of the awesome might of nature being divinely inspired, rather than the Divine itself
being a source of fear and terror, as we find in Dennis’ formulation. Still, Kant’s ‘sublime’
obtains from humankind’s relation vis-à-vis the Divine; from a dichotomous construct of our
everlasting existence, i.e. eternalism, in contradistinction to non-existence, or nihilism.
Within this broad framework, Kant conceives of the sublime as divisible into a binary of,
first, a mathematical nature; and, secondly, of a dynamic nature. The mathematical sublime is
explained under the headings of quantity and quality, and the dynamically sublime under the
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heading of relation. Briefly, Kant holds that the grand in nature, which overwhelms, presents to
the imagination the unpresentable, which the imagination is unable to process. However, our
sense of overwhelm is but momentary, as reason immediately takes hold and formulates
ratiocinative comprehension of the incomprehensible. The incommensurable becomes
apprehensible, and we are again standing on firm ground. Or so argues Kant, but are we?
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VI.
Is a Coherent Theory of the Sublime Even Possible?

Given the amount of time and space which philosophers and critics have devoted to
discourses around the merits and characteristics of the sublime, one might wonder why the
question: Is a philosophically coherent theory of the sublime even possible? was not posed in,
say, the early eighteenth-century, when the sublime was first being seriously examined and
debated. It is frankly astonishing to think that great Western philosophical minds of modern
times, including Burke, Kant, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and then more recent scholars and
thinkers including Samuel Monk, Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-François
Lyotard, Paul Crowther, and others, have not, in the course of their work, stumbled over the
glaring paradoxes and incoherencies fundamental to the theory and structure of the ‘sublime’
since the time of Boileau’s translation of Longinus’ treatise in the late seventeenth-century, and
Dennis’, et al., subsequent hermeneutics thereafter.
It wasn’t until 1993 that the (often unarticulated) epistemological and ontological
assumptions found throughout the various theories of, and commentaries on the sublime were
called into question with the publication of the paper “How Is a Theory of the Sublime
Possible?”, by Guy Sircello.185 Suddenly, the ontological and epistemological tensions
previously explained away, or often simply ignored, did not hold up under Dr. Sircello’s close
scrutiny.
Sircello begins with a statement, or definition of the problem, viz. that the notion that
“what I take to be a common, if not very well considered or articulated opinion that, because
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sublime experience often professes to ‘see’ beyond human powers of knowledge and description,
the sublime is inaccessible to rational thought” (Sircello 541). This deconstruction of the
definition of the sublime serves, then, as the basic ground of Sircello’s argument which proceeds,
first, by stating that “there is—or…we should look for—some kind of ‘natural core’ in sublime
experience that is distinguishable from various personal or cultural elaborations and
embroiderings…[Such a] ‘natural core’ will manifest what sublime experience at bottom has to
tell us—if anything at all—either about the world or about ourselves” (Sircello 542). This is
indeed the central question: What is this ‘natural core’ of the sublime experience? And, what, if
anything, does the sublime experience have to tell us?
There is obviously something to it all, as the sublime has bedevilled philosophers and
critics alike for centuries. Sircello argues that there most definitely is, and asserts that it is
possible to identify two key themes running through the long and varied discourse about, and in
consequence of the sublime: first is “the [central] theme of epistemological transcendence”
(542); and the second—which proceeds from the interpretation of epistemological
transcendence—is ontological transcendence (545). The theme of epistemological transcendence
obtains from the assumption or claim that “human mental powers in general are revealed (in the
experience of moment [sic]) to have radically limited access to what, provisionally and for want
of a more precise designation, I’ll call ‘reality’ ” (543). If by ‘reality’ Sircello means the
noumenal ‘freedom’ at the ground of our subjectivity, then he is taking his cue directly from
Kant. And if this is so, then this gives rise to one of the paradoxes (or incoherencies, if you will)
of the sublime moment: the “claim to see into the limitations of human powers of knowledge and
description is somehow to transcend those limitations” (543). Here Sircello identifies the thread
which runs through the entire sublime project, which is what he defines as ‘epistemological
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transcendence’. Sircello illustrates this point by citing passages from literary sources including
William Wordsworth’s The Prelude (1799, 1805), and Laozi’s Daodejing (from much, much
earlier: ca. fifth century BCE) that, in several instances, echo what Sircello describes when
referring to the sublime as “that which is beyond cognitive and descriptive powers” (543), i.e.,
that which is beyond or outside the capability of our normative discursive thought. If we accept
Sircello’s preceding argument as valid, viz., that we indeed possess the ability to ‘see into [and
therefore beyond] the limitations of human powers of knowledge and description’, then this
infers that there is no limitation at all, and that access to ‘reality’, or noumena is available to us.
This would then indicate that the commonly accepted Kantian arguments about the ‘limitations
of human powers of knowledge and description…’ and experience, are mistaken. In fact, this is
exactly what the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka projects argues, as I have cited previously, and is the
missing link in Sircello’s thesis.
Sircello distills his main argument into six points:
i)

An experience of the sublime presents the object of the experience, i.e., the
sublime, as epistemologically inaccessible.

ii) An experience of the sublime, insofar as it presents the sublime as
epistemologically inaccessible, is correct about the sublime.
iii) The sublime, as an object of experience, is epistemologically inaccessible.
iv) A theory of the sublime is a theory of the object of an experience of the sublime.
v) Any true theory of the sublime constitutes epistemological access to the object
of the experience of the sublime and thus to the sublime. [However, due to the
veracity of iii. above, we must therefore conclude that:]

277
vi) A true theory of the sublime is impossible. (Sircello: 545, original emphasis)
Examining Sircello’s logic point by point, we first consider his proposition that “an
experience of the sublime presents the object of the experience, i.e., the sublime, as
epistemologically inaccessible”. This interpretation begins from the first premise that “(the
experience of) radically limited access to reality” which then proceeds into “a thesis about (the
experience of) an object, or perhaps realm, that is inaccessible to human powers of knowledge or
description” (545). It is by virtue of this direct and simple line of logic that Sircello concludes
that “no (true) theory of the sublime is possible” (545).
Sircello’s second point is that “an experience of the sublime, insofar as it presents the
sublime as epistemologically inaccessible, is correct about the sublime” (545, original
emphasis). This point, Sircello maintains, is implicit in all sublime discourse. This takes into
account the apparent fact that because we have “no access to the sublime outside of the sublime
experience” (545, original emphasis), we must take at face value and adjudge as valid, all
accounts of the sublime, such as Wordsworth’s and Laozi’s. However, Sircello states that this
point “does not presuppose that the sublime ‘exists’” (545), or what this sublime might be, but
only that there are accounts of the ‘sublime experience’. Unfortunately, Sircello does not
elucidate his comment above on the existence or non-existence of the sublime in his essay.
Following then from points i. and ii., point iii. maintains that “the sublime, as an object of
experience, is epistemologically inaccessible” (545). And because the sublime is the object of the
experience of the sublime, therefore, it follows that (point iv.) “a theory of the sublime is a theory
of the object of an experience of the sublime” (545); which would seem to indicate that (as stated
in point v.,) “any true theory of the sublime constitutes epistemological access to the object of the

278
experience of the sublime and thus to the sublime” (545). However, point iii. has already
established that ‘the sublime, as an object of experience, is epistemologically inaccessible’, and
therefore impossible. Point v. is therefore contradictory. From the previous five points of this
logical exercise, Sircello, in his final point vi., declares that “a true theory of the sublime [free of
contradictions and incoherencies] is impossible” (545, my emphasis).
Sircello argues that the notion of epistemological transcendence, which anchors his first
point above, implies an ontological transcendence as well. Because, he explains, “it is not
plausible to assert or imply that the sublime experience presents the sublime both as an object
that is epistemologically inaccessible and as possibly not existing” (545, original emphasis). And
by this, Sircello is getting down to the nut of the problem. Obviously, if the object does not exist,
the question of epistemological inaccessibility is then a moot point. But more importantly for our
project, what is then happening if there is ‘no object which exists’? This is a radical notion, and
one which is addressed in the thesis of śūnyatā; this, however, has never been addressed in the
Western canon before.
Sircello posits that “the full (hypothetical) interpretation of epistemological
transcendence…should be that sublime experience represents something as existing that is
inaccessible to the epistemological powers of human beings…which transcends that of
humankind and all of humankind’s possible environments…” (545, original emphasis). This is
what Sircello is calling his thesis of ontological transcendence, and which he says obtains from
the interpretation expressed in his first point, viz. that ‘an experience of the sublime presents the
object of the experience, i.e. the sublime, as epistemologically inaccessible’. To determine if this
thesis is valid, Sircello advises that we “inquire whether the sublime experience [as generally
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situated in the European tradition between 1675 and 1825] does indeed present a kind or level of
being as existing that is epistemologically inaccessible” (546). The philosophers and critics
writing during this period generally present the sublime as a transcendent realm or experience,
with this realm or experience usually taking the guise of God or a divine power, as we saw in our
earlier discussions of Dennis and Kant. And as Sircello notes, it is not uncommon that a writer
will treat the transcendent realm as that which remains, to us, epistemologically inaccessible.
However, the important point here is, as Sircello writes, that “none of the discourses that
represent a transcendent ontological realm consistently treats [the transcendent ontological
realm] as epistemologically inaccessible” (546, original emphasis), whether if, in the particular
discourse, the representation of the transcendent reality is implied as epistemologically
transcendent or not.
Jane Forsey elucidates Sircello’s basic argument for us, writing that Sircello’s
first theme interprets ‘the experience of the sublime’ as denoting an experience of
an object, although it leaves open the question of what this object might be, or
whether it indeed exists (p.545), referring instead to ‘reality’ at large. The second
theme, what Sircello called ‘ontological transcendence’, addresses this object
directly and suggests that sublime experience represents something as existing that
is inaccessible to our cognitive powers, something ‘on a level of being… which
transcends that of humankind and all of humankind’s possible environments.
(Sircello: 545; Forsey/Clewis: 321)
What are the philosophical ramifications, then, of the open question of there being no existing
object in the equation of the sublime experience? And what are we to think of ‘the experience of
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the sublime’ which refers to something ‘on a level of being’… to ‘reality’ at large, and not
simply to an object? What is going on here? This objectless experience is, I maintain, the
experience of the nature of our mind, viz. emptiness, śūnyatā, completely open, lucid knowing,
completely free of intuition, imagination, and reason. This is what I call the empty-sublime.
Sircello makes a strong final argument that, “just as it is impossible to have a visual
experience that presents an invisible object, it is impossible to have any kind of experience at all
that presents an object or realm that is in no way epistemologically accessible. Therefore, to say
(or imply or suggest) that I have had an experience of such a description is to say or imply or
suggest what is, and must be, false” (547, original emphasis). And Sircello concludes that
sublime experiences cannot simply be fantasies or dreams, in which anything goes.
For if they are simply such fantasies—and here is a small argument for this very
deep assumption—they have no philosophical meaning whatsoever. For only if
sublime experiences can be seen to tell us something (true or plausible) about ‘the
world’ or ‘ourselves’, and/or about what we can do or be, do they become of
philosophical interest. (547, original emphasis)
Within discourses on the sublime, Forsey writes, “we grasp at and fail to achieve an
understanding of some notion of ‘reality’. This is Sircello’s main premise: that sublime
experience embodies a certain kind of cognitive failure. In these moments we become aware of
our limitations; whatever we construe this broad notion of reality to be, it remains tantalizingly
out of reach” (Forsey: 320). The apprehension of the nature of the experience remains, as Forsey
says, ‘tantalizingly out of reach’—so close, and yet, seemingly so far. It is out of reach for the
very reason that “as it has been historically formulated [the sublime] is simply not possible”
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(Forsey: 324, my emphasis). But to be clear, the experience of the sublime moment, and the
apprehension of empty-sublime, is very much possible. It is the historical epistemological and
ontological construct which belies the sublime’s absurdity. Forsey concludes by positing that
The fundamental questions of a tradition—What kinds of objects are sublime? What
does the sublime tell us about ourselves as subjects? and, centrally, What does
sublime experience illuminate about the limitations of our access to the world?—
have no purchase in a purely phenomenological or emotional account [of the
sublime]. This is deeply unsatisfying because if we accept this option, we must
conclude that a theory of the sublime such as we have historically striven for is
simply out of reach. (Forsey: 327)
And this must be a deeply unsatisfying conclusion for Forsey, proposing no alternative solution,
or way out, to the problems postulated in her essay, nor those posed by Sircello. Forsey seems to
conclude that this leaves us adrift of any useful philosophical theory of the sublime.
And thus, the number of questions left unanswered about the sublime is the crux of the
matter. A host of philosophical luminaries have weighed in on the sublime over the past 300
years, wrestling with what appears as a ‘cognitive failure’; an inexplicable phenomenological
reality that remains ‘tantalizingly out of reach’; an objectless/subjectless experience which, while
illuminated by Sircello, has taken us no closer to a resolution of the problem. What if the sublime
moment can be shown to be not a ‘cognitive failure’, but an experience of lucid clarity? That the
objectless/subjectless experience is the actual experience of the true nature of our mind,
absolutely free of concepts, an emptiness which has remained undisclosed due to Western
philosophical/conceptual limitations. Perhaps, if we engage an altogether different conceptual
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scaffolding, the proposition that is ‘the sublime’ can be opened up and understood in new and
intriguing ways.
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VII.
What Is Emptiness (Śūnyatā)?
The teaching of śūnyatā is not actually all that outrageous; it is very simple and ordinary.
-Chögyam Trungpa186

Emptiness is the key to understanding the sublime, for the sublime experience is nothing
other than an experience of emptiness. This is the key that Sircello and Forsey were missing in
their scrutiny of the historical notions of the sublime, and how those notions might be applied to
an understanding of the sublime today. The epistemic problems which Sircello identifies and
wrestles with within in the construct of the sublime do not obtain in considering emptiness. Jan
Westerhoff explains that “Essentialism about epistemic procedures is thus replaced [in the
discourse on emptiness] by contextualism: procedures can give us knowledge in some contexts,
but not in others, without ceasing to be means of knowledge” (Westerhoff 2009: 17). This
contextualist account of epistemology therefore “allows for means of knowledge but does not
assume that they exist intrinsically” (17).
So, what is this emptiness, or śūnyatā? Westerhoff says: “The notion of emptiness
(śūnyatā) denotes precisely the absence of svabhāva …the term svabhāva [is] often translated as
‘inherent existence’ or ‘own-being’” (19). Svabhāva is, obviously, a difficult concept to discuss,
due to the fact that “svabhāva does not have any straightforward equivalent among the concepts
discussed in the history of Western philosophy” (20). However, if we turn to the Buddhist
Abhidharma textual tradition, we find “three important conceptual dimensions to svabhāva: a
cognitive [epistemological] dimension, an ontological dimension, and a semantic dimension”
(22). We are not interested, within the present scope of this project, to delve into a detailed
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examination of svabhāva, nor is it necessary here to pursue this particular subject further. But
suffice it to say that svabhāva encompasses all that we perceive and experience and take to be
‘me’. Likewise, the experience of ‘me’ engenders the apperception of ‘mine’ and of ‘other’. And
it is the belief in, and attachment to all things svabhāva, of ‘me’ and ‘mine’, which obscures the
clear lucidity of emptiness, or śūnyatā, from shining through. It could be said that svabhāva is
the very opposite of (or impediment to the experience of) emptiness, because the experience of
emptiness, śūnyatā, is the experience of non-reference point; we do not refer back to ‘this’, nor
do we refer back to ‘that’. Trungpa explains that “the experience of non-reference point is not a
process of collecting reassurances so that you could be non-referential. It is just simple and
straight non-reference point—absolutely open. […] It is a very simple personal experience”
(Trungpa 2014:132). The external, phenomenal world, and our perceptions of it, are varied, vivid
and colorful; yet empty. The internal world of emotions is also endlessly vivid and riveting, but
also completely and utterly empty. “Absolutely empty means that there is nothing particularly to
do”, Trungpa explains (133), which seems to be what Rauschenberg was alluding to when he
remarked that “The duty or beauty of a painting is that there is no reason to do it nor any reason
not to. It can be done as a direct act or contact with the moment, and that is the moment you are
awake and moving” (Hunter: 121). I hope it is clear, however, that this view has nothing in
common with Sartre’s nihilistic existentialism, where there is no openness, no clarity, no
lucidity, and no joy in being in the world with other beings.
The experience of emptiness can indeed be experienced when we experience moments of
enthusiastic terror or astonishment, of overwhelm or abjection. These experiences provide vivid
contrasts to the experience of emptiness which often immediately follows. However, it is also
true that the “śūnyatā experience takes place in very simple moments of life. At the point when
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our expectations are fading out and future possibilities have not yet turned up, there is a faint
little gap in which there is the possibility of some unknown factor taking place” (Trungpa
2014:141). We miss these ‘faint little gaps’ again and again as we go about our day, as the
contrast is not as extraordinary as we might find in the gap experienced following a moment of
astonishment, a moment of awe, or a moment of enthusiastic terror, as described by Burke, Kant,
and Dennis. In these raw emotional moments, we experience a gap of utter openness and nonreference point; the contrast to the preceding moment of awe or astonishment or terror is great,
and so much more noticeable than in the ‘very simple moments of life’. And yet, this gap is the
same gap of emptiness we might experience while drinking a cup of tea. Opening the possibility
of the sublime experience to the simple, mundane activity of making a cup of tea, or looking at a
rose in the garden, is revolutionary to the question ‘What is the sublime?’. The experience of the
gap of emptiness is always available.
Śūnyatā is neither a portale into the divine nor into the profane; nor into the realm of the
religious, nor into the mystical. “It is what it is”, Trungpa explains in his signature tout droit
manner. “However, it covers a lot of ground. It is the first clear thinking and conclusion about
reality in the history of the human mind” (145, my emphasis). Śūnyatā reveals our phenomenal
world clearly and vividly. This is the ever-elusive ‘freedom’ that Western philosophers have
been discussing and searching for, for millennia. Beyond constantly fixating on this and that, i.e.
‘me’ and ‘mine’ and ‘other’, a “greater freedom can be experienced that is not particularly a
vacant or a blank state of being, but a much clearer, unpossessed state of being. It is total
spaciousness, which you cannot actually label. Once you begin to label it”, Trungpa explains,
“you lose it. You become non-spacious immediately” (146). And this is precisely what has
happened in and throughout discourses about the sublime since at least the time of Boileau. In
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attempting to conceptualize the experience that is the sublime moment, an experience that is of
complete, unbounded spaciousness, the experience is lost to efforts to comprehend what
happened, to make sense of it, to conceptualize it, and then to report it. And there has never been
the context within the history of Western philosophy which allows an understanding of śūnyatā
as being a (non-theistic) experience of completely open space, that is to say, the nature of mind.
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VIII.
Transcendent Wisdom and Emptiness:
The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras Corpus and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās of Nāgārjuna:

In Chapter Three, I surveyed two primary, classical Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. This
investigation, when undertaken within the discourse of the sublime, serves to elucidate those
aspects of the sublime which have so far escaped common understanding. The first is from the
vast and extensive Prajñāpāramitāsūtras corpus which elucidates the complete thesis of
emptiness, or śūnyatā: viz. the Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya, or Heart Sūtra, by an unknown author
and provenance.187 The second is the classic, foundational text of the Mahāyāna tradition,
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamkakārikās, or The Root Stanzas of the Middle Way, from ca. the
second century CE; a remarkable explication of the view of emptiness, which I employ in this project to
illustrate the transcendental aspect of the sublime. As background to the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras

literature, Karl Brunnhölzl explains that “when we speak about prajñāpāramitā, we are talking
about our mind and its basic capacity to realize how things actually are beyond superficial
appearances” (Brunnhölzl 2012:23). “Prajñā”, Brunnhölzl continues, “is the active
inquisitiveness of our mind, its basic curiosity of wanting to know and wanting to find out how
things really are” (23). Prajñā is our inherent discriminating, inquisitive intelligence and
curiosity. “It is the ‘best of cognitive mind’, the ‘best of cognition’, and the ‘best of knowledge’,
all put together. … [Prajñā] is the state of knowingness, the state of wakefulness” (Trungpa
2013: 256-57), and a discriminating awareness that actually cuts through conceptual thinking and
reveals the fundamental state that is naturally empty, clear, and lucid. And the other side of that,
Trungpa explains,
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is being unable to see or experience precision; it is being ignorant and wallowing in
confusion. Discriminating does not mean taking sides. It is not that you like
something and you accept it, or that you dislike something and you reject it. In this
case, discriminating refers to having tremendous precision, and being able to see
the sharp edges of situations. Everything is very bright and beautiful. Although you
do not take sides, you still have a sense of what is what, which is which, when is
when, how is how, and why is why. (260-61).
Without the discriminating wisdom, the prajñā which sees things as they are, the proposition of
the sublime is all but moribund in contradictory logics. And yet, once engaged in the project of
looking at and discriminating reality, this same prajñā incessantly “questions who we are and
what we perceive” (Brunnhölzl 2012:26). With much exertion and persistence, prajñā discovers
emptiness; or perhaps more accurately, the dedicated cultivation of prajñā allows emptiness to
dawn, and with it, compassion. Emptiness, then, “is not about some thing called ‘emptiness’ that
we have to realize, but it is about letting go of everything that prevents us from realizing what
the true nature of our mind actually is” (30). Emptiness is the true nature of our mind, and of all
phenomena. Which means that there are not two worlds, as Kant argued, viz. a world of
phenomena and a world of noumena; rather, there is only non-dual emptiness, which is the key to
the thesis of empty-sublime.
The Madhyamaka project outlines three disciplines to be undertaken in order to apply
śūnyatā, or emptiness to, and realize śūnyatā in, everyday life. These three disciplines, known by
their Sanskrit equivalents, are: śila, samādhi, and prajñā. Briefly, śila is the moral approach to
discipline. Samādhi is meditative equipoise, and is described by Trungpa, in this context, as
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having “good control over your mind, over your mental events, and over the products of those
mental events” (Trungpa 2013:204-05), constantly referring back to, and recalling the meditation
practices of śamatha and vipaśyanā.188 And the third discipline is prajñā. Prajñā in this case
refers to wisdom, or “knowledge without [the reference point of] a self” (Trungpa 2003a: 343),
which employs the disciplines of great compassion and clarity, or lucidity, in order to see clearly
and act in complete synchronicity with the situation. And, by applying compassion, clarity, and
skillfulness, “you finally begin to know the meaning of peace. You actually can get into the
nitty-gritty of it” (Trungpa 2013: 205). Trungpa elucidates this idea of ‘peace’ further, writing
that “it is interesting that after discussing śūnyatā—form is empty, emptiness is form, form is no
other than emptiness…and so on… In this instance [it] is not just throwing away but, having
thrown everything away, we begin to feel the living quality of peace. …And this particular peace
is not feeble peace, but it has a strong character, an invincible quality, an unshakable quality. …
We do not fear, we do not try to defend ourselves at all” (Trungpa 2003b: 147).
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IX.
The Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya, or Heart Sūtra

The Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya, or Heart Sūtra, comes down to us as a Chinese
translation—of what was presumably an original Sanskrit text—made by a Central Asian monk,
Chih-ch’ien, sometime between 200-250 CE,189 and originally titled the Prajñāpāramitā
Dhāraṇī.190 The Heart Sūtra condenses the whole of the Mahāyāna Buddhist project into thirtyfive densely packed, pithy lines. Red Pine characterizes it as “Buddhism in a nutshell” (Red Pine
2004: 5). Prajñāpāramitā, or the Perfection of Wisdom, or, per Conze, The Heart of Perfect
Wisdom,191 “is that, the perfect cognizing (ā-jānanā) of all dharmas192—therefore it is called
‘wisdom’. ‘Wisdom’…is [quite simply] a cognition without an (objective) sphere” (Conze: 2002:
18). Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso explains that “discriminating wisdom, realizing the way
everything exists, is equivalent to discriminative wisdom realizing the non-existence of a self, or
in other words, emptiness” (Gyamtso 2000: 339).
The essence of the Heart Sūtra can be said to be the postulation of ‘non-reference point’.
Every line of this brief Dhāraṇī cuts through any idea of, or allegiance to, a point of reference
that we might seek to grasp as affirming, or confirming, the ground of our being-ness; “it is gone
forever” (Trungpa 2013: 131). There is “no this, no that, and no this-and-that together” (130).193
This is what is known in the Mahāyāna teachings as the ‘three-fold purity’. That is to say, in
emptiness neither I, nor other, nor any action engaging the two truly exist as unitary,
independently existing phenomenon, or self-same identities. And “by breaking down the this and
that reference point, this and that become it. So, in the actual shunyata [sic] experience, there is
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no longer any discrimination” or distinction between what appeared as two (130). This
experience of “non-reference point comes from [the development of] openness, friendliness, and
warmth. It comes from compassion, which is absolutely necessary, and compassion comes from
awareness” which is cultivated through the practice of vipaśyanā (Tib. lhag mthong)
meditation.194 “You have to have an awareness of thisness and the nonexistence of thisness, and
an awareness of thatness and the non-existence of thatness” (130). However, it is important to
note that the postulation of non-reference point does not imply “just going berserk and getting so
confused that you don’t know who is who or what is what” (132). And I do not believe that the
Heart Sūtra leaves one with this impression. The Heart Sūtra is all about sharpening one’s
prajñā, which inescapably legislates against further confusion, and in fact points the way to the
attenuation, and finally the complete cessation, of all confusion. “Non-reference point is an
intelligent perspective in which you begin to see that nothing is its own primary
spokesperson…things do not speak for themselves; they are just an echo of themselves” (132).
Earlier in this dissertation, I quoted Red Pine’s excellent translation of the Heart Sūtra
from 2004. Subsequently, Kazuaki Tanahashi and Joan Halifax Roshi crafted a translation
employing contemporary phraseology, with the aim of making the text more accessible to
western readers and practitioners. Most notably, they substitute the word ‘boundlessness’ for
‘emptiness’, the common translation of the Sanskrit word śūnyatā, as ‘emptiness’ is a
notoriously difficult idea to grasp. I believe they have succeeded in contributing a translation
which, while not traditional in the literal sense, conveys the spirit and indeed, elucidates the
essence of the Heart Sūtra, and which may speak more forcefully for some (who have perhaps
not dedicated themselves to years to practice and study) than the more traditional translations.
Their translation follows below.
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The Sūtra on the Heart of Realizing Wisdom Beyond Wisdom
Avalokiteśvara, who helps all to awaken,
moves in the deep course of
realizing wisdom beyond wisdom,
sees that all five streams of
body, heart, and mind are without boundary,
and frees all from anguish.
O Śāriputra [who listens to the teachings of the Buddha],
form is not separate from boundlessness;
boundlessness is not separate from form.
Form is boundlessness; boundlessness is form.
Feelings, perceptions, inclinations, and discernment are also like this.
O Śāriputra,
boundlessness is the nature of all things.
It neither arises nor perishes,
neither stains nor purifies,
neither increases nor decreases.
Boundlessness is not limited by form,
nor by feelings, perceptions, inclinations, or discernment.
It is free of the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind;
free of sensory realms, including the realm of the mind.
It is free of ignorance and the end of ignorance.
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Boundlessness is free of old age and death,
and free of the end of old age and death.
It is free of suffering, arising, cessation, and path,
and free of wisdom and attainment.
Being free of attainment, those who help all to awaken
abide in the realization of wisdom beyond wisdom
and live with an unhindered mind.
Without hindrance, the mind has no fear.
Free from confusion, those who lead all to liberation
embody profound serenity.
All those in the past, present, and future,
who realize wisdom beyond wisdom,
manifest unsurpassable and thorough awakening.
Know that realizing wisdom beyond wisdom
is no other than this wondrous mantra,
luminous, unequalled, and supreme.
It relieves all suffering.
It is genuine, not illusory.
So set forth this mantra of realizing wisdom beyond wisdom.
Set forth this mantra that says:
GATÉ, GATÉ, PĀRAGATÉ, PĀRASAṂGATÉ, BODHI! SVAHA! (Tanahashi: 3-4)
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Trungpa offers an excellent explanation of this manta. He says:
One would have thought that…this mantra would say something about śūnyatā—
OM ŠŪNYATĀ MAHĀŚŪNYATĀ or something of the sort. Instead it says, GATE
GATE—“gone, gone, gone beyond, completely gone”. This is much stronger than

saying ‘śūnyatā’, because the word śūnyatā might imply a philosophical
interpretation. Instead of formulating something philosophical, this mantra exposes
that which lies beyond philosophy. Therefore it is GATE GATE—“gone, given up,
got rid of, opened”. The first GATE is “rid of the veil of conflicting emotions”. The
second GATE represents the veil of primitive beliefs about reality. That is, the first
GATE represents the idea that ‘form is empty’, and the second GATE refers to

‘emptiness is form’. Then the next word of the mantra is PĀRAGATE—‘gone
beyond, completely exposed’. Now form is form—PĀRAGATE—and it is not only
that form is form but emptiness is emptiness, PĀRASAṂGATE—‘completely gone
beyond’. BODHI. BODHI here means ‘completely awake’. The meaning is ‘given up,
completely unmasked, naked, completely open’. SVAHA is a traditional ending for
mantras, which means ‘So be it’. “Gone, gone, gone beyond, completely exposed,
awake, so be it”. (Trungpa 2003b: 147-8)
The benefit of studying the Heart Sūtra is a realization of the complete openness of our
natural mind which, when experienced in meditation, in the extremity of a mind-stopping event,
or within the clarity of simple non-conceptualized presence, can be described as empty-sublime.
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X.
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikās of Nāgārjuna

The Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, by the brilliant Indian scholar and philosopher,
Nāgārjuna, from ca. the second century CE, is the foundational text of the Madhyamaka school
of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the quintessential lucid exposition of śūnyatā, emptiness.
Nāgārjuna offers his view of emptiness by way of disputing, through negative dialectic, the idea
that phenomena have an essence, a kernel of independently existing self-identity. Nāgārjuna
explains this by force of the postulation of ‘two truths’. Garfield explains that “the ultimate truth
is that all phenomena are empty of essence. The conventional truth is the ordinary empirical truth
about the world. However, the distinction between the two truths is emphatically not an
appearance/reality distinction. They are two truths, not a truth and a falsehood” (Garfield &
Samten: xx). Nāgārjuna goes on to argue, importantly, that emptiness is “nothing but the fact that
phenomena are dependently arisen—that every entity depends for its existence on causes and
conditions, upon its parts, upon the wholes to which it belongs, and for its identity on nominal
and conceptual imputation and conventions” (ibid.). And if “phenomena are [merely] a tissue of
interdependent relations, they cannot be the clear-cut, isolated, really existing entities that they
seem to be” (Nāgārjuna 2016: xix). Because of, or due to this interdependence, no thing, no
phenomenon can be said to exist independently. Interdependence, which indicates the emptiness
of all phenomena; the two truths, relative and absolute; and the emptiness of emptiness are the
“central ontological principles” of Nāgārjuna’s negative dialectic arguments in the
Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (ibid.).
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Tibet’s most renowned Buddhist yogī195 and poet-saint, Milarepa (1052-1135), composed
a song elucidating Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, or Middle Way postulations, titled:

An Authentic Portrait of the Middle Way.
From the standpoint of the truth that’s genuine
There are no ghosts, there are not even buddhas,
No meditator and no meditated,
No paths and levels traveled and no signs,
And no fruition bodies and no wisdoms,
And therefore there is no nirvāṇa there,
Just designations using names and statements.
All animate, inanimate—the three realms,
Unborn and nonexistent from the outset,
No base to rest on, do not co-emerge,
There is no karmic act, no maturation,
So even the name ‘saṃsāra’ does not exist.
That’s the way these are in the final picture,
But oh, if sentient beings did not exist,
What would the buddhas of three times all come from?
Since fruition with no cause—impossible!
So the standpoint of the truth that’s superficial
Is saṃsāra’s wheel, nirvāṇa past all grief.
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It all exists, that is the Sage’s teaching.
Then what exists appearing to be things,
And their nonexistence, reality that’s empty,
Are essentially inseparable, one taste,
And therefore there is neither self-awareness
Nor awareness of what’s other anywhere.
All of this a union vast and spacious,
And all those skilled in realizing this
Do not see consciousness, they see pure wisdom,
Do not see sentient beings, they see buddhas,
Don’t see phenomena, they see their essence,
And out of this compassion just emerges
Retention, powers, fearlessness, and all
The qualities embodied by a buddha
Just come as if you had a wishing jewel—
This is what I, the yogī, have realized.196
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It should now be clear that neither the sublime, nor emptiness (śūnyatā), nor the emptysublime has anything to do with cloudless skies, raging seas, empty pages, or large canvases. Nor
does the sublime, or emptiness, have anything to do with the empty space within a pot, or even
the pot itself, regardless how beautiful or how masterfully it was made. The empty-sublime is not
vacancy, voidness, or the terror-evoking wrath of a Divine. The empty-sublime is complete
openness and lucid clarity. The empty-sublime is the freedom philosophers have sought for
millennia: the experience of the lucid clarity of our natural state of mind.
Whether one prefers the descriptive noun perfection, or astonishment, or inspiration, or
‘aha! moment’, or the sublime, these all point towards the remarkable and fleeting experience of
emptiness, or śūnyatā: when discursive mind stops, and we experience a boundless, nonconceptual, lucid openness. Or, in the language of philosophers, freedom.
There is very hopeful talk today of individuals and institutions committing to a new
social/moral contract of openness and inclusiveness throughout all levels and strata of society.
My hope is that this new contract will also be embraced by the western, mostly-white,
philosophical Academy, so that ideas such as ‘the sublime’ might benefit from a fresh look and a
courageous new engagement which dares to enter foreign territory, such as I have done in this
current project. Forging new and fresh hermeneutics from extraordinary philosophical projects
found outside the European or Anglo-American canon can, I believe, be applied profitably in
addressing the very pressing and immediate problems of this turbulent age. What the sublime
moment has to teach us is important. And life changing.
Looking at ourselves and the world through the lens of emptiness changes everything. And
heaven knows we have not a moment to spare to make dramatic, meaningful, deep, and lasting

299
societal changes around racial prejudices, historic exclusion and inequalities. Perhaps even more
pressing, we need to embrace the reality of our interdependent coörigination within this whole
world system we call home, which extends to and encompasses all life, all beings, the rocks and
the trees, the mountains, the rivers and the oceans. An understanding of emptiness is a
remarkable start. And then we need to dedicate this understanding of the empty-sublime, echoing
Pierre Hadot, to embodying a caring, respectful, and loving ‘way of life’.
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This is an empty page. Is it sublime?
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93

Tuck writes:
“Nineteenth-century idealists from Schopenhauer on viewed Indian thought as a response
to the problem of the relation between appearance and reality and found their own concerns
mirrored in Upaniṣadic, Vedāntin, and Mādhyamika writings. Accordingly, Nāgārjuna was
read as if he were a Platonic or, more usually, Kantian transcendentalist. In the first half of
the twentieth century, analytic and positivist philosophers characterized the Indian
philosophical spectrum as an assortment of rival claims about causal efficacy and logical
accuracy. In this context, Nāgārjuna was viewed as a logical analyst of competing
metaphysical and epistemological propositions. Subsequently, post empiricist postWittgensteinians have seen Nāgārjuna as an anti-philosopher, primarily concerned with
language use, conceptual holism, and the limits of philosophical discourse” (Tuck 1990: vvi).

This results in what Foucault would describe as an aphasiac rearranging of existing philosophical
concepts, thus failing to grasp the thing-as-it-is, and finally resulting in failed scholarship.
94

See Nāgārjuna/Padmakara Translation Committee, The Root Stanzas of the Middle Way, the Mūla-

madhyamakakārikās (2016). All quotations from the MMK are from this translation, unless otherwise
noted.
95

Candrakīrti (seventh-century CE) is considered by all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism to be the

preëminent commentator on Nāgārjuna’s Mūla-madhyamakakārikās. Candrakīrti produced two
commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s treatise, the Madhyamakavatara, or Introduction to the Middle Way, and
the longer Prasannapadā, or Lucid Words.
96

See: Candrakīrti/Mipham, Introduction to the Middle Way (2004).

97

Saṃsāra: “birth-death cycle; afflicted existence; everyday life seen as the antipode of nirvāṇa” (Sprung

1979: 277). Khenchen Palden Sherab describes saṃsāra as the twelve links of interdependence: “Because
this exists, then that arises. Because this arose, then that arises. Conditioned by ignorance, there are
formations. Conditioned by formations, there is consciousness. Conditioned by consciousness, there are
name and form. Conditioned by name and form, there are the six sense sources. Conditioned by the six
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sense sources, there is contact. Conditioned by contact, there is feeling. Conditioned by feeling, there is
longing. Conditioned by longing, there is grasping. Conditioned by grasping, there is becoming.
Conditioned by becoming, there is birth. Conditioned by birth, then aging, death, anguish, lamentation,
suffering, misery, and distress arise”. (Palden Sherab: 46-7). This afflicted birth-to-death-to-birth cycle
can be purified, and when purified is known as nirvāṇa.
98

Nirvāṇa: “According to the buddhadharma, theistic and mystical experiences of all kinds still fall

within saṁsāra, as long as they confirm the experiencer or solidify his [or her] experience, even in the
most subtle way. Buddhist norms of experience are: universal impermanence; existence as suffering;
egolessness; and peace as absence of struggle to attain or maintain anything.
“According to the [Theravāda] tradition, enlightenment [nirvāṇa] means the cessation of
ignorance and of conflicting emotions, and therefore freedom from the compulsive rebirth in saṃsāra. Its
degrees of attainment were graded by the four levels: stream enterer (Skt. srotāpanna), once-returners
(sakṛdāgāmin), non-returner (anāgāmin), and arhat.
“According to the Mahāyāna tradition, [Theravāda] nirvāṇa is a way station, like an illusory city
in the desert created by the Buddha to encourage travelers. Enlightenment requires not only cessation of
ignorance but also compassion and skillful means to work with the bewilderment of all sentient beings.
The arhat does not attain complete enlightenment because of this underdeveloped compassion.
“According to Vajrāyāna tradition, [Theravāda] and Mahāyāna attainment are necessary, but they
contain dogma. It is necessary for the yogin [or yoginī] to develop complete partnership with the
phenomenal world and to experience a more penetrating unmasking of the root of ego. In presenting the
final fruition, the Vajrāyāna teaches either four or six tantric yānas. The term nirvāṇa can have the utmost
positive sense when referring to enlightenment; or it can have a limiting or pejorative sense when
referring to a limited goal of cessation” (Trungpa 1980:347-8).
99

See: Gyamtso (2003), p. 164, for this translation.

100

See Trungpa, Chögyam, The Path of Individual Liberation, pp. 382-400.

101

Batchelor’s reference to Śākyamuni Buddha’s monsoon meditation practice as brahmāvihāra is

another remarkable re-interpretation of long-established foundational Buddhist philosophy. The Four
Brahmāvihāras are methods used at the foundational level of Buddhist practice to “awaken our basic
enlightened genes”, according to Trungpa, who further explains that “Brahmā is the ultimate god in the
Hindu tradition, and vihāra means ‘dwelling place’; so brahmāvihāra means ‘the dwelling place of
Brahmā’ ”. Trungpa continues: “The four brahmāvihāras [love, compassion, joy, and equanimity] are at
the level of ordinary decency and good manners. Love or gentleness to oneself; compassion or gentleness
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to others; joy; and equanimity or equilibrium are all designed to thaw out the ego by a natural process,
rather than by a fight. They are practiced by non-theistic Buddhists, who don’t believe in ego, as well as
by theists. [‘Theist’ here means maintaining an attitude of self-preservation, as opposed to an attitude, or
aspiration, of giving up the self.] By working with the four brahmāvihāras, you are keeping the world in
good order and trying to be a good person. In order to wake up your enlightened genes, you have to
develop decency. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to awaken that psychological inheritance of
softness, brightness, and goodness” (Trungpa 2014:72-3).
102

Oxford English Dictionary, digital edition. www.oed.com. accessed 15 June 2020.

103

Heidegger writes in “What is Metaphysics”: “Because the truth of metaphysics dwells in this

groundless ground it stands in closest proximity to the constantly lurking possibility of deepest error”
(Heidegger 2008: 109-110, my emphasis).
104

Heidegger’s last sentence in his essay, “What is Metaphysics”, reads, in part: “…the basic question of

metaphysics which the nothing itself compels: Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?”
(Heidegger 2008: 110).
105

Creature: i.e., that which is created; implying a creator and His/Her creations. This is a very curious

word choice, if not an expression of a point of view, for a self-described ‘agnostic Buddhist’ (whatever
that may be), as there is neither ‘Creator’ nor ‘creation’ in Buddhist thought or philosophy.
106

Prajñā: “…is the natural sharpness of awareness that sees, discriminates, and also sees through

conceptual discrimination…prajñāpāramitā [the perfection of prajñā, or transcendent knowledge] is the
awareness that the whole of reality is without origination or basis. It sees through any solid existence as
well as through any nihilistic interpretation of reality. Even the duality between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is
transcended, and therefore, prajñā gives birth to more active and energetic upāya (seventh pāramitā)”
(Trungpa 1980:361).
107

Upāya: or, skillful means. “The active masculine principle on the feminine ground of prajñā. It is not

based purely on ego-inclined common sense. If one relates to open space, then his [or her] way of
perceiving the display of apparent phenomena is colorful and inspiring, so that [s]he doesn’t hesitate to
deal with the situation. [S]he simply sees the open situation, the way of unconditioned appropriate
response to the nowness” (Trungpa 2003a:480).
108

See Conze (2002), p. 7.

109

Morton also states, in ¶29, that Candrakīrti was a student of Nāgārjuna. This is impossible. While

Nāgārjuna’s dates are imprecise, he is generally believed to have produced the MMK in the second
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century CE. Candrakīrti, the author of the Madhyamakavatāra, however, “lived approximately five
centuries after Nāgārjuna” (Candrakīrti/Mipham 4).
110

See Phuntsho (2005), pp. 231-2, for an exhaustive listing of texts, beginning with those of the early

Pali, which deal with emptiness, including the extensive Prajñāpāramitāsūtras literature.
111

Written by: George & Ira Gershwin, and Du Bose Hayward (1934).

112

See: James Porter, Sublimity Without Longinus (2017).

113

Boileau’s 1674 translation: Le Traité du Sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours. Traduit du grec

de Longin, was preceded by an earlier French translation, dated 1644, by an anonymous translator at the
court of Louis XVI, “De la sublimité du discours”. See: (Costelloe: 4).
114

See: Ashfield and de Bolla’s The Sublime: a reader in British eighteenth-century aesthetic theory

(1996), Monk’s The Sublime (1935, 1960), and Shaw’s The Sublime (2017), for comprehensive overviews
of aesthetics and the sublime, from the eighteenth-century to the present. Doran’s The Theory of the
Sublime from Longinus to Kant (2015) is indispensable for an understanding of the sublime up through
Kant.
115

See: José Luís Borges, “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins” (1942).

116

The Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge, or, Emporia celestial de conocimientos benévolos,

a taxonomy of animals cited by Borges in his essay of 1942, cited above.
117

Thanks to Andrew Cole for noting this passage, from chapter 74 of Melville’s Moby-Dick, in his The

Birth of Theory (2014).
118

John Dennis, from The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (1704), in: Ashfield, Andrew, and Peter de

Bolla, Eds., The Sublime: A Reader in British Eighteenth-century Aesthetic Theory (1998), pp. 35-39. As
Robert Doran writes: “The principal aim of these works [viz., Dennis’ work of 1704, and his earlier The
Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry from 1701] is to show how modern poetry can, with the
aid of Christian revelation, equal and even excel that of the ancients” (Doran: 127).
119

See: Koch, Christof, The Feelings of Life Itself: Why Consciousness Is Widespread But Can’t Be

Computed (2019).
120

Khenchen Thrangu explains that the early teachings of Buddha “enumerated six different kinds of

consciousness. First, there are five consciousnesses associated with the five physical sensory organs: the
visual consciousness of the eye, the auditory consciousness of the ear, the olfactory consciousness of the
nose, the gustatory consciousness of the tongue, and the tactile consciousness of the body. […] The sixth
consciousness is the mental consciousness, which engages with the perceptions of the five sensory
consciousnesses[, and] is defined as a conceptual consciousness. It is the mental consciousness that
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defines a visual perception, for example, as being good or bad, large or small, and so forth. So first, an
object is perceived by the eye and apprehended by the visual consciousness. This then passes on to the
mental consciousness, which then conceptualizes, ‘This is good’, or ‘This is big’. This categorization goes
on, of course, for the perceptions of the other four sensory consciousnesses. …the[se] first six
consciousnesses are classed as ‘temporary, but vivid’ ” (Thrangu 2013: 3-4).
The later, Yogācāra teachings of Asaṅga and Vasubhandu add a seventh consciousness, kliṣṭamanas, or
the consciousness of afflicted mentation (afflicted by the 51 saṃskāras, or various and varied mental
formations, and the five central adventitious stains: desire, aversion, deludedness, pride, and jealousy),
and an eighth consciousness, the ālaya-vijñāna, often referred to as the storehouse or matrix for all seeds
or latent tendencies. Brunnhölzl writes: “The predominant explanations [of the ālaya-vijñāna, or ālayaconsciousness] are 1) that the ālaya-consciousness sticks in, or adheres to, the body; 2) that it adheres to
phenomena as their cause (and phenomena to it as its result); and 3) that sentient beings cling to it as their
self” (Brunnhölzl 2018: 62).
121

Koch quotes from Saint Augustine of Hippo, City of God (426 CE), Book 11, chapter 26: “But,

without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know
and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians,
who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am (si enim fallor, sum). For he who is not,
cannot be deceived, and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how
am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am if I am deceived.”
This is extraordinarily and fallaciously circular logic.
122

Saṃskāras: “There are innumerable mental factors (Tib. sems byung) or events concomitant with the

consciousness (the main mind), which can be gathered, according to Asaṅga, in fifty-one principal ones.”
The ‘main mind’ is a “technical term of Buddhist epistemology, referring to the consciousness that detects
globally the presence of an object, while the different types of mental factors [saṃskāras] apprehend and
react to particular aspects of that object (Candrakīrti/Mipham: 388). Also, see: Lusthaus (2003), p. 53.
The fifty-one mental factors, which are further divided into six categories, are:
1) Five Omnipresent Mental Factors (sarvatraga, kun ‘gro):
feeling; discernment; intention; contact; mental engagements.
2) Five Determining Mental Factors (viniyata, yup la byed pa):
aspiration; belief; recollection; stabilization (samadhi); superior knowledge (prajñā).
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3) Eleven Virtuous Mental Factores (kushula, dge ba):
faith; shame; embarrassment; detachment; non-hatred; non-bewilderment; joyous effort;
suppleness; conscientiousness; equanimity; non-harmfulness.
4) Six Root Afflictions (mulaklesha, rtsa nyon):
desire; anger; pride; ignorance; doubt; afflicted view.
5) Twenty Secondary Afflictions (upaklesha, nye nyon):
wrath; resentment; concealment; spite; jealousy; avarice; deceit; dishonesty; self-importance;
harmfulness; non-shame; non-embarrassment; lethargy; agitation; non-faith; laziness; nonconsciousness; forgetfulness; distraction; non-introspection.
6) Four Changeable Mental Factors (aniyata, gzhan ‘gyur):
contrition; sleep; examination; analysis.
See: Thrangu, Transcending Ego: Distinguishing Consciousness from Wisdom, A Treatise of the Third
Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje (2013), pp. 79-80.
123

See: Turing, A., “Computing machinery and intelligence”, Mind, 59 (1950), pp. 433-460. As further

explanation, “a Turing machine [first described by Alan Turing in 1936-7] then, or a computing machine
as Turing called it, in Turing’s original definition is a machine capable of a finite set of configurations…
The machine is an automatic machine (a-machine) which means that at any given moment, the behavior
of the machine is completely determined by the current state and symbol (called the configuration) being
scanned. […]” (Liesbeth De Mol, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, posted 24 September 2018).
124

“Mahamudra Aspiration”, Karmapa Rangjung Dorje, Nālandā Translation Committee, 2002. see:

<www.shambhala.org/ntc>; also Thrangu, The Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorje’s Aspirational Prayer for
Mahāmudrā (2001), p. 42.
125

As Caygill puts it in The Kant Dictionary: “…transcendental illusion arises from the 'fundamental

rules and maxims for the employment of our reason' having 'the appearance of being objective
principles’” (CPR A 297/B 353). Caygill (1995) p. 158.
126

Kant writes in the Critique of Pure Reason:
We have not, indeed, been able to prove that sensible intuition is the only possible intuition,
but only that it is so for us. But neither have we been able to prove that another kind of
intuition is possible. Consequently, although our thought can abstract from all sensibility,
it is still an open question whether the notion of a noumenon be not a mere form of a
concept, and whether, when this separation has been made, any object whatsoever is left.
(Candrakīrti: 356 fn 21) (CPR A, 252)
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127

Prajñā vs. jñāna. The distinction is often confusing. For instance, Lusthaus (2003), writing from the

Yogācāra, or Cittamātra, view, maintains that the “Realization of vijñapti-mātra exposes this trick
intrinsic to consciousness’s workings [i.e., our incapability of “distinguishing our mental constructions
and interpretations of the world from the world itself”… this is to say, that even though “what we cognize
is occurring within our act of cognition, we cognize it as if it were external to our consciousness”],
catching it in the act, so to speak, thereby eliminating it. When that deception is removed, one’s mode of
cognition is no longer termed vijñāna (consciousness); it has become direct cognition (jñāna)” (538).
Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso (1986), however, writes that “From the Shentong[-Madhyamaka] point of
view, the luminous self-aware non-conceptual mind that is experienced in meditation, when the mind is
completely free from concepts, is Absolute Reality, and not a vijñāna; vijñāna is always saṃvṛti from the
Shentong point of view and is not what is found by the supreme wisdom (prajñā) that sees Absolute
Reality. When the luminous, self aware, non-conceptual mind that is the Wisdom Mind (jñāna) is realized
by the supreme wisdom (prajñā) there is no seeing and seen aspect, no realizing and realized aspect to the
realization. This is called the Transcendence of Supreme Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā). It is none other than
the non-conceptual Wisdom Mind (Jñāna) itself. It is also called the non-dual Wisdom Mind (Jñāna), the
Clear Light Nature of Mind (prabhāsvara) and Dhātu (spacious expanse or element). Elsewhere it is
called Dhātu and awareness inseparable, clarity and emptiness inseparable, bliss and emptiness
inseparable. It is also called the Dharmatā and the Tathāgatagarbha” (77-78).
So it seems to me that Gyamtso is saying that it is prajñā, the supreme wisdom, ‘that’ realizes jñāna, the
Wisdom Mind.
128

See T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (1968), pp. 213, 297-301.

129

It is thought that Śāntideva was active during the first half of the eighth-century CE. see: Mipham

2017: 58.
130

The first edition of The Gay Science was published in 1882. An expanded edition with a new preface, a

fifth book, and an appendix of poems was published in 1887. My reference is to the 1887 edition.
131

Prajñā is “the natural sharpness of awareness that sees, discriminates, and also sees through

conceptual discrimination. ‘Lower prajñā’ includes any sort of worldly knowledge (e.g., how to run a
business, how to cook a meal). ‘Higher prajñā’ includes two stages: seeing phenomena as impermanent,
egoless, and suffering; and a higher prajñā that sees śūnyatā—a direct knowledge of things as they are”
(Trungpa 1980: 361).
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132

Duḥkha: “the unenlightened state, unregenerate existence coterminous with primal ignorance (avidyā)

and the everyday (saṁvṛti); afflicted existence in contrast to nirvāṇa” (Sprung: 270).
Trungpa adds: “Duḥkha could also be translated as ‘misery’, ‘restlessness’, or ‘uneasiness’. It is
‘frustration’. The Tibetan word for ‘suffering’ is dug-ngal. Dug means ‘reduced into a lower level’—
‘wretchedness’ may be the closest English word—and ngal means ‘perpetuating’; so dug-ngal has the
sense of perpetuating that wretchedness. The quality of dug-ngal is that you have done a bad job already,
and you are thriving on it and perpetuating it. It is like sticking your finger in your wound. […] that is not
a very intelligent thing to do” (Trungpa 2014: 383).
133

See: Conze, The Large Sūtra of Perfect Wisdom, p. 76.

134

When viewed in the Kantian sense, ‘transcendent’, as Caygill explains, “is the term used to describe

those principles which 'profess to pass beyond' the limits of experience, as opposed to immanent
principles ‘whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience’ (CPR A 296/B
352). Transcendent principles ‘which recognise no limits’ are to be distinguished from the transcendental
employment of immanent principles beyond their proper limits. Such principles include the
psychological, cosmological and theological ideas discussed in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ ” (Caygill:
399).
135

See: Thrangu (2013), Trungpa (2014), and Brunnhölzl (2018).

136

Rauschenberg said, in conversation with Dorothy Miller, “painting relates to both art and life. Neither

can be made. (I try to act in that gap between the two)” (Miller: 58).
137

From: Newman, “the sublime is now”, p. 52.

138

From Gottlieb, Rothko, with Newman, “Statement”, in Harrison & Wood, Art in Theory 1900-2000

(2015) p. 569.
139

Most famously the British Romantic painter, printmaker, and watercolorist, J.M.W. Turner (1775-

1851); and his contemporary, the German Romantic painter, Caspar David Friedrich (1774-1840).
140

(Co-authored by Adolph Gottlieb, with Barnett Newman), simply titled “Statement”, in response to a

critical review in The New York Times in June, 1943, by Edward Alden Jewell, about their work on
exhibition at the Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors, in New York; the “Statement” functioned
as a manifesto for the raison d’être of the work these avant-garde artists were producing.
141

Newman’s essay appeared thirteen years after the publication of Samuel Monk’s seminal work on the

sublime, The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England (1935). Monk’s monograph
was the first work on the sublime to appear in the twentieth century.
142

See: Newman, “The Sublime is Now”, in Harrison & Wood, Art in Theory 1900-2000 (2015), p. 580.
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143

The field of ornithology, and not Pre-Columbian Art, figured largely in Newman’s formal

undergraduate studies (see Jeremy Stick, The Early Work of Barnett Newman: Painting and Drawings
1944-1949).
144

The exhibition ran from September 15-October 19, 1946. See: Temkin (2002).

145

Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1950-51), oil on canvas, measured 242.2 cm x 541.7 cm. The Latin title may be

translated as: “Man, heroic and sublime”.
146

See: Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and

the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun (2002), (p vii).
147

And which Husserl ‘bracketed’, and suspended from consideration or judgment (epochē), but which

Heidegger argues is incoherent (i.e., Husserl’s bracketing) by virtue of the seemingly obvious fact that we
are not subjects isolated from phenomena and our world, but, as Dasein, live with and in it. Husserl
wants to bracket all subjective conceptual framing, which leaves us…where? In emptiness. If you look at
a pot, for example, and take away all conceptual thought, where does that leave you? It challenges your
phenomenological experience to be empty (śūnya), not full of conceptual conceits.
148

Which are comprised of our five sense consciousnesses plus the mind consciousness, which then make

for our six consciousnesses.
149

See: Lanchner (2009) p. 17.

150

See Tomkins, p. 59.

151

Kay Larson, in Where The Heart Beats (2012), writes that the poem was hung on a wall of the gallery;

while Kristine Stiles, in her exhibition catalog from 2014, Rauschenberg: Looking Long and Thinking
Hard, asserts that Cage passed out the poem, in the form of a leaflet, at the door of the gallery.
152

Stiles, professor of Art, Art History & Visual Studies at Duke University, curated an exhibition at the

University’s Nasher Museum of Art, inaugurated in late 2014, with an accompanying catalogue:
Rauschenberg: Looking Long and Thinking Hard.
153

Albers was at Black Mountain from 1933 until 1949 (see: Tomkins, Off The Wall: A Portrait of Robert

Rauschenberg (2005)).
154

See: Tomkins, Off The Wall: A Portrait of Robert Rauschenberg (2005), pp. 27, 29.

155

This work has been lost; the only documentation which exists is a black and white photograph by

Aaron Siskind. The coloration of the elements and forms in the work is uncertain. (see: Hopps, p. 44)
156

See: Tomkins, Off The Wall: A Portrait of Robert Rauschenberg (2005), p. 47.

157

See: Hopps (1991), pp. 48-54.

158

See: Hopps, p. 76.
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159

See: Tomkins p. 59; Tomkins dates the work from 1951. However, in Lanchner’s brief survey for the

Museum of Modern Art, she dates “Automobile Tire Print” from 1953 (see: Lanchner, Carolyn, Robert
Rauschenberg (2009).
160

The first, true ‘Combines’, from the middle of 1954, Untitled (with shelf and illuminated colored

glass), and Collection, are “infused with essentially the same red palette of the more abstract Red
Paintings” (Hobbs 214).
161

See: Hopps, p. 165).

162

See: (Clare Farrow, pp. 22-23).

163

See Klaus Ottmann (2000).

164

Laib created a huge Pollen Field for an exhibition at New York’s Museum of Modern Art in 2013.

This extraordinary Field was made entirely of Hazelnut pollen, covering an area of ~550 cm x ~640 cm,
and was named simply Pollen from Hazelnut.
165

See: Jason M. Wirth, Schelling’s Practice of the Wild (2015). Also see: Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and

subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche (2014).
166

The terms ‘spiritual’ and ‘spirituality’ are often misunderstood. Chögyam Trungpa explains:
spirituality refers to a sense of personal experience connected with basic sanity. When you
begin to turn away from basic sanity, spirituality becomes materialistic, and one begins to turn
away from their own power and wisdom. Spirituality has nothing to do with believing in
spirits, or ghosts, so it has nothing to do with spiritualists or mediums. It’s not about the spirits
of your ancestors coming back to tell you what to do. And of course it has nothing to do with
alcohol, or that sense of spirits. Here, the term spirit is like the spirit of the morning, or the
spirit of watching the sun rise, the spirit of a journey. This kind of spirit is based on the idea
of delight and joy and heroism. Here, spirituality is based on picking up on something that is
inherently yours. You are about to give birth to it. It is that kind of spirit. (Chögyam Trungpa,
The Enlightenment of the Buddha, Talk One, an unpublished seminar at Karmê Chöling,
Vermont, 1975.)

167

See: Brenton Good, “Still Points:The Quiet Spaces of Wolfgang Laib”.

168

Ziggurat : (among the ancient Babylonians and Assyrians) a temple of Sumerian origin in the form of a

pyramidal tower, consisting of a number of stories and having about the outside a broad ascent winding
around the structure, presenting the appearance of a series of terraces. (Random House Compact
Unabridged Dictionary, 1996.)
169

Martin, Agnes, Writings / Schriften (1998), p. 15.
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170

See: Princenthal (2015).

171

See, for instance, Rothko’s The Artist’s Reality: Philosophies of Art, written ca. 1940-41, and

published posthumously in 2004. There is no entry in the Index for ‘sublime’.
172

Andre’s tile patterns arranged on the floor of an exhibition space include 144 Lead Square, 1969, and

Twenty-fifth Steel Cardinal, 1974.
173

Chögyam Trungpa explains that “spirituality refers to a sense of personal experience connected with

basic sanity. Here, the term ‘spirit’ is like the spirit of the morning, or the spirit of watching the sun rise,
the spirit of a journey. This kind of spirit is based on the idea of delight and joy and heroism. Here,
spirituality is based on picking up on something that is inherently yours. You are about to give birth to it.
It is that kind of spirit”. (from The Enlightenment of the Buddha, Talk One, an unpublished seminar at
Karma Chöling, Vermont, 1975.)
174

See Princenthal’s Agnes Martin: Her Life and Art (2015).

175

See the New Oxford American English Dictionary (2001).

176

See: Hisamatsu, Zen and the Fine Arts (1982), p 25.

177

See: The Book of Genesis 5:1.

178

See: Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (1979).

179

See: Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting (1987).

180

See: Paul de Man, “Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant”, in G. Schapiro and A. Sica, Eds.,

Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects (1984).
181

See: Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984); and, Lessons

on the Analytic of the Sublime (1994).
182

See: Kant, I., Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (2008), §23, ¶246, p. 76.

183

See: Jaspers, Karl, Kant (1962), p. 4.

184

See: Kant, CJ, §23, ¶245, p. 76.

185

See: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51:4 (Fall 1993), pp. 541-550.

186

See: Trungpa, Chögyam, The Bodhisattva Path of Wisdom & Compassion (2014), p. 139.

187

The Heart Sūtra is first known through its earliest Chinese translation, by Chih-ch’ien, in ca. 200-250

CE (see Red Pine 2004:20).
188

Śamatha, (Tib. zhi gnas), ‘calm abiding’, and vipaśyanā, (Tib. lhag mthong), ‘vivid insight’, are

foundational and sequential meditation practices and stages within the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition.
Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso defines them as follows: “Calm abiding’ means that all movements of the
mind towards the outside are totally appeased or stilled and one abides one-pointedly focused on the
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virtuous or authentic object [of meditation, such as an image of the Buddha]. ‘Vivid insight’ means that
within this state of calm abiding, or in other words, while the mind is free from thought, the authentic
object is truly and individually discerned or analyzed. On the level of an ordinary being these two aspects
of meditation are developed. This is not yet qualified special insight (Tib. lhag thong mtshan nyid pa),
which in the Mahāyāna tradition is defined as direct realization of emptiness. With this realization,
qualified special insight arises in one’s own stream of being” (Gyamtso 2000:370).
189

See fn. 10 above.

190

A dhāraṇī is “an incantation with mnemonic value as well as spiritual potency” (Red Pine 2004:170).

191

See: Conze, Edward, Trans., Perfection of Wisdom: The Short Prajñāpāramitā Tests (2002).

192

Dharmas: “Derived from the root dhri, meaning ‘to grasp’, this word refers to anything held to be real:

an object, an event, a teaching, a code. For students of the Abhidharma, it referred to such basic entities of
the mind as the Five Skandhas [or the aspects into which early Buddhists analyzed our experiential
world—form, sensation, perception, memory, and consciousness—and which formed the basis for the
subsequent development of the Abhidharma]. When capitalized, it refers to the teaching of a buddha”
(Red Pine 2004:170, 172).
193

This is referred to, in the Mahāyāna project, as the ‘threefold purity’. “The three purities are the non-

existence of the actor, the action, and the object of the action. That is, there is no ‘you’ as actor, there is
no action, and there is no one to be acted upon” (Trungpa 2013:93). Lest this postulation is thought to be
merely a theoretical one, Trungpa explains that “Threefold purity is immediate on the spot, simultaneous.
It is not a practice, but an experience that arises as a result of practice. Throughout the Mahāyāna, all
practices are based on threefold purity. Therefore, actions come only from warmth and openness” (93).
194

See fn. 11.

195

A ‘yogī’ “is ‘one who arrives at naturalness’. A practitioner who has directly realized the true nature

of reality…” (Gyamtso 2003:215).
196

From: Gyamtso, The Sun of Wisdom: Teachings on the Noble Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of

the Middle Way (2003), pp. 205-06.
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